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There is a puzzle about what Aristotle means when (e.g. at Pol. 1.13) he attributes virtue 
of character to deliberatively imperfect persons like slaves, women, and children.  This is 
because his official ethical works (EN, EE) seem to insist that virtue requires the 
deliberative excellence of practical wisdom (phronêsis). If slaves, women, and children 
don’t have the virtue that Aristotle develops at length in the ethical works, then what 
exactly is the “virtue” that he ascribes to them?   
I argue that the virtue of slaves, women, and children, while not amounting to 
virtue strictly-speaking, approximates such virtue in the following way (chapter 1).  Start 
with the uncontroversial idea that virtue strictly-speaking, as a mode of rational 
excellence, essentially involves not only the excellence of an agent’s (strictly) rational or 
deliberative part, but also the excellence of her non-rational part—her alogon or 
emotional part—qua that part’s ability to “follow” or “be persuaded by” reason. Now, 
while slaves, women, and children lack perfect deliberative faculties and so cannot have 
the deliberative excellence required for virtue strictly-speaking, they can at the very least 
have non-rational parts that follow reason in a way, and so can have virtue that 
approximates virtue strictly-speaking.   
Such obedience of the alogon consists, I argue, in the alogon attaching to fine 
objects qua fine (chapter 2).  To support this claim, I look at what Aristotle says about 
 following reason. I then examine the motivational and evaluative capacities of non-
rational desire and argue that appetite (epithumia) and spirited desire (thumos) can, if 
habituated properly, be motivated by considerations of the fine (kalon) as such (chapters 
3 & 4). 
Granting that slaves, women, and children can have non-rational desires for fine 
action as such, can they decide on (prohairesthai) fine action? To answer this question, I 
argue for an account of decision whereby it essentially arises out of reflective 
deliberation about the constituents of happiness (chapters 5 &6). Because women can, but 
slaves and women cannot, engage in such deliberation, only women are capable of 
deciding on virtuous actions. The virtues of slaves and children do not include prohairetic 
motivation (chapter 7).  
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CH 1 
THE VIRTUES OF WOMEN, SLAVES, AND CHILDREN AS APPROXIMATIONS 
OF PARADIGMATIC VIRTUE 
 
 
I. Introduction 
 
In Politics 1.13 Aristotle asks whether natural slaves,1 women, and young people can 
participate in the same kind of virtue of character as adult male citizens do. He decides 
that while they can participate in a type of virtue of character, they do not participate in 
the same virtue as adult male citizens.  
We must suppose that all [slaves, women, and children] necessarily partake of the 
virtues of character, but not in the same way: rather, in such measure as is proper 
to each in relation to his own function (hoson hekastôi pros to hautou ergon).   
Hence the ruler must possess virtue of character in completeness (telean) (for any 
work, taken absolutely, belongs to the master-craftsman, and reason is a master-
craftsman  (architektonos)); while each of the others must have that share of this 
virtue which is appropriate to them (hoson epiballei autois). (Pol. 1.13 1260a14-
17) 
 
When Aristotle attributes virtue of character to slaves, women, and children, he cannot be 
attributing to them the virtue of character he discusses in his ethical works (call this latter 
virtue “paradigmatic virtue”). For paradigmatic virtue requires the deliberative excellence 
                                                
1 Aristotle distinguishes between legal slaves and natural slaves. Natural slaves are people whose natural 
constitutions make them disadvantaged, and disadvantaged in a way that actually makes it advantageous for 
them to be ruled and owned by another. This inferior natural constitution consists in having a deficient 
reasoning capacity, a deficiency that, in Aristotle’s view, is found in non-Greeks: “Hence, as the poets say, 
‘It is proper that Greeks should rule non-Greeks,’ on the assumption that non-Greek and slave are by nature 
identical” (Pol. 1.2 1252b4-1252b8). Aristotle also defines a natural slave as anyone “who, though human, 
belongs by nature not to himself by to another,” explaining that “a human being belongs to another if, in 
spite of being human, he is a possession; and a possession is a tool for action and has a separate existence” 
(Pol. 1.5 1254a13-18). He provides further characterizations of natural slaves at Pol. 1.5 1254b22-3 and 
1.13 1260a12. 
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of practical wisdom (phronêsis) (EN 6.13 1144b30-2), and Aristotle suggests later in Pol. 
1.13 that slaves, women, and children, being deliberatively deficient,2 lack practical 
wisdom. This raises the following question:  if the virtues of slaves, women, and children 
are not instances of paradigmatic virtue, what are the natures of these virtues?  What sorts 
of ethical capacities do slaves, women, and children have, according to Aristotle? 
For example, we might ask about the kind of motivational attitudes involved in 
slaves’, women’s, and children’s virtues, and in particular about how these attitudes 
compare with those of the paradigmatically virtuous person. The latter, Aristotle tells us, 
has both non-rational and rational motivation prompting her to act virtuously; that is, in 
addition to having appetitive desires (epithumia)3 and spirited desires (thumos)4 that 
prompt her to act virtuously, she decides (prohairesthai) 5 on virtuous activity.  
A related question concerns the values or ends for the sake of which virtuous 
slaves, women, and children perform virtuous actions. Do slaves, women, and children, 
like the paradigmatically virtuous person,6 do virtuous actions for the sake of the fine 
(kalon)?  Or are they like the slavishly virtuous people of the Phaedo7 who live orderly 
lives not because they value virtuous activity for its own sake but because they want to 
maximize their self-interest (which they narrowly conceive as pleasure) over a lifetime?  
Determining these specifics about the ethical capacities of slaves, women, and 
                                                
2 “Although the parts of the soul are present in all [i.e., slaves, women, and children] (kai pasin 
enhuparchei men ta moria tês psuchês), they are present in different ways. For the slave lacks the 
deliberative faculty (bouleutikon) entirely (holôs). The woman has it, but it is without authority (akuron). A 
child (pais) has it, but it is incomplete (ateles)” (Pol. 1.13 1260a10-14). 
3 For passages suggesting that the virtuous person’s appetites prompt her to pursue virtuous action, see EN 
2.3 1104b5-7 and EN 3.12 1119b15-6.   
4 For a passage where Aristotle says that spirited desire prompts the virtuous agent to pursue virtuous 
action, see EN 3.8 1116b32-1117a5. 
5 EN 2.4 1105a30-1105b1.  
6 The virtuous person acts “because it is fine” (hoti kalon, 1116a11, b3, 1117b9, MM 1191a20) and “for the 
sake of the fine” (tou kalou heneka 1115b12-3, 23, 1116b31, 1117a8) (Cf. dia to kalon 1120a24-8, 1122b6-
7, 1123a24-5, EE 1230a27-33, 1248b36-7, MM 1190a28-34, 1191a23-4, b15). 
7 Phaedo 68c-69c.  
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children is important for two reasons. For starters, we might just want to know what 
Aristotle thinks about the ethical capacities of people who made up more than half the 
population8 and played important roles in the polis.9  More importantly, however, if we 
can show that Aristotle has a satisfactory account of non-paradigmatic virtue, then the 
ethical works’ account of paradigmatic virtue may turn out to be less objectionable than it 
otherwise might be. For one might reasonably interpret paradigmatic virtue as requiring 
rather sophisticated intellectual capacities10—a grasp of philosophical ethics, for 
example—and this might make the account seem unrealistic: any account of virtue 
simpliciter that requires the virtuous agent to be something like a moral philosopher is, so 
one might think, implausible and unattractive.11 If, however, Aristotle’s ethical theory 
and moral psychology have room for a type of virtue of character that is available to 
deliberatively imperfect persons, the demanding account of paradigmatic virtue is 
rendered less objectionable.   
We have good reasons, then, to try to get a handle on the nature of slaves’, 
                                                
8 At Pol. 1.13 1260b13-21 Aristotle explicitly notes that together women and children make up more than 
half the population and on this basis urges that women and children receive appropriate education.     
9 Slaves were responsible for the polis’ labor needs; women for the preservation of household goods; and 
young people (if they were boys) were trained to eventually be legislators and (if they were girls) to work 
within the home.  
10 I defend this interpretation of paradigmatic virtue in chapters 5 and 6.  
11 This is Sarah Broadie’s complaint against interpretations of paradigmatic virtue that make philosophical 
reflection about the good a pre-requisite for virtue.  In her opinion, it unrealistic to require the virtuous 
person to have a blueprint of the good that is arrived at by philosophical reflection (a “Grand End”): 
“[A]ristotle would be the last to deny that philosophical ethics must be rooted in such reflection.  
But if we take account of experience, we must recognize that in so doing we recall particular 
practical responses, our own and others’, which seem and have seemed to us right; and we bring to 
mind the kinds of personalities which those responses represent.  Some of them seem to exemplify 
what, speaking unguardedly, we should be happy to term ‘practical wisdom’.  Are we now to 
withhold, any more than before, the predicate ‘wise’ until we have made sure that the subjects 
possessed an explicitly pictured Grand End?  And if we do now withhold it for the sake of a 
theory, does not our same moral experience show that practical wisdom defined now according to 
the theory is not a necessary condition for good decisions and virtuous actions?  But if that is so, 
practical wisdom as defined is not to be considered an essentially practical virtue (and if not 
practical, why a virtue at all?), since it would appear that we can function well in practice without 
it” (Broadie, 201).  
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women’s, and children’s virtues. But if we cannot straightforwardly identify their virtues 
with the paradigmatic virtue of the ethical works, how do we go about identifying the 
evaluative and motivational attitudes that characterize their virtues?  
In the remainder of the chapter, I present a methodology for approaching slaves’, 
women’s, and children’s virtues. First, I argue that when Aristotle attributes virtue of 
character to slaves, women, and children, we should interpret him as attributing to them 
approximations of paradigmatic virtue, where these approximations are based on the way 
in which these parties approximate the excellent rational activity that constitutes 
paradigmatic virtue. I then argue that we can determine what sorts of motivational 
attitudes their virtue includes if we determine (1) the psychological phenomena involved 
in motivational attitudes like decision, and (2) the psychological capacities of slaves, 
women, and children.   (1) and (2) will set the agenda for the rest of the dissertation. 
  
II. Pol. 1.13 in Outline 
 
We should begin by examining in greater detail the Pol. 1.13 passage where Aristotle 
first mentions their virtues.  He begins by presenting a certain puzzle concerning the 
capacities for virtue in slaves in particular, a puzzle that he later extends to women and 
children. The puzzle goes as follows:  
[1] As to slaves the question might be asked: does a slave possess any other 
virtue, besides his merits as a tool and a servant, more valuable than these, for 
instance temperance, courage, justice and any of the other virtues or character? [2] 
Or has he no virtue beside his bodily service? [3] For either way there is a 
difficulty: [4] if slaves do possess virtue, how will they differ from freemen 
(eleutherôn)? [5] Or if they do not, this is strange (atopon) as they are human 
beings (anthrôpôn), and participate in reason (logou koinônountôn). [6] And 
nearly the same question is also raised about the woman and the child (paidos): 
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have they too virtues and ought a woman to be temperate, brave and just, and can 
a child be intemperate or temperate, or not? [7] This point therefore requires 
general consideration in relation to natural ruler and subject: is virtue the same for 
ruler and ruled, or different? [8] For if both have to partake of “good and fine 
character” (kalokagathias), why should one have to rule unqualifiedly, and the 
other unqualifiedly obey? (Pol 1.13 1259b22-35) 
 
After acknowledging that slaves have virtues of the body ([1]), Aristotle considers 
whether slaves have virtues of the soul—virtues such as temperance, courage, and justice 
([2]). Reasoning that slaves are human beings and so participate in reason (logou 
koinônountôn), he infers that they can partake in some sort of virtue ([5]). Women and 
children also participate in reason and so should be eligible for virtue ([6]). But 
attributing a type of virtue to slaves, women, and children raises the following puzzle: if 
both free adult males and slaves, women, and children partake of virtue, why is it right 
for the one group to rule, and for the other to be ruled unconditionally? ([8]) Or, to put 
the question a bit differently, in what way do their virtues differ from that of freemen 
such that they should obey and their masters should rule?  Only adult free males, after all, 
are given ruling power. 
To resolve the dilemma, Aristotle appeals to certain facts about the psychological 
capacities of slaves, women, and children:  
Although the parts of the soul are present in all [i.e., slaves, women, and children] 
(kai pasin enhuparchei men ta moria tês psuchês), they are present in different 
ways. For the slave lacks the deliberative faculty (bouleutikon) entirely (holôs). 
The woman has it, but it is without authority (akuron). A child (pais) has it, but it 
is incomplete (ateles). (Pol. 1.13 1260a10-14) 
 
This solution involves first of all acknowledging that the naturally ruled parties have 
certain psychological credentials:  “the parts of the soul” are present in slaves, women, 
and children. (We shall examine in the next section what exactly this cryptic phrase 
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means). Such credentials are not enough, Aristotle then says, to give slaves, women, and 
children the power to rule. This is because their psychological capacities are importantly 
limited: the slave lacks the deliberative faculty (bouleutikon) entirely (holôs), the 
woman’s is without authority (akuron), and the child’s is incomplete (ateles).  These 
imperfections justify these groups’ subordinate positions, for, as Aristotle insists later,  
rulers (i.e. adult free men) do not possess such deficiencies:  
Hence the ruler possesses virtue of character to its fullest extent—for any work, 
taken absolutely, belongs to the master-craftsman, and reason is a master-
craftsman (to gar ergon estin haplôs tou architektonos, ho de logos 
architektôn)—but each of the others [slaves, women, and children] have just as 
much as is appropriate to them (hekaston hoson epiballei autois). (Pol. 1.13 
1260a17-9) 
 
Slaves’, women’s, and children’s deliberative capacities are limited by comparison with 
those of the natural rulers, and these limitations are what justify slaves’, women’s, and 
children’s subordination.  
 So the primary elements of Aristotle’s response to the puzzle are the following. 
First, there is the concession that slaves, women, and children have certain soul parts and 
so may partake of a kind of virtue of character. Second, there is the insistence that such 
virtue is based on imperfect or limited psychic capacities, imperfections and limitations 
that the natural ruler does not have. Finally, there is the claim that, to the extent that the 
natural ruler’s virtue is based on perfect or complete rationality, his virtue is superior in a 
way that makes it right for him to rule and for the ruled class to be ruled.   
 
III.  Pol. 1.13 in Focus: Slaves’, Women’s, and Children’s Virtues as Approximations 
of Paradigmatic Virtue  
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With this rough outline of Pol. 1.13 in hand, let us look in greater detail at the dilemma 
that Aristotle raises. As I will try to show, an examination of the dilemma reveals that he 
takes slaves, women and children to approximate paradigmatic virtue in some way. 
When Aristotle says that it is slaves’ participation in reason that makes it prima 
facie reasonable to attribute virtue of character to them  ([5]), he implies that rational 
capacity has an important connection to virtue of character. This suggests that Pol. 1.13 is 
alluding to the account of paradigmatic virtue developed in the ethical works, for the 
ethical works present paradigmatic virtue as a perfection of the rational soul. Such an 
account of virtue results from the function arguments in EN 1.7 and EE 2.1, where 
Aristotle appeals to the human function (ergon) to clarify the nature of the human good. 
What counts as the good for x depends on what sort of thing x is, and so if we want to 
know the human good, we must know what sort of thing a human is. After ruling out the 
life of nutrition and perception as possible functions of humans on the grounds that these 
functions belong to plants and animals, Aristotle identifies a practical (praktikê) sort of 
life of what possesses reason (tou logon echontos) as the distinctive human function 
(1098a4). Because a virtue of x is that characteristic which makes x perform x’s function 
well (1106a15-24), it follows that human virtues are those states of the soul whereby 
human beings perform well their distinctively human function of living lives guided by 
reason. 
The rationality relevant to virtue of character comes in two forms, corresponding 
to  two parts or aspects of the rational part of the soul (to echon logon). One part of to 
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echon logon actually thinks (dianooumenon)12 and in particular deliberates (bouleuesthai 
6.1 1139a 12-3). The other part (the alogon) does not itself think but rather desires; this 
part is the seat of non-rational desires and emotions, and it counts as derivatively rational 
or rational “in a way”  (pêi,11102b4) insofar as it can respond to the strictly rational part 
by “obeying” (peitharchei, peitharchikon),  “listening” (euêkoôteron, katêkoon) or 
harmonizing with (homophônei) reason.13 14 Paradigmatic virtue of character is thus that 
state of the soul whereby a human being expresses well her two types of rationality: the 
rationality of her deliberative part and the rationality of her non-rational part (her alogon 
                                                
12 “There remains a practical sort of life of what possesses reason tou logon echontos); and of this, one 
aspect “possesses reason” insofar as it is obedient to reason, while the other possesses it insofar as it 
actually has it, and itself thinks (to d' hôs echon kai dianooumenon)” (1.7 1098a3-5).   
13 If one must say that this part too has reason [s.c. the part that is responsible for appetite and non-rational 
desire], then reason, too, will be twofold, consisting of one part that has reason strictly speaking and in 
itself, and another part that is capable of listening as if to one’s father” (1.13 1103a1-2).   “Another nature 
in the soul would also seem be nonrational (alogos), though in a way has a share in reason (metechousa 
mentoi pêi logou). For in continent and incontinent people we approve their reason, or the [part] of the soul 
that has reason, because it urges them in the right way and towards what is best; but they evidently also 
have in them some other [part] beside reason, which combats and resists reason.  For just as paralyzed parts 
of the body, when we decide to move them to the right, do the contrary and move off to the left, the same is 
true of the soul; for incontinent persons have impulses (hormai) in contrary directions. But whereas in the 
body we see the erratic member, in the case of the soul we do not see it; nevertheless we should suppose 
also that the soul has something apart from reason, which opposes and runs counter to reason, though in 
what sense the two are distinct does not concern us here. But this [part] as well [as the rational part] 
appears, as we said, to participate in (metechein) reason; at least in the continent man it obeys (peitharchei) 
reason—and no doubt in the temperate and brave man it listens still better (euêkoôteron), for there it agrees 
(homophônei) with reason in everything.  Thus we see that the irrational part, as well as the soul as a whole, 
is double. One division of it, the vegetative, does not share in rational principle at all; the other, the seat of 
the appetites and of desire in general (to d' epithumêtikon kai holôs orektikon), does in a sense participate in 
principle (metechei pôs), insofar as it listens to reason and obeys it (hêi katêkoon estin autou kai 
peitharchikon): in the sense in fact in which we speak of ‘listening to reason’ from father and friends, not in 
the sense of the term ‘rational’ in mathematics. And that the nonrational part is in a way persuaded by 
(peithetai) by reason is indicated by our practice of admonishment (nouthetêsis), reprimanding (epitimêsis), 
and encouraging (paraklêsis) generally” (EN 1.13 1102b13-1103a1). 
14 In EN VI.1, Aristotle says that the thinking part of the soul (dianooumenon 1098a5) is itself bipartite:  the 
scientific part—to epistêmonikon— is that by which we study beings whose principles  do not admit of 
being otherwise, and the rationally calculating part or deliberating part—to logistikon/bouleutikon-- is that 
by which we study beings whose principles do admit of being otherwise (EN 6.1 1139a7-9; 1139a12-5). 
Since virtue of character is about principles which admit otherwise, it involves the deliberative part but not 
the scientific part. Thus, we can set the scientific part of the dianooumenon aside.  
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or emotional part) qua that part’s ability to “listen to” or “obey” reason.15   
We’ve seen that slaves, women, and children cannot have paradigmatic virtue, 
since this virtue requires the deliberative excellence of practical wisdom, and these 
parties lack practical wisdom.  Nevertheless, we have seen that Aristotle clearly alludes 
to paradigmatic virtue in Pol. 1.13 when he connects virtue to reason and relies on that 
account of paradigmatic virtue when he attributes virtues to slaves. (Recall the passage 
where he connects virtue with reason: “If [slaves] do not possess virtue of character], this 
is strange (atopon) as they are human beings (anthrôpôn), and participate in reason 
(logou koinônountôn)” (1259b28)). 
What is going on?  When Aristotle says that slaves have a share in reason and 
thus are candidates for virtue, he must be drawing our attention to the fact that slaves 
have rational capacities that in some way approximate or resemble the rational capacities 
involved in paradigmatic virtue. This approximation, he must be saying, makes slaves 
eligible for some sort of approximation of paradigmatic virtue.   
What sort of approximation of paradigmatic virtue does he have in mind? A 
passage from Pol. 1.5 clarifies the kind of approximation of rational excellence, and so 
virtue, that Aristotle seems to wants to attribute to slaves in Pol. 1.13.    
 For he who can be another’s (and that is why he is another’s), and he who 
participates in reason (koinônôn logou) to the extent that they perceive 
(aisthanesthai) but not have (echein) [reason], is a slave by nature. (Pol. 1.5 
1254b22-5) 
 
Aristotle says that the natural slave “participates in reason enough to perceive 
(aisthanesthai) it, but not to possess (echein) it.” The contrast he draws here between 
                                                
15 This is correct in spite of 1.13’s assignment of the virtues of character to the reason-responsive part and 
phronêsis to the strictly rational part (1.13 1103a1-6). For Aristotle makes clear later (at 6.13 1144a17) that 
one cannot have virtue of character strictly speaking (kurios) unless one has phronêsis. 
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perceiving (aisthanesthai) reason and having (echein) reason is strongly reminiscent of 
the contrast at EN 1.13 between the part of the soul that “listens to,” reason (1102b27, 31 
& 1103a3) and the part of the soul that has reason (echein) strictly speaking and actually 
thinks (dianooumenon). Indeed, a few lines later in Pol. 1.13, we get a clear reference to 
EN 1.13’s division of the soul: 
For the soul by nature contains a part that rules (archon) and a part that is ruled 
(archomenon), to which we assign different virtues, that is, the virtue of the part 
having reason (tou logon echontos) and that of the nonrational (alogou).  (Pol 
1.13 1260a4-9) 
 
 Given the parallels between Pol. 1.5 and EN 1.13, it is reasonable to interpret 
Pol. 1.5 as saying that slaves have one of the two aspects of the distinctively human soul 
that he presents in EN 1.13.  At Pol. 1.5 he is attributing to slaves the capacity to have an 
obedient alogon and correspondingly denying slaves the capacity to have reason strictly 
speaking. Since an obedient alogon partly constitutes paradigmatic virtue, a slave who 
has an obedient alogon has a critical part of paradigmatic virtue.  This explains why 
Aristotle at Pol.1.13 can appeal to paradigmatic virtue as a reason to attribute virtue to 
slaves without thereby attributing to them paradigmatic virtue. What he is attributing to 
them is an approximation of paradigmatic virtue, one based on slaves’ abilities to have 
reason-responsive aloga. It is only an approximation of paradigmatic virtue, since slaves 
lack the excellence of the strictly rational or deliberative part.   
Aristotle’s strategy is the same regarding the virtues of women and children: he 
attributes to women and children approximations of paradigmatic virtue that are based on 
the way in which they approximate the rational activity that is constitutive of 
paradigmatic virtue. To see this, recall from Pol. 1.13 1260a10-9 that in solving the first 
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horn of the dilemma, Aristotle attributes to slaves, women, and children “parts of the 
soul” that he takes to be relevant to virtue: “Although the parts of the soul are present in 
all [i.e., slaves, women, and children] (kai pasin enhuparchei men ta moria tês psuchês), 
they are present in different ways.” We saw that Aristotle says that the soul parts that 
make slaves candidates for virtue are the parts of rational soul. Thus, it is reasonable to 
think that the “parts of the soul” that make women and children candidates for virtue are 
the rational soul parts. Aristotle is implying that they have aloga that are potentially 
obedient to reason, deliberative soul parts, or both.   Whether women’s and children’s 
approximations of paradigmatic virtue are identical to slaves’ approximations is a 
question that I explore in chapter 7.  
It is important to stress that in attributing approximations of virtue of character to 
slaves, women, and children, Aristotle is not thereby attributing to them genuine human 
virtue. The states Aristotle attributes to these parties come close to genuine virtue, but 
they fall short of the threshold for genuine human virtue, because human virtue is the 
state whereby the distinctively human soul functions well, and these parties lack a crucial 
part of this excellence. I will continue to talk of slaves’, women’s, and children’s virtues, 
but it is important to stress that in doing so I use “virtues” as shorthand for “virtue 
approximations.”  
 
IV.  Paradigmatic Virtue as a Guide to the Motivational Attitudes Involved in Slaves’, 
Women’s, and Children’s Virtues 
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Knowing that slaves’, women’s, and children’s virtues are approximations of 
paradigmatic virtue does not tell us whether their virtues includes decision (prohairesis), 
or whether they are restricted to non-rational motivation. Nor does it tell us whether their 
virtues are directed at the fine (kalon) as such, or whether their virtues are oriented 
around a different value. To determine what sorts of evaluative and motivational attitudes 
are involved in their virtue, we need to look more closely at the psychological natures of 
these attitudes themselves and at the psychological capacities of slaves, women, and 
children.  
With respect to the natures of these attitudes, we need to determine what roles, if 
any, the non-rational soul and the deliberative soul part play in the generation of a 
decision for virtuous activity. Along the same lines, we need to figure out what sorts of 
psychological capacities can give rise to a concern with the fine as such.  
With respect to slaves’, women’s, and children’s psychological capacities, we 
need to determine both their non-rational desiderative capacities and their deliberative 
capacities. Can they all have aloga that are reason-responsive?  Can they have 
deliberative parts that approximate practical wisdom (phronêsis) in some way?   
Difficulties surround both issues. For example, there is substantial disagreement 
over the relative roles the alogon and deliberative part play in the generation of a 
decision.  According to one line of interpretation,16 deliberation about the human good is 
responsible for the production of wishes (boulêseis), the desiderative element in 
decisions. By contrast, according to a different line of interpretation, the alogon is 
responsible for the production of wishes.  
                                                
16 I defend this particular line of interpretation in chapters 5 and 6. 
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Concerning motivation by the fine, some commentators take this to be an 
essentially rational motivation that results when agents realize, on the basis of reflection, 
that fine action is part of their good. 17 Others argue that motivation to do fine actions as 
such need not have such rational origins. On this view, appetites and spirited desires have 
the cognitive and evaluative capacities to pursue the fine as such.18  
Regarding the issue of slaves,’ women’s, and children’s psychological capacities, 
Aristotle does not tell us as much as we would like.  It is not clear, for example, what 
Aristotle means when he says that slaves lack entirely the deliberative faculty, that 
women’s deliberative faculty is inauthoritative (akuron), and that children’s deliberative 
                                                
17 In this camp is Terence Irwin. Irwin grants that a good condition of the non-rational part may be a 
necessary condition of the virtuous person’s attachment to fine action, and moreover seems to think that 
one’s non-rational desires can attach to actions that are fine for the pleasure or honor that comes from them.  
However, he seems to think that one cannot have a non-rational desire for the fine as such. On his view, 
desiring the fine as such requires pursuing fine action on the basis of a rational conviction about what 
makes fineness worth choosing:  
“Aristotle suggests that rational desire for the fine is thoroughly good dependent [i.e. that it is 
based on a conception of the good that is prior to what one desires].  The demand to choose 
virtuous action because it is fine is more stringent than the demand to pursue it non-
instrumentally.  For we might have an attachment to virtuous action that is both non-instrumental 
and non-rational; we stick to it even when we gain no further instrumental benefit from it, but we 
do not stick to it because we have some rational conviction about what makes it worth sticking to 
in these circumstances. The virtuous person’s choices rest on convictions about the good that have 
formed her views about the goals that are worth choosing” (Irwin [1], 191).   
18 In this camp is M.F. Burnyeat. Burnyeat seems to think that doing fine actions for the sake of the fine can 
arise out of an agent’s coming to take pleasure in fine activity.  
“[If] learning to do and to take (proper enjoyment in doing just actions is learning to do and to 
enjoy them for their own sake, for what they are, namely, just, and this is not to be distinguished 
from learning that they are enjoyable for themselves and their intrinsic value, namely, their justice 
and nobility, then perhaps we can give intelligible sense to the thesis that practice leads to 
knowledge, as follows.  I may be told, and may believe, that such and such actions are just and 
noble, but I have not really learned for myself (taken to heart, made second nature to me) that they 
have this intrinsic value until I have learned to value (love) them for it, with the consequence that I 
take pleasure in doing them.  To understand and appreciate the value that makes them enjoyable in 
themselves I must learn for myself to enjoy them, and that does take time and practice—in short, 
habituation.”  (Burnyeat, 78.) 
Burnyeat’s discussion of habituation focuses on pleasure rather than on development of an agent’s 
deliberative capacities, and so he seems to think that one can develop an appreciation for the intrinsic value 
of fine action without developing one’s capacities for deliberation. He grants that the appreciation for the 
intrinsic value of fine action does not include the virtuous person’s understanding of what makes a given 
fine action fine and thus intrinsically valuable; he grants that habituation does not give you “the why” (to 
dioti) that the person of practical wisdom has.  
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faculty is incomplete (ateles).  In the case of slaves, is Aristotle denying them the capacity 
to do any and all deliberative reasoning? 
A main goal of the dissertation will be to get some clarity on these issues.  By 
doing so, we can begin to understand the specific motivational and evaluative features of 
slaves’, women’s, and children’s virtues.   
My first aim, taken up in chapter 2, is to argue that the human alogon can prompt 
an agent to pursue fine action and fine as such. My argument rests on an interpretation of 
what it is for the reason-responsive part of the soul (the alogon) to obey (peitharchei, 
peitharchikon), listen to (euêkoôteron, katêkoon) or harmonize with (homophônei) 
reason. On the view I put forward, one of the features that make an alogon obedient to 
reason is its grasping, and being motivated by, the fine (kalon) as such. In chapters 3 and 
4, I’ll supplement my argument by examining in greater detail the evaluative and 
cognitive capacities of non-rational desire. In chapters 5 and 6, I argue that wishes, and 
thus decisions, result from reflective reasoning about the good.  
I then turn to examining the non-rational desiderative capacities and deliberative 
capacities of slaves, women, and children (chapter 7). There I argue that slaves, women, 
and children can all have reason-responsive aloga and thus can have non-rational 
motivation prompting them to pursue the fine qua fine, but that only women can decide 
on fine activity.  
What emerges from the discussion is the following. Slaves’ and children’s virtues 
consist entirely in desiderative excellence; they approximate paradigmatic virtue only to 
the extent that they can have reason-responsive aloga. While such an approximation 
allows them to pursue virtuous activity for the sake of the fine, their deliberative 
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imperfections preclude them from having the capacity to decide on virtuous activity. 
Women turn out to be a different case; their virtue involves both non-rational motivation 
for the fine as such, and prohairetic motivation for fine action as such.  
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CHAPTER 2  
NON-RATIONAL DESIRE AND THE FINE (TO KALON) 
 
I. Introduction 
 
We are interested in whether the virtues of slaves, women, and children involve these 
people doing virtuous actions for the sake of the fine, or whether their virtues are oriented 
around some other value.   To answer this question, we should determine whether the 
human alogon can give rise to a concern for the fine as such. If it can, then deliberatively 
deficient individuals like slaves, women, and children should be able to act for the sake 
of the fine. If it cannot, then slaves, women, and children must perform virtuous actions 
for some end other than the fine.  
In this chapter, I argue that the human alogon can prompt an agent to pursue fine 
action as such. My argument rests on an interpretation of what it is for the reason-
responsive part of the soul (the alogon) to obey (peitharchei, peitharchikon), listen to 
(euêkoôteron, katêkoon) or harmonize with (homophônei) reason. On the view I put 
forward, one of the features that make an alogon obedient to reason is its grasping, and 
being motivated by, the fine (kalon) as such. 
 My interpretation of the reason-responsive alogon assumes that appetites and 
spirited desires have the evaluative and cognitive sophistication to pursue the fine as 
such. In chapters 3 and 4, I’ll examine the evaluative and cognitive capacities of non-
rational desire in detail and show that they do have such sophistication.  
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II. What is it for a Person’s Alogon to Obey Reason?  Some Desiderata for an 
Interpretation 
 
II.1 EN 1.13 in Focus 
 
We should begin by looking closely at EN 1.13, the longest discussion of the part of the 
soul that is reason-obedient:  
Another nature in the soul would also seem be nonrational (alogos), though in a 
way has a share in reason (metechousa mentoi pêi logou). For in continent and 
incontinent people we approve their reason, or the [part] of the soul that has 
reason, because it urges them in the right way and towards what is best; but they 
evidently also have in them some other [part] beside reason, which combats and 
resists reason.  For just as paralyzed parts of the body, when we decide to move 
them to the right, do the contrary and move off to the left, the same is true of the 
soul; for incontinent persons have impulses (hormai) in contrary directions. But 
whereas in the body we see the erratic member, in the case of the soul we do not 
see it; nevertheless we should suppose also that the soul has something apart from 
reason, which opposes and runs counter to reason, though in what sense the two 
are distinct does not concern us here.  But this [part] as well [as the rational part] 
appears, as we said, to participate in (metechein) reason; at least in the continent 
man it obeys (peitharchei) reason—and no doubt in the temperate and brave man 
it listens still better (euêkoôteron), for there it agrees (homophônei) with reason in 
everything. Thus we see that the irrational part, as well as the soul as a whole, is 
double. One division of it, the vegetative, does not share in reason at all; the other, 
the seat of the appetites and of desire in general (to d' epithumêtikon kai holôs 
orektikon), does in a sense participate in reason (metechei pôs), insofar as it 
listens to reason and obeys it (hêi katêkoon estin autou kai peitharchikon): in the 
sense in fact in which we speak of ‘listening to reason’ from father and friends, 
not in the sense of the term ‘rational’ in mathematics. And that the nonrational 
part is in a way persuaded by (peithetai) by reason is indicated by our practice of 
admonishment (nouthetêsis), reprimanding (epitimêsis), and encouraging 
(paraklêsis) generally. (EN 1.13 1102b13-1103a1)19 
                                                
19 For further descriptions of this soul division, see EN 1.7 1098a4-8 and EE 2.1 1219b26-1220a4: “The 
remaining possibility, then, is some sort of life of action of the [part of the soul] that has reason (tou logon 
echontos). One [part] of it has reason as obeying reason (epipeithes logôi); the other has it as itself having 
reason and thinking (to d' hôs echon kai dianooumenon)… We have found, then, that the human function is 
activity of the soul in accord with reason or requiring reason” (EN 1.7 1098a4-8, translation Irwin [2]). 
“We must now investigate the soul:  because virtue belongs to the soul, and does so not incidentally.  As it 
is human virtue that is the object of our inquiry, let us assume that there are two parts of the soul that share 
in reason, but that they do not both share in reason in the same way:  one’s nature is to command (to men 
 19 
 
The passage says that the part of the soul that is obedient to reason is the appetitive and 
desiderative soul part (epithumêtikon kai holôs orektikon, 1102b30-1). While orektikon 
here might make one think that Aristotle is here referencing all desires, including rational 
desire or wish (boulêsis),20 the context suggests that he means only the non-rational 
desires of appetite (epithumia) and spirited desire (thumos). For Aristotle uses the 
incontinent person’s opposing impulses (hormai, 1102b21) to suggest that the soul has 
multiple parts, and he is justified in making this suggestion only if he is assuming that the 
orektikon is battling an impulse coming from elsewhere—namely from the rational part. 
This reason-derived impulse is presumably a wish (boulêsis) (or its close cousin, decision 
(prohairesis21)). For elsewhere Aristotle assigns wish to the rational part (DA 432b5), and 
in his discussion of incontinence he makes clear that what conflicts with the appetitive 
desire is a decision. If this is right, then the orektikon that obeys reason does not include 
wish or decision; it is the agent’s non-rational desires—her appetites and spirited 
desires—that listen to reason.  
 An important piece of information comes from the passage’s appealing to 
incontinent, continent, and virtuous agents as evidence that the soul has a part that is 
potentially obedient to reason. Aristotle appeals to the virtuous agent as an example of 
                                                
tôi epitattein), the other to obey and listen (to de tôi peithesthai kai akouein pephukenai). And if there is 
something that is non-rational in a different way from this, let us disregard that part….Any other part of the 
soul that there may be, the vegetative part for example, is removed from consideration…For if [a part 
belongs] to a human being qua human being, it necessarily includes reasoning (logismon), as a starting-
point and action; but reasoning rules (archei) desire and emotions (orexeôs kai pathêmatôn), not reasoning 
itself, so the human soul must have those parts.  And as physical well-being is made up of the virtues of the 
several parts, so is the virtue of the soul, insofar as it is a complete whole” (EE 2.1 1219b26-1220a4). 
20 Aristotle recognizes three species of desire (orexis):  appetite (epithumia), spirit (thumos), and wish 
(boulêsis). (EN 1111b11-5; EE 1123a26-7, 1225b24-6; MM 1.12, 1187b37; DA 414b2, 432b5-6, 433 a22-
26; Pol. 7.15, 1334b17-25). 
21 “But further, [decision] is not wish either, though it is apparently close to it” (EN 3.2 1111b20) 
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someone who follows reason to the fullest extent; the virtuous person’s alogon agrees 
with (homophônei 1102b28-29) reason in everything (panta). As Aristotle makes clear 
later, the virtuous person, in addition to acting on reason’s decision, has non-rational 
desires that cooperate with that decision (sunergei, EN 3.8 1116b32). So when a person’s 
alogon follows reason to the fullest extent, none of her non-rational desires prevent her 
from acting on reason’s decision; indeed, she has non-rational desires that positively push 
her towards the action that reason recommends.  
The continent person follows reason, but not to the fullest extent possible. While 
the continent person’s alogon obeys (peitharchei) reason, the virtuous person’s alogon 
“listens better” (euêkoôteron, 1102b28) and “agrees with reason in everything” 
(homophônei…panta, 1102b28-29). One reason the continent person fails to meet the 
threshold of full agreement or listening is that the continent person has non-rational 
desires that urge her towards actions that are incompatible with reason’s 
recommendations, so that it takes some struggle before she acts on her decision. 
However, these recalcitrant non-rational desires are not strong enough to cause her to act 
against reason’s recommendation, and for this reason her non-rational desires count as 
following reason in a minimal way.  
Unlike the continent agent, who follows reason in a minimal way, the incontinent 
person does not follow reason at all. The incontinent person’s non-rational desires are 
sufficiently opposed to reason such that she fails to act on reason’s recommendations 
altogether (1142a17).   
 
II.2 Is Reason-Responsiveness Mere Correspondence? 
 21 
 
 If we focus on these illustrations of the virtuous, continent, and incontinent agents, it is 
reasonable to think that according to Aristotle having a reason-responsive alogon is, in 
part at least, a matter of having non-rational desires that correspond with reason’s 
recommendation enough for an agent to do the action that reason recommends. Now, 
while such correspondence between the alogon and reason’s recommendation is surely 
part of what Aristotle has in mind when he talks about the alogon following reason, it 
cannot be all. That it is not enough is clear from the passage in Politics 1.5 where 
Aristotle discusses the difference between natural slaves and animals.   We’ve already 
looked at this passage, but it’s worth revisiting again: 
[1]For he who can be another’s (and that is why he is another’s), and [2] he who 
participates in reason (koinônôn logou) to the extent that they perceive 
(aisthanesthai) but not have (echein) [reason], is a slave by nature. [3] Whereas 
the lower animals cannot even perceive reason; they follow (hupêretei) their 
feelings (pathêmasin). [4] The use (ergon) made of them differs little:  for from 
both—slaves and tame animals—comes bodily help in the supply of essentials 
(Pol. 1.5 1254b20-5). 
 
According to the passage, a natural slave “participates in reason enough to perceive 
(aisthanesthai) it, but not to possess  (echein) it” ([2]). In chapter 1, I noted that the 
perceptual terminology here is strongly reminiscent of the terminology Aristotle uses at 
EN 1.7 and 1.13 when he describes the relationship between a continent or virtuous 
person’s alogon and her rational part: as we’ve seen, there too he talks about the alogon 
“listening to” reason (1102b27, 31; 1103a3). Also reminiscent of EN  1.13 is the contrast 
between perceiving reason (aisthanesthai) and having reason (echein).  These two 
similarities between Pol. 1.5 and EN 1.13 strongly suggest, I argued, that in Pol 1.5 
Aristotle has in mind EN 1.13’s division of the soul.  
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 If the Pol 1.5 passage is making use of EN 1.13’s division of soul, then when 
Aristotle says in Pol 1.5 that animals—even tame ones ([4])—obey feelings ([3]) and not 
reason, he is denying animals the capacity to have the reason-responsive alogon that he 
discusses in EN 1.13.  Now, the fact that tame animals—animals who are trained to do 
what their masters demand—fail to obey reason is important, because it suggests that 
having a reason-responsive alogon isn’t merely a matter of having non-rational desires 
that prompt you to do (or, minimally, do not prevent you from doing) the actions that 
reason recommends. After all, tame animals do what their master’s reason recommends, 
and yet Aristotle says at Pol. 1.5 that these animals don’t follow reason. It follows that 
obeying reason must not simply be a matter of having non-rational desires for actions that 
correspond enough with the actions that reason recommends so that the agent does what 
reason recommends; reason-responsiveness must involve something else.  
What else might be involved?  However we answer this question, our answer 
must involve something of which animals are not capable.  I will call this the “animals 
constraint,” and it will be helpful for testing our interpretation of following reason.  
Pol. 1.5 puts another constraint on our interpretation of a reason-responsive 
alogon.  Because Pol. 1.5 attributes to natural slaves the capacity to have a reason-
responsive alogon, any interpretation of a reason-responsive alogon must be able to 
account for the fact.  Call this the “natural slave” constraint.  The natural slave constraint, 
like the animals constraint, will be crucial for testing our interpretation of following 
reason.22   
                                                
22  The natural slave constraint is the reason that Broadie’s interpretation of reason-responsiveness fails. 
According to Broadie, when Aristotle says that the human alogon obeys reason he means that a person’s 
alogon is defined in terms of a functional relationship that it shares with reason. On her view, it is because 
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III. A Promising Start: Lorenz’s Interpretation 
 
Lorenz23 argues that the non-rational part of the soul can listen to or obey reason insofar 
as reason can affect appetite and spirit by informing them of salient features of an agent’s 
situation. Reason can draw appetite’s attention to a pleasant aspect of a situation and 
spirit’s attention to a fine or shameful aspect of a situation, and thereby adjust the 
direction of a person’s appetitive and spirited desires. By pointing out to the alogon 
                                                
the human alogon is actually defined in terms of a functional relationship it bears to reason that the human 
alogon, but not an animal’s alogon, counts as following reason.  
[When Aristotle says that the alogon listens to reason], [h]e means that in human beings the 
function of the desiderative part is to be defined by reference to its relation to the strictly rational 
function. In this respect it differs from the human soul’s nutritive part, and also from the 
desiderative part of nonrational animals. The human nutritive faculty is human only in the sense of 
being essential to all life, and therefore to human life. But it is not defined by its relation to any 
specifically human faculty, and so it may be said to be formally the same in human and subhuman 
organisms. Now, in a sense desire, too, is common to a wider class of creatures than man, for 
according to Aristotle’s biological classification, sense perception and desire are universal in 
animals. But according to the division of the Ethics, the fact that dogs, fishes, and human beings 
may all be described as desiderative creatures does not entail that they share something formally 
the same. For the essence of human desideration is different, being defined in terms of a functional 
relationship possible only for creatures rational in a strict sense. (Broadie 62)  
Later Broadie expands on this picture, arguing that a person’s alogon and deliberative part together make 
up a single functional system that is teleologically geared toward correct action, with reason having the 
function of prescribing to the alogon, and the alogon having the function of executing reason’s 
prescriptions.  In this way, the function of each capacity—the alogon and reason—refers to the other. 
Broadie’s interpretation doesn’t seem able to accommodate Aristotle’s attribution of a reason-
obedient alogon to natural slaves, since natural slaves obey reason though an external source of reason. 
Given her account, this would mean saying that a slave’s alogon is defined in terms of a functional 
relationship it has with his master’s reason. There is an oddness about such a picture. In a single soul, the 
job of the alogon is to obey reason, and correlatively the job of reason is to govern the alogon; this system 
is teleologically oriented toward correct action for the agent. Presumably, in the case of master and slave 
Broadie will say that the job of the slave’s alogon is to obey the master’s reason and the job of the master’s 
reason is to issue commands to the slave. But do we really want to then say, as it seems we must if Broadie 
is right, that the master’s reason is partially defined in terms of a prescribing function it bears to a slave’s 
alogon? Such a consequence would be bizarre. For having a strictly rational soul is essential to (non-slave) 
human life, and yet being in a position to prescribe to slaves seems to be a non-essential feature. After all, 
impoverished free men have strictly rational soul parts, but a lack of financial resources entails a lack of 
slaves to issue orders to. I conclude, then, that Broadie’s reading fails the natural slave constraint. For this 
reason we ought to dismiss it.  
23 Lorenz, Hendrik. The Brute Within. Oxford: OUP, 2006. 
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future painful consequences of eating an unhealthy meal, for example, reason can cause 
the alogon’s appetitive desire for the meal to subside: 
As far as appetite is concerned, its attention may be redirected from the pleasure 
that seems imminent to some other prospective pleasure (“encouragement”) or to 
some prospective pain (“admonition” or “warning”). Similarly, it should be 
possible to move spirit by drawing its attention to shameful or otherwise 
unseemly aspects of a course of action (“reprimanding”) or alternatively to fine or 
admirable aspects (another form of “encouragement”). In these various ways, an 
intense occurrent non-rational desire may grow less intense or may subside 
altogether.24 
 
On Lorenz’s view, obeying reason is a matter of the alogon receiving factual information 
from reason about a subject’s circumstances and adjusting its desires in response. This 
information is the product of reason’s deliberations about how to (e.g.) avoid future pain, 
deliberation that yields the belief that the unhealthy meal is a source of future pain. 25   
 On Lorenz’s interpretation, non-rational desires respond not just to any source of 
reason but to an agent’s own deliberations and beliefs. Thus, a tame animal that has 
developed, under the guidance of his master’s reason, non-rational desires that 
correspond to the actions his master’s reason recommends does not follow reason, since 
the direction of its desires is not the result of its own deliberations. For this reason, 
Lorenz’s interpretation meets the animals constraint.  
                                                
24 Lorenz, 189. 
25 In the presentation of his interpretation, Lorenz focuses on reason’s ability to direct the alogon by 
playing a sort of informational role that is analogous to the sort of role that phantasia might play: the role 
of informing the alogon of certain sources of pleasure, etc. However, Lorenz makes a comment that 
suggests that a reason-responsive alogon will be sensitive to considerations of the kalon when he says that 
reason can  “move spirit by drawing its attention to shameful or otherwise unseemly aspects of a course of 
action (“reprimanding”) or alternatively to fine or admirable aspects (another form of “encouragement”)”.  
(189).  If Lorenz intends this comment to say that a distinguishing feature of a reason-responsive alogon is 
sensitivity to the fine as a value, then I agree with his interpretation. Because he makes no attempts to 
motivate the view that sensitivity to the fine is partly constitutive of following reason, I have assumed here 
that he does not hold this view. 
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There are several virtues of Lorenz’s interpretation. For starters, it meets the 
animals constraint. Secondly, it coheres well with what happens in childhood training. 
Certainly a crucial aspect of such training is teaching children to use their reason to 
anticipate future pains or pleasures and other considerations that do not present 
themselves immediately. The goal is to get children to consider a wide variety of factors 
and modify their desires in response. Given the strong connection Aristotle draws 
between an obedient alogon and reason on the one hand and a child and parent or guide 
on the other (EN 1.13 1102b30-1103a4; EN 3.12 1119b5-20), the fact that Lorenz’s 
interpretation coheres well with childhood training is a point in its favor. Given that 
natural slaves presumably have rational capacities that are well-developed enough to 
anticipate future pains and consequences, Lorenz’s interpretation meets the natural slaves 
constraint as well.  
Lorenz’s interpretation also coheres well with what DA 3.3 says about 
incontinence. There, Aristotle says that an incontinent person’s appetite and reason are 
opposed because appetite tends to be sensitive to immediate pleasures, whereas reason 
takes into consideration long-term pleasure and pain:   
Now, desires arise which are contrary to one another, and this occurs whenever 
reason (logos) and the appetites (epithumiai) are opposed, and this happens in 
those animals which have perception of time. For intelligence (nous) bids us resist 
because of the future, while appetite has regard only to the immediate present; for 
the pleasure of the moment appears absolutely pleasurable and absolutely good 
because we do not see the future. (DA 3.10 433b5-10)  
 
The passage suggests that reason plays a critical role in informing appetite of salient 
features of an agent’s situation like hidden sources of future pain or pleasure, and that 
failure to follow reason—here manifested by the incontinent or continent agent—is a 
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function of the non-rational part not being sensitive to reason’s communications about 
these features.  If continent and virtuous people do not suffer from this sort of discord, 
presumably this is partly because the appetites of continent and virtuous people, unlike 
the appetites of incontinent people, respond to information from reason about salient 
aspects of the agents’ situations. 
 
IV. Should We Stop at Lorenz’s Proposal? 
 
With its many virtues, Lorenz’s interpretation should be incorporated into any plausible 
interpretation of a reason-responsive alogon. Nevertheless, I think his interpretation fails 
to capture all that is involved in reason-responsiveness. As I hope to show, there are good 
reasons to think that reason-responsiveness involves an evaluative shift in a person’s 
alogon, a shift whereby the desires of the alogon become sensitive to reason’s own 
values. Specifically, one of the features that makes an alogon reason-responsive is its 
coming to grasp, and be motivated by, the fine (kalon) as such.  
 
IV.1 Does a Reason-Responsive Alogon Follow Reason’s Evaluations?   
 
Consider the following passage where Aristotle compares the appetitive part of the soul 
to a young child: 
[1] If, then, [the child or the appetitive part] is not obedient (eupeithes) and 
subordinate to its rulers (hupo to archon), it will go far astray…That is why 
appetites must be moderate and few, and never contrary to reason (tôi logôi 
mêthen enantiousthai). [2] This is the condition we call obedient (eupeithes) and 
temperate. [3] And just as the child must live according to the instructions of his 
guide, so too the appetitive part [must be] according to reason (kata ton logon). 
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[4a] Hence the temperate person’s appetitive part must agree with reason 
(sumphônein tôi logôi); [4b] for the aim of both [his appetitive part and reason] is 
the fine (skopos gar amphoin to kalon), and the temperate person’s appetites are 
for the right things, in the right ways, at the right times-- which is just what reason 
also prescribes (tattei). (EN 3.12 1119b5-20) 
 
Aristotle says that the temperate person’s appetitive part obeys (eupeithes), accords with 
(kata), and agrees with (sumphônein) reason, and he suggests that this condition involves 
both reason and the appetitive part aiming at the fine [4b]. We know that reason 
commands that one do what is fine for the sake of the fine. 26 Thus, the decision 
(prohairesis) reason issues to the agent takes the form of “do X for sake of Y”, with an 
action like “stand fast in battle” standing in for “X” and “the fine” standing in for “Y.”27  
This raises the following question: When Aristotle says that the aim of appetite in 
a reason-obedient soul is the fine, is his point only that we have appetitive motivation to 
do actions that are in fact fine? Or does he mean something stronger, namely that appetite 
pursues these fine actions under the description ‘fine’, so that ‘the fine’ is part of 
appetite’s aim?  
I want to argue that following reason involves the fine (kalon) becoming part of 
the object of appetite (and spirit).  Specifically, I’ll suggest that the alogon follows reason 
when the following two conditions hold: (1) its desires respond to empirical information 
from reason concerning salient features of the agent’s situation and (2) its desires attach 
to fine actions qua fine. Call this the “Evaluative view,” since it says that a central part of 
following reason is following reason’s evaluations of fine actions as choiceworthy qua 
                                                
26 This is the upshot of Aristotle’s claim that the virtues courage are followings of reason (EE 3.1 1229a2). 
Since the virtues make one to do fine actions (1101b32) and do them for the sake of the fine (EN 3.7 
1115b20-5), it seems that reason’s command is to do fine actions for the sake of the fine.  
27 If I am right about the structure of decision, it explains why Aristotle says that decisions distinguish 
characters better than actions do (EN 3.2 1111b5-7). The idea is that when we know someone’s decision, 
we thereby know the Y of the action and thus their motive. By contrast, when we know someone’s action, 
we only know X; we do not know their motive.    
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fine. Call Lorenz’s interpretation the “Non-Evaluative view.” My goal in the remainder 
of the section is to set out some considerations in favor of the Evaluative View.   
I should make clear that my aim here is to present different pieces of evidence 
that, when examined together, strongly suggest the Evaluative view of reason-responsive 
alogon. My case is a cumulative one. It relies not on one extremely compelling piece of 
evidence that necessarily implies the Evaluative view, but rather relies on an overall 
picture that emerges when we think about the concept of following reason and examine 
several important passages.  
One note before proceeding. To assess the plausibility of the argument I give 
here, it will be ultimately necessary to state what the fine is for Aristotle. This is a 
complicated task, and to keep my argument in this chapter clear, I set aside the task until 
the next chapter. Simply presenting this chapter’s argument does not require a full 
exposition of the fine. For now, it will suffice to say that fine actions include the actions 
prescribed by the virtues, and that when someone does fine actions for the sake of the 
fine, her motivation is not self-interested.  
 
IV.2: Considerations in Favor of the Evaluative View: The Concept of Virtue 
 
Consider the following analogy. Imagine a parent who is a moral individual, and makes 
moral decisions throughout her life. She returns misplaced wallets to their owners, and 
does so because returning the wallets is the right things to do.  She prepares honest tax 
returns, and does this because being honest with one’s taxes is the right thing to do. In 
doing these moral actions, she sometimes has a second motivation: for example, in the 
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tax case, she desires to avoid the harsh penalties that come with tax evasion. 
Nevertheless, the desire to do the right thing is a major motivation for her. 
  The mother has two children, and as the children grow up their behaviors and 
attitudes resemble their mother’s to different degrees. The elder child files honest tax 
returns, and does so both because doing so is the right thing to do and because he wants 
to avoid the harsh penalties that come with tax evasion charges.  The younger one also 
files honest tax returns, but does so only because he wants to avoid the penalties 
associated with tax evasion.   
 Both children have followed in their mother’s footsteps to some extent, since both 
file honest tax returns. However, the elder follows his mother to a greater extent, since 
(unlike his brother) he files honestly for all the same reasons his mother does.  
 Returning to reason and appetite, we’ve seen that a virtuous agent’s reason 
commands her to do what is fine because it is fine. Thus, reason commands (e.g.) 
standing fast in battle or repaying one’s debts because standing fast in battle and repaying 
one’s debts is fine.  On the Evaluative interpretation of a reason-responsive alogon, the 
the alogon responds to reason’s command when it prompts the agent to stand fast in 
battle for the sake of the fineness of such action. By contrast, on the Non-Evaluative 
interpretation of a reason-responsive alogon, the alogon prompts the agent to stand fast in 
battle not for the sake of the fine, but for the sake of a value to which the alogon has a 
natural sensitivity (perhaps honor or pleasure).  
 It seems that just as the elder son is more a follower of his mother than the 
younger son, so the alogon on the Evaluative view is more a follower of reason than the 
alogon on the Non-Evaluative view.  If the reason-responsive alogon on the Evaluative 
 30 
view more fully instantiates following reason or harmonizing with reason, than the non-
Evaluative view, then reason-responsiveness on the Evaluative view is a better candidate 
for virtue.  After all, virtue is that by which we perform our function well (EN 2.6 
1106a15), and what it is for X to perform its function F well (or, equivalently to perform 
F with virtue) depends in part on the extent to which X type things can F: if X type things 
have an inherent capacity to F to extent R, then presumably the virtue of X will be 
whatever state allows X to F to extent R. Thus, Aristotle’s notion of virtue as that in 
virtue of which we perform a function well suggests that we should prefer views of 
reason-responsiveness that attribute to the alogon the fullest sort of following reason 
consistent with the inherent capacities of the non-rational part.  It follows that if the 
human the alogon has the capacity to follow reason in the Evaluative way, then the virtue 
of the alogon will be the state whereby it follows reason in the Evaluative way and not 
simply in the non-Evaluative way.  
  
IV.3 Textual Considerations in Favor of the Evaluative View 
 
§ EN 7.6   
 
In a passage that shows some striking similarities to the EN 1.13/EE 2.1 passages about 
reason-responsiveness, Aristotle uses the term “following reason” to describe the alogon 
when the alogon has an evaluative attitude that renders it similar to reason in some way. 
Here is the passage:  
 
[a] Moreover, let us observe that incontinence about spirit is less shameful than 
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incontinence about appetites. [b] For (gar) spirit would seem to hear reason in 
some way (akouein men ti tou logou), but to mishear it (parakouein de). It is like 
overhasty servants who run out before they have heard all their instructions (tês 
prostaxeôs), and then carry them out wrongly, or dogs who bark at any noise at 
all, before looking to see if it is a friend.  [c] In this way (houtôs), spirit, since it is 
naturally hot and hasty, hears (akousas), but it does not hear the instruction (ouk 
epitagma d’akousas), and rushes off to exact a penalty (hormâi pros tên 
timôrian).  [d] For (gar) reason or appearance has shown that an insult or slight 
has been received and spirit, as though (hôsper) it had reasoned (sullogisamenos) 
that it is right (dei) to fight this sort of thing, is irritated at once (chalepainei dê 
euthus).  [d] Appetite, however, if reason or perception merely says that an object 
is pleasant (ean monon eipêi hoti hêdu), rushes off for gratification (hormâi pros 
tên apolausin).  [f] With the result that spirit follows reason in a way (akolouthei 
tôi logo pôs), but appetite does not. Therefore [incontinence about appetite] is 
more shameful.  [g] For (gar) if someone is incontinent about spirit, he is 
overcome by reason in a way (tou logou pôs hêttatai); but if he is incontinent 
about appetite, he is overcome by appetite, not by reason. (EN 7.6 1149a30-b5) 
 
 
Aristotle says that even in cases where spirit leads the incontinent person astray by 
causing her to act on her anger and retaliate, spirit (unlike appetite) counts as in a way 
following or listening to reason. Notice the striking similarity of language between  this 
passage and EN 1.13/EE 2.1. At EN 7.6 he says that the spirited part but not the 
appetitive part listens (akouein) to reason’s orders (epitagma, tês prostaxeôs), and on that 
account spirit but not appetite follows reason (akolouthei tôi logo pôs). In EN 1.13 and 
EE 2.1 Aristotle says that the alogon listens to (katêkoon, euêkoôteron, akouein) reason, 
the part that instructs (epittatein 1219b30, epitaktikon 1102a21).   
There are several influential interpretations of what Aristotle means by this claim 
that spirit but not appetite follows reason, but all agree that it has something to do with 
spirit, and not appetite, having a certain evaluative attitude that reason finds dear.28 If any 
                                                
28 Irwin seems to think that what distinguishes spirit from appetite, and what makes spirit but not appetite a 
follower of reason, is that spirit involves evaluations of actions as being ‘good,’ ‘right,’ ‘bad,’ and ‘wrong,’ 
rather than simply as ‘pleasant’ or ‘painful’ (Irwin [2] 163). Lorenz argues that spirit, but not appetite, 
follows reason insofar as spirit has an evaluative outlook that “partially reflects reason’s own evaluative 
outlook”—albeit in a “cruder and significantly different” way, an outlook that spirit “derives from correct 
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of these interpretations are on the right track, then Aristotle clearly uses “following 
reason” to refer to sensitivity to reason’s evaluations. Given that there is no reason to 
think that the “following reason” he mentions at EN 7.6 is not a kind of following reason 
that is relevant to the EN/EE 2 sense of “following reason,” we should assume that the 
evaluative reason-responsiveness discussed at 7.6 is applicable to the reason-
responsiveness discussed in EN 1/EE 2. 
Specifically, I want to propose that, given the similar language at EN 1/EE 2 and 
EN 7.6, we see the following reason at 1.13 and the following reason of 7.6 as reflecting 
different aspects of a single account of full harmonization with/following of reason; these 
aspects, when brought together, constitute the full harmonization that is partially 
constitutive of virtue.  
 Recall that, on my view, full harmonization or following is filling a complex 
prescription that reason issues—do X for the sake of Y. What fills “X” here will be an 
action described in purely descriptive terms. By contrast, what fills “Y” is “the fine”—an 
evaluative term.  When I say that both EN 1.13 and EN 7.6 describe the state of following 
reason but describe different aspects of this following, what I have in mind is the 
following. In EN 1, Aristotle is concerned with the question of whether a person’s non-
rational desires correspond with reason enough to support (or at the very least not hinder) 
the agent’s doing of X.  After all, full harmonization of reason requires that the alogon 
attach to actions recommended by reason, and not simply values recommended by 
reason.   
                                                
reason” (Lorenz 193). Grönroos argues that the relevant difference between appetite and spirit is that the 
“very value involved in spirited desire…is more complex…and touches upon more aspects of life than 
pleasure” (Grönroos 263).  
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By contrast, in EN 7.6, Aristotle is concerned with the Y portion, not the X 
portion, of reason’s prescription.  When the alogon harmonizes with reason to the fullest 
extent, the values which serve as the ultimate ends (Y) of the alogon are as close to the 
values of reason as possible. Given Aristotle’s concern with Y, what he needs at EN 7.6 is 
an illustration that shows non-rational desire acting on behalf of values that are the same 
as, or close to, reason’s own values. His case of the angry incontinent person does just 
this: it shows that anger, by being sensitive to values like self-respect and justice, acts on 
behalf of values that are dear to reason.29 
Unfortunately, EN 1/EE 2’s focus on X is at the expense of Y, which is why EN 
1/EE 2 puts appetite and spirit on a par qua followers of reason and appeals to cases of 
controlled action to illustrate following reason. Similarly, EN 7.6’s focus on Y is at the 
expense of X. Because Aristotle at EN 7.6 is not concerned with the X portion of reason’s 
prescription, he does not restrict his illustrations of following reason to cases of self-
controlled actions. 30  
Similarly, because Aristotle at EN 7.6 is not concerned with the X portion of 
reason’s prescription, he need not represent spirit and appetite as on a par qua followers 
of reason. It is because spirit’s values in the anger case are dearer to reason than 
appetite’s values that Aristotle says that spirit but not appetite follows reason. (Indeed, as 
                                                
29 This responds to Lorenz’s objection that the reason-responsiveness discussed at 7.6 does not apply to the 
reason-responsiveness discussed in EN 1.7/1.13. To support the view that EN  1.13 following reason and 
EN 7.6 following reason are wholly separate,  Lorenz points out that whereas the reason-responsiveness 
that Aristotle has in mind in EN 1.13 is “precisely not manifested by uncontrolled people when they act 
without self-control,”  “the way in which spirit follows reason in [EN 7.6]… is in evidence in acts that 
express lack of self-control, namely lack of self-control with regard to anger” (Lorenz 192, fn 18). 
However, as I have argued, EN 1.13 and EN 7.6 are concerned with different aspects of one and the same 
kind of following reason. Because they are concerned with different aspects, it is possible for some details 
of  the 1.13 illustration to diverge from some details of the 7.6 illustration.  
 
30 Of course, the spirited part in the example does not follow reason in a full sense, since (this being a case 
of incontinent action), it prompts the agent to act against reason’s recommendation.  
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we shall see in chapter 3, spirit pursues the fine as such in a more straightforward way 
than appetite does, and thus spirit really is more of a follower of reason than appetite 
is).31  
The important point is that each discussion—the one we get in EN 1/EE 2 and the 
one we get in EN 7.6—intends to reveal only one aspect of reason-responsiveness, and 
that we need to join the aspects of both illustrations to have a full picture of following 
reason.  Again, were EN 1.13 and EN 7.6 not in the project of describing dual aspects of 
one and the same kind of following reason, EN 1.13’s and EN 7.6’s striking similarity of 
language is highly misleading.  
  
§ Following Reason vs. Following Emotion 
 
If we survey the ethical works, we find that the ethical works contain a dichotomy 
between following reason and following emotion, a contrast that seems to track the 
distinction between pursuing the fine as such and pursuing the pleasant as such.  This 
contrast offers some support to my claim that part of what it is for an alogon to follow 
reason is for its desires attach to fine actions qua fine. 
Recall the Pol. 1.5 1254b20-5 passage where Aristotle defines a natural slave as 
someone who “participates in reason (koinônôn logou) to the extent that he perceives 
(aisthanesthai) but does not have (echein) [reason].” In that passage, Aristotle contrasts 
                                                
31 This responds to Lorenz’s other objection that the reason-responsiveness discussed at 7.6 cannot apply to 
the reason-responsiveness discussed in EN 1.7/1.13. Lorenz argues that because the reason-responsiveness 
discussed in EN 1.7/1.13 applies to both appetite and spirit, whereas the reason-responsiveness discussed at 
7.6 applies to spirit only, the followings must be wholly separate and unrelated. However, as I have argued, 
EN 1.13 and EN 7.6 are concerned with different aspects of one and the same kind of following reason. 
Because they are concerned with different aspects, it is possible for some details of  the 1.13 illustration to 
diverge from some details of the 7.6 illustration.  
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those who participate in reason (koinônôn logou) to the extent that they perceive 
(aisthanesthai) reason and those who cannot perceive reason but follow (hupêretei) their 
feelings (pathêmasin). When we look elsewhere for places where Aristotle talks about 
following reason and following feelings, they seem to refer to different types of 
motivational outlooks, and specifically motivational outlooks that are connected in some 
way with the fine and the pleasant respectively.  In particular, Aristotle suggests that 
those who follow reason pursue the fine as such, whereas those who follow feelings 
pursue the pleasant as such.  One place where we get this picture is in EN X.9, where 
Aristotle contrasts the good (epieikês) person and the base (phaulon) person.   
The good person (epieikês) who lives with a view to the fine (pros to kalon zônta) 
will obey reason (tôi logôi peitharchêsein), but the base (phaulon) person who 
desires pleasure (hêdonês oregomenon) is held in check by pain, like a beast of 
burden (lupêi kolazesthai hôsper hupozugion). (EN X.9 1180a10-2)  
 
Aristotle gives two features that distinguish the good person from the base person.  First, 
the good person obeys reason (tôi logôi peitharchêsein), whereas the base person does 
not. Second, the good person pursues the fine  (pros to kalon zônta), whereas the base 
person pursues the pleasant (hêdonês oregomenon). Now, Aristotle is not simply saying 
that the good person and the base person differ in the kind of actions they do, with the 
virtuous person doing what is in fact fine and the base person doing what is in fact 
pleasant. After all, Aristotle thinks that the virtuous person’s actions are pleasant—indeed 
the most pleasant32--and thus the good person does pleasant actions no less than the base 
person does. It follows that the nature of the contrast that the passage draws between the 
                                                
32 “Further, each type of person finds pleasure in what ever he is called a lover of; a horse, for instance, 
pleases the horse-lover, a spectacles the lover of spectacles.  Similarly, what is just pleases the lover of 
justice, and in general what accords with virtue pleases the lover of virtue…. Actions in accord with virtue 
are pleasant by nature, so that they both please lovers of the fine and are pleasant in their own right” (EN 
1.8 1099a8-15, translation Irwin [2]). 
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good and the base person must be a contrast between their motives: the good person is 
motivated by the fine as such, whereas the base person is motivated by the pleasant as 
such. Accordingly, we seem to have a connection between obeying reason and being 
motivated by the fine on the one hand, and obeying feelings and being motivated by the 
pleasant on the other hand.  
In a different EN X.9 passage, Aristotle strongly suggests that someone who 
follows reason aims at the fine as such.  
 [1] For the many naturally obey fear, not shame (ou gar pephukasin aidoi 
peitharchein alla phobôi); they avoid what is base because of the penalties, not 
because it is disgraceful (oud' apechesthai tôn phaulôn dia to aischron alla dia 
tas timôrias). [2] For (gar) since they live by their feelings (pathei gar zôntes), 
they pursue their proper pleasures and the sources of them (tas oikeias hêdonas 
diôkousi kai di' hôn hautai esontai), and avoid the opposed pains, (pheugousi de 
tas antikeimenas lupas), and they have not even a notion of what is fine and truly 
pleasant (tou de kalou kai hôs alêthôs hêdeos oud' ennoian echousin), since they 
have had no taste of it (ageustoi onte). (EN X.9 1179b11-16, translation Irwin 
[2].) 
 
The passage suggests that living by feelings (pathei gar zôntes) implies pursuing the 
pleasant as such and not pursuing the fine as such. The many live by emotions (pathei 
gar zôntes), and because they live this way (epei) they pursue their proper pleasures (tas 
oikeias hêdonas diôkousi kai di' hôn hautai esontai) and avoid the opposed pains 
(pheugousi de tas antikeimenas lupas) ([2]).  Such people do not pursue the fine-- they 
“have not even a notion of what is fine and truly pleasant (tou de kalou kai hôs alêthôs 
hêdeos oud' ennoian echousin), since they have had no taste of it (ageustoi onte)” [(2)]. 
Aristotle contrasts this condition with the condition of those people who have a sense of 
shame and avoid the base because it is disgraceful [(1)].   
Aristotle is saying not simply that the many pursue what is in fact pleasant and 
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avoid what is in fact fine.  On the contrary, he is saying the many, because they follow 
their emotions, pursue the pleasant as such and not the fine as such.  To see this, first note 
that Aristotle invokes the many’s tendency to live by their feelings (pathei gar zôntes) to 
explain their dispositions to obey fear rather than shame and to avoid the base because of 
the penalties and not because of disgrace. This, at any rate, is suggested by what appears 
to be an explanatory ‘gar’ connecting [2] with [1].  If this is right, then the contrast 
between motivation by fear and motivation by shame can tell us something about what it 
is for the many to live by feelings.  
 What is it to be motivated by fear, and how is it different from motivation by 
shame? If we look at Aristotle’s discussion of citizen bravery in EN 3.8, we see that the 
contrast is centered on a contrast between motivation by the pleasant as such and 
motivation by the fine as such.   
[1a] Citizen (politikê) bravery is the most like the [full] bravery described earlier,  
[1b] since it comes about on account of virtue (di' aretên ginetai) [1c] (for (gar) it 
comes about on account of shame  (di' aidô) and [1d] on account of a desire for 
fineness (kai dia kalou orexin) [1e] (namely honor (times gar)) [1f] and by 
aversion from disgrace (phugên oneidous), which is something shameful 
(aischrou ontos). [2a] Into this class someone might also put those compelled by 
their superiors.  [3a] But they are worse, [3b] insofar as not on account of shame 
(ou di' aidô) [3c] but on account of fear they act (alla dia phobon auto drôsi), [3d] 
and they flee not the shameful but the painful (pheugontes ou to aischron alla to 
lupêron). [4] For their superiors compel them, just as Hector does:  ‘If I notice 
anyone shrinking back from the battle, nothing will save him from being eaten by 
dogs.’  (EN 3.8 1116a16-1116b5) 
 
Aristotle discusses two conditions—citizen bravery and bravery from compulsion—that 
resemble genuine bravery but fall short of it. Presumably, it is the behavioral similarity 
between these pseudo forms and genuine bravery that falsely lead people to think that the 
former are instances of the latter. Brave citizens and compelled soldiers stand fast in 
battle like genuinely brave people, but this behavior is not enough, Aristotle wants to say, 
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to make the citizens and the compelled genuinely virtuous.  
While neither citizen bravery nor compelled bravery is genuine bravery, citizen 
bravery is nonetheless better than compelled bravery ([3a]). The reason is that citizens act 
on account of shame, whereas the compelled act on account of fear ([3b], [3c]). What sort 
of motivational contrast is Aristotle drawing here? Aristotle says that those who act on 
account of fear flee not the shameful but the painful (pheugontes ou to aischron alla to 
lupêron) ([3c], [3d]), suggesting that what defines people who act out of fear and 
distinguishes them from those who act out of shame is a concern with pleasure and pain.  
(That people who act out of fear have an overriding concern with pleasure and pain is not 
surprising, given Aristotle’s definition of fear.33 The definition specifies a special 
relationship between fear and pleasure and pain). By contrast, those who act on account 
of shame  (di' aidô) act on account of a desire for fineness (kai dia kalou orexin) ([1c], 
[1d]).  
People who are “brave” because of fear do the same actions as the people who are 
brave because of shame. After all, Aristotle’s whole point in EN 3.8 is to argue that 
actions that resemble brave actions on the outside are not real instances of bravery. It 
follows that what separates the fearful person who remains at the battle line from the 
person who remains at the battle line on account of shame is not her actions but her 
motive: the fearful person acts on account of pleasure and pain, whereas the person with a 
sense of shame acts out of a concern for fineness.  If this is right, then the contrast 
between acting because of fear and acting because of shame is a contrast between acting 
out of a concern for the pleasant as such and acting out of a concern for the fine as such. 
                                                
33 Fear is “a pain or disturbance due to imagining some destructive or painful evil in the future” (Rhet. 
1382a21-2). 
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Returning to X.9 1179b11-6, recall that Aristotle invokes the many’s tendency to 
live by their emotions (pathei gar zôntes) to explain their disposition to obey fear rather 
than shame (ou gar pephukasin aidoi peitharchein alla phobôi). We’ve seen from the 
citizen bravery passage that the contrast between motivation by fear and motivation by 
shame is a contrast between being motivated by the pleasant as such and being motivated 
by the fine as such. It follows that when Aristotle invokes the many’s tendency to live by 
their feelings to explain their disposition to obey fear rather than shame, he is invoking 
the many’s tendency to live by their emotions to explain their disposition to pursue the 
pleasant as such and avoid the fine as such. It is not unreasonable to conclude from this 
that living by emotion is a matter of pursuing the pleasant as such at not the fine as such.  
Given the contrast between obeying reason and obeying feeling (Pol. 1.5 1254b20-5), we 
can infer that obeying reason is a matter of pursuing the fine as such and not only the 
pleasant as such. 
The two passages from EN X.9 thus suggest that following reason and following 
feelings have something to do with the contrast between pursuing the pleasant as such on 
the one hand and pursuing the fine as such on the other. The person who follows reason 
pursues fine actions for their own sakes, because she values fineness for its own sake. 
The person who follows feelings might perform actions that are, from an external 
standpoint, fine, but this person, even if he recognizes the action as fine, does not do it for 
that reason; instead, the person acts on considerations of pleasure alone.  
In the pieces of evidence I cited, what follows reason are lives or persons as a 
whole. While we cannot automatically assume that what it is for an alogon to follow 
reason is the same thing as what it is for a whole person or a life to follow reason, we 
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should assume that they are not identical only if we can find compelling reason to resist 
the identity. That is, it seems that our default position should be that “following reason” 
in the case of the alogon means the same thing as “following reason” in the case of a 
whole life or person. If that is right, then for the alogon to follow reason is for it to 
respond to considerations of the fine and not simply to considerations of pleasure.   
 
IV.4 Conclusion 
 
In conclusion, several pieces of evidence suggest the Evaluative view over the Non-
Evaluative view of a reason-responsive alogon. First, Aristotle’s notion of virtue as that 
in virtue of which we perform a function well suggests that we should prefer views of 
reason-responsiveness that attribute to the alogon the fullest sort of following reason 
consistent with the capacities of the non-rational part. Second, Aristotle in EN 7.6 uses 
“following reason” to refer to the following of evaluations, and, given the striking 
similarities between EN 7.6 and EN 1.7/1.13, we have reason to think that the evaluative 
following discussed in 7.6 is applicable to the following reason presented in EN 1.7/1/13.  
Finally, the contrast in the ethical works between “following reason” and following 
passions strongly suggest that following reason involves pursuing the fine as such.  
 
V. Testing the Evaluative View Against the Desiderata 
 
The Evaluative Interpretation meets the desiderata presented in section II.  
 
 41 
V.1 The Animals Constraint 
 
The Evaluative interpretation agrees with the Non-Evaluative view that part of what it is 
for an alogon to respond to reason is for it to respond to the beliefs and calculations of the 
rational part.  Since animals lack beliefs and calculations, they cannot have a reason-
responsive alogon. But the Evaluative view meets the animal constraint for a second 
reason.  Consider the following passage in Pol. 1.2 where Aristotle contrasts the 
evaluative capacities of animals with the evaluative capacities of human beings:  
And whereas mere voice is but an indication of pleasure or pain, and is therefore 
found in other animals (for up this point (mechri gar toutou) their nature attains to 
the perception of pleasure and pain and the intimation of them to one another), 
speech is intended to set forth the expedient (sumpheon) and inexpedient 
(blaberon), and therefore likewise the just (dikaion) and the unjust (adikon).  And 
it is a characteristic (idion) of man in distinction from the other animals that he 
alone has any sense of good (agathou) and evil (kakou), of just and unjust, and the 
like (tôn allôn), and the association of living beings who have this sense makes a 
family and a state. (Pol. 1.2 1253a7-17)  
 
According to this passage, non-rational animals do not need language, for they act on 
considerations of pleasure and pain alone (“up to this point” (mechri gar toutou)), and 
these considerations are effectively communicated without language. By contrast, man 
needs language, because it is characteristic (idion) of man to have a sense not just of the 
pleasant but of good (agathou) and evil (kakou), of just and unjust, and the like (tôn 
allôn).   By “the like”, Aristotle surely includes the fine, as he frequently groups the just 
with the fine and good. (See, for example, his claim that political science studies just and 
fine things (dikaia kai kala, EN 1.3 1094b14-5) and his claim that practical wisdom is 
concerned with “just and fine things, and things good (agatha) for a human being” (6.12 
1143b22-3)). So in Pol. 1.2, Aristotle seems to say that animals differ from humans 
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insofar as the former are confined to acting on considerations of the pleasant and painful 
alone, whereas the latter have evaluative concepts other than ‘pleasant.’ It follows that an 
animal, not being able to represent objects as fine, cannot represent as fine the objects 
that reason recommends. They cannot have a reason-responsive alogon as the Evaluative 
view interprets it. 
 
V.2 The Natural Slaves Constraint 
 
Pol. 1.2 strongly suggests that slaves can represent objects as fine. For slaves are human 
(1254a16, 1259b27-8) and thus have the capacity to go beyond the pleasant and pursue 
the good, the just, and the fine. His descriptions of the naturally slavish Triballoi and 
Scythians explicitly say that natural slaves have the capacity to represent objects as fine: 
And in the same way, in certain places it is fine (kalon) to sacrifice one’s father, 
e.g. among the Triballoi, but without qualification it is not fine. But possibly this 
indicates not “where” but “for whom” for it makes no difference where they may 
be:  for everywhere it will be fine to the Triballoi, since they are Triballoi. (Top. 
2.11 115b22-6) 
 
If the audience esteems (timion) a given quality, we must say that our hero has 
that quality, no matter whether we address Scythians, or Spartans, or 
philosophers. And in general the category of the esteemed falls into the category 
of the fine. (kai holôs de to timion agein eis to kalon), since there seems to be a 
resemblance between the two. (epeiper ge dokei geitnian) (Rhet. 1367b7-11) 
 
In chapter 5 I will argue that natural slaves like the Triballoi and Scythians do not have 
wishes; they have non-rational desires alone. Assuming that the Triballoi people’s 
judgments about what is fine are action guiding, these judgments about the fine must 
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underlie non-rational desires in particular; they cannot underlie wishes. This suggests that 
natural slaves’ non-rational desires are sensitive to the fine as a value.  
Since slaves do not reason, they will need an external source of reason to guide 
them to reason-recommended actions. I’ll discuss this in more detail in chapter 7.  
 
V.3 Motivation by the Fine and Reason Strictly Speaking 
 
Sensitivity to the fine as such is connected to reason strictly speaking, since the fine is a 
value dear to reason. However, such sensitivity is not sufficient for reason strictly 
speaking. As we shall see in chapters 5 and 6, reason strictly speaking involves actual 
deliberation about ends, whereas (as I will argue in chapter 3) when one has a non-
rational desire for the fine as such, this desire is the result of pre-rational attachments to 
what is familiar (oikeion). Motivation by the fine as such thus does not entail rationality 
in the strict sense.  
 
VI.  Conclusion 
 
I argued that the human alogon can prompt an agent to pursue fine action as such. My 
argument was based on an interpretation of what it is for the alogon to obey reason. 
According to that interpretation, an alogon follows reason when (i) its desires responds to 
factual information from reason about salient features of an agent’s situation, and (ii) its 
desires attach to fine actions qua fine.  
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If my interpretation of a reason-responsive alogon is right, it follows that 
individuals acting on their non-rational desires can pursue fine actions and fine actions as 
such.  
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CHAPTER 3 
SPIRIT, APPETITE, AND PURSUIT OF THE FINE (KALON) 
 
 
I. Introduction  
 
My interpretation of reason-responsiveness is plausible only if I can show that the desires 
of the alogon can attach to fine actions as such. In this chapter, I try to show that the 
alogon is in fact susceptible to the fine as a value. I first offer an account of the fine in 
terms of what I will call “honorability.” I then argue that spirited desires can pursue the 
fine so construed. To make this argument, I show that spirited desires are the desires 
through which we form attachments to what is familiar (oikeion), attachments that lead 
spirited desires to pursue honorable actions and honorable actions as such. Assuming that 
an agent is habituated in a well-ordered society, her alogon will satisfy its desire for 
honorability by attaching to actions that are in fact honorable.  
I’ll then argue that appetitive desires can be sensitive to the fine and the fine as 
such insofar as that they can be trained to seek the pleasures of fine action under the 
description “pleasures from fine action.” Like spirited desires, appetitive desires that are 
habituated in a well-ordered society will satisfy its desire for pleasures from fine action 
by focusing on actions that are in fact fine.  
 
II.  The Fine (To Kalon) 
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II.1 The Fine: Overview 
 
 
Since I want to argue that the desires of the alogon can be susceptible to the fine as a 
value, we should first clarify what the fine is. In the Rhetoric, Aristotle says that the fine 
is that which, being choiceworthy in itself (di’ auto haireton), is praiseworthy 
(epaineton).34 In the EE’s discussion of the difference between the good and the good-
and fine, Aristotle makes a similar connection between the fine and the praiseworthy:  
Being good and being fine-and-good admit of distinction, not only in their names 
but also in themselves.  For, of all goods, those are ends which are worth having 
for their own sake, while, of these, all that are praiseworthy (epaineta) for 
themselves are fine….But health is not something praiseworthy (epaineton); for 
neither is its function.  Nor is [acting] with strength, for strength is not, either.  
But, though they are not praiseworthy (epaineta), they are goods (EE 8.3 
1248b16-25). 
 
Aristotle suggests that ends constitute one class of goods, where ends are those goods that 
are choiceworthy for themselves. He then says that fine things make up only a subclass of 
the category of ends, and are those ends that are praiseworthy.  So while health and 
strength are goods, they are not fine, since they are not praiseworthy.  
In the EN, Aristotle clearly says that strictly speaking only voluntary actions are 
praiseworthy (1109b31, EE 1223a9-15), and he says specifically that the actions that are 
praiseworthy are virtuous actions (1101b32).  
Virtuous actions benefit others (EN 1169a8-11), but it is not enough for an action 
to benefit others for the action to be fine. As EE 8.3 makes clear, actions are fine only 
when they have a specific motive: 
                                                
34 “Whatever is praiseworthy, being chosen for its own sake, is kalon, or whatever being good, is pleasant 
because it is good” (Rhet 1.9 1366aa33-4). Aristotle does not go on to connect pleasure with the fine in the 
Rhetoric (this is not the case for goodness and praiseworthiness), so I have assumed that the point about 
pleasure is not intended as an essential feature of the fine.  
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There is a certain state of a citizen such as the Spartans have, or other such people 
would have.  This is a state of the following sort; there are those who think that 
one should possess virtue, but for the sake of the natural goods.  They are 
therefore good men (for natural goods are so for them), but they do not have 
nobility (kalokagathian).  For they do not possess the things that are fine for 
themselves, but those who possess them, also choose things fine-and-good (kala 
kai agatha) for themselves; and not only those things, but also the things not fine 
by nature, but good by nature, are fine for them.  For they are fine when that for 
the sake of which they act and choose is fine (EE 8.3 1248b37-1249a6) 
 
The Spartan is good but not fine and good, because the Spartan does virtuous actions for 
the sake of the natural goods (1248b40) and not for the virtuous actions (“themselves”) 
(1249a3-4) or (equivalently) for the sake of the fine (1249a5-6).   When the Spartan 
chooses virtuous actions, he (unlike the virtuous person) does something fine only 
incidentally (1249a15-6). There are other passages where Aristotle connects fine action to 
an action that is prompted by a particular motive. For example, he says that fine actions 
do not aim at self-interest (1125a11-2, 1168a9-12, 1169a3-6, Pol. 1338a30-2)35 and do 
not aim at pleasure (EN 1110b11).36  
How should we understand this motive “for the fine”? Because of the prominence 
of praiseworthiness in the ethical works’ discussions of the fine (Rhet. 1.9, EE 8.3 
1248b16-25),37 a plausible starting point for interpreting the fine is to say that Aristotle 
identifies acting for the sake of the fine with acting for the sake of the honorable or 
                                                
35 A similar contrast Aristotle invokes to describe the fine is that between acting for the sake of the fine and 
acting from necessity (1116b2-3 1120b1, 1155a28-9, 1165a4, 1171a24-6). One acts from necessity 
(anankezesthai) when one stands fast in battle to avoid some greater evil (say, death or punishment) 
(1180a4-5).  
36 It is for the sake of either the pleasant or the fine, he says, that every action is performed (1110b11). 
37 Aristotle distinguishes between honorable in possession and honorable in result (IV.2 1122b15-23). The 
distinction between honorable in possession and honorable in action helps clarify Aristotle’s distinction 
elsewhere between the praiseworthy and honorable (EN 1.12 1101b10-5).  At EN 1.12 Aristotle doesn’t 
commit himself here to a distinction between the honorable in action and the praiseworthy (how could he, 
since he describes fine action as both honorable and praiseworthy?  Rather, he is distinguishing between the 
praiseworthy and the honorable in possession. Praiseworthiness, being essentially about action, cannot 
apply to honorable possessions. So when Aristotle says that fine actions are honorable, he means that they 
are honorable in action.  This is presumably the same thing as being praiseworthy.  
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praiseworthy, where acting out of a concern for the honorable or the praiseworthy, is 
acting out of a non-instrumental concern to instantiate a moral ideal.  By ‘moral ideal’ I 
mean a set of ideals that is not defined in terms of the agent’s interests (and hence might 
require self-sacrifice).  
 This characterization fits well with several important aspects of Aristotle’s 
description of the fine. Recall the passages where Aristotle contrasts acting for the sake 
of the fine with acting for the sake of self-interest. These passages suggest that Aristotle 
takes fine action to be conceptually distinct from self-interested action.  Note also that the 
concepts of honor and the honorable seem to be essentially social: they essentially 
originate in a peer group. Thus, any value connected to honor or the honorable most 
likely will not be conceptually tied to self-interest. 38  39 
                                                
38 Examples of fine action include those actions that benefit others and promote the common good: “Those 
things…are fine…which a man does not do for his own sake; things which are absolutely good, which a 
man has done for the sake of his country, while neglecting his own interests; things which are naturally 
good; and not such as are good for the individual, since such things are inspired by selfish motives. And 
those things are fine which it is possible for a man to possess after death rather than during his lifetime, for 
the latter involve more selfishness; all acts done for the sake of others, for they are more disinterested; the 
successes gained, not for oneself, but for others; and for one’s benefactors, for this is just; in generally, all 
acts of kindness, for they are disinterested. And the contrary of those things of which we are ashamed 
(aischunontai); for we are ashamed of what is disgraceful (aischra), in words, acts, or intention.” (Rhet. 1.9 
1366b37-1367a7) Aristotle also mentions the long hair of the Spartans as an example of something fine: 
“Customs that are unique (idia) to individual peoples and all the instances of what is praised 
(epainoumenôn) among them are noble; for instance, in Sparta it is fine to wear one’s hair long, for it is the 
mark of freedom (eleutherou), the performance of any service task being difficult for one whose hair is 
long. And not carrying on any vulgar (banaouson) profession is fine, for a free person does not live in 
dependence on others.” (Rhet. 1.9 1367a27-33) 
39 As Terence Irwin has pointed out, Aristotle also connects the fine with the common good.  For example, 
he says in the Rhetoric that the extreme degree of virtue is to benefit everyone” (1367b6-7) and provides a 
general account of virtue as “a capacity to provide and protect goods and a capacity to benefit in many and 
great ways” (1366a36-8).  “When everyone is contending towards the fine and straining to do the finest 
actions, the community will gain everything it ought to (deonta), and each individual will gain the greatest 
of goods, if that is the character of virtue” (1169a8-11). “Since the feature of virtue that is properly praised 
is its tendency to benefit others, this is also the feature that makes it fine” (127). 
I think that this is compatible with my claim that the fine making characteristic is praiseworthiness 
or honorability. What is going on here is description at different levels. At the most general level, the fine 
making characteristic is praiseworthiness. But at a more specific level, one can determine that the feature 
that we should pick out for praise is promotion of the common good.   
Consider someone who pursue what he regards as praiseworthy but who is ignorant of what is in 
fact praiseworthy. For example, consider someone who wants to do what is praiseworthy but does not 
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Putting together these elements of the fine, we can say the following. One 
performs a fine action when one performs the sort of behaviors characteristic of the 
virtues, and moreover does so out of a non-instrumental concern to instantiate a moral 
ideal. Acting finely as such thus requires not only that one does actions that the virtuous 
person tends to do, but that one does them because such behavior instantiates a moral 
ideal.  
 
II.3 Richardson-Lear’s View 
 
Richardson-Lear has a different view of the fine. Because her interpretation has been 
influential, I want to examine it before moving on to the question of whether the alogon 
can pursue fine action as such.  
According to Richardson Lear, the central elements making up something fine is 
(1) fittingness (prepon), (2) order (taxis), (3) symmetry (summetria), (4) definiteness or 
boundedness (horismenon), (5) visibility, and (6) pleasure.  The first four elements 
constitute something’s being effectively teleologically ordered—its having parts that are 
well-ordered in relation to its end (telos), and taken together they capture the fact that fine 
actions seem well-ordered and thus good to an agent.   
                                                
know what makes (e.g.) courage praiseworthy. The person does actions that are in fact fine and does them 
because he thinks they are praiseworthy. But he cannot identify the feature that makes them praiseworthy; 
he does not know that it is promotion of common good that makes it praiseworthy and thus fine. I say that 
this person does the fine and the fine as such in the sense that he does actions that are in fact fine and 
moreover does them because of their praiseworthiness (as opposed to their pleasure, or for instrumental 
reason).  Of course, he lacks a synoptic understanding of fineness and so doesn’t pursue the fine as such in 
the way the virtuous person does. 
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Because “defining the fine as effective teleological order does not yet distinguish 
it from the good,”40 Richardson-Lear introduces (5) and (6). When something is, in 
addition to being effectively teleologically ordered, both visible and pleasant, it is kalon. 
(5) captures both visibility to the senses and visibility to the intellect and is important 
primarily because it makes (6) possible: something’s being visible allows the agent to 
take pleasure in what she sees.41 42  According to Richardson-Lear, virtuous actions, 
insofar as they lie in a mean, display a type of order that is pleasant for the virtuous agent 
to behold.  
I have three main problems with Richardson Lear’s account. First, she relies 
heavily on Aristotle’s statements about the fine that occur in non-ethical contexts, and 
we’ve seen that it is questionable whether the accounts of the fine offered in these 
different passages are part of one unified account. Second, she downplays the references 
to praiseworthiness in the accounts of the fine that surface in explicitly ethical contexts. 
Finally, EE 8.3 directly contradicts her account.   
Since I’ve already discussed the first problem in some detail, I will explain the 
second and third problems. In addition to ignoring entirely the connection EE 8.3 draws 
                                                
40 Richardson-Lear, 122. 
41 “But the visibility of the fine is also important as a condition of its causing (its proper) pleasure. Aristotle 
says that the decent person, “insofar as he is decent, delights in virtuous actions and is pained by bad ones 
just as a musical person delights in fine and beautiful [kalois] songs and is pained by bad [phaulois] ones” 
(EN IX.9 1170a8-11). Here I think it is clear that the pleasure comes not so much from doing what is fine 
as from contemplating it” (Richardson Lear 123-4). 
42 (6) plays a critical role in Richardson-Lear’s account. The fine is important to reason because, as a form 
of aesthetic pleasure, it makes the perfection of virtuous actions “easily intelligible.” The intelligibility of 
such perfection is threatened by the fact that reason is constantly focused on future action, and thus a 
rational agent is vulnerable to losing sight of the fact that virtuous rational action is an end in itself: 
But if practical reasoning is by nature ever sensitive to external circumstances and focused on 
future action, there is a risk of not fully registering in consciousness that one has already achieved 
the ultimate practicable good:  virtuous rational activity itself….This is why it matters to reason 
that actions be fine as well as good.  For when our actions are fine, their perfection is easily 
intelligible.  In fact the grander and more beautiful they are, the more easily we know their 
goodness (Richardson-Lear, 131). 
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between the fine and praiseworthiness, Richardson-Lear downplays Rhet. 1.9’s reference 
to praiseworthiness and instead focuses almost entirely on its reference to pleasure, 43 
using it to establish (6).  Such treatment is unjustified, for if we look at the passage and 
its surrounding context, we see that it is praiseworthiness, and not pleasure, that receives 
most of Aristotle’s emphasis. To establish virtue’s fineness, for example, Aristotle relies 
on virtue’s praiseworthiness; he does not rely on its pleasantness. He reiterates the fine’s 
connection with praise when later on in Rhet 1.9 he says that what is rewarded with honor 
(timê) is fine (Rhet. 1.9 1366b37-1367a7; Cf. Rhet. 1.9 1367b10-12) and what is 
honorable (timion) is fine (Rhet 1.9 1367b31). Richardson-Lear unjustifiably leaves out 
the connections the ethical works draw between praise and the fine.  
 Next, the EE 8.3 passage seems to directly contradict Richardson Lear’s account. 
EE 8.3 suggests that pleasantness is not the feature that, when combined with goodness, 
makes something fine. Health is a good and, being visible, should be pleasant according 
to Richardson-Lear’s account. Since But EE 8.3 clearly states that health is not fine, 
Richardson-Lear’s account must be wrong.  
   
II.3 Conclusion 
 
If acting finely as such involves both doing actions that are characteristic of the virtues 
and doing them out of a non-instrumental concern for the honorable, then the question 
                                                
43 For example, after quoting the passage, she concludes that the fine in action is “the morally pleasant.” 
Moreover, she leaves praiseworthiness out of her characterization of the “central elements of the fine”:   “I 
will argue that there are three central elements of the fine or beautiful as Aristotle conceives it:  effective 
teleological order, visibility, and pleasantness” (Richardson Lear, 117). She seems to understand 
“praiseworthy” as “likely to bring about praise” and not “deserving of praise (whether or not it is likely to 
bring about praise),” and this might influence her decision to downplay the role of praise in her account of 
the fine. 
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before us is the following:  Is it possible for agents, qua experiencing appetitive and 
spirited desires, both to do actions characteristic of the virtues and do them out of a non-
instrumental concern to do what is honorable? A “yes” answer means that appetitive and 
spirited desires can attach to fine actions as such.   
 One clarificatory remark before we go on.  I will sometimes talk of the alogon 
pursuing the fine (or fine actions), and I will sometimes talk of the alogon pursuing the 
fine as such (or fine action as such). I use the former locution to refer to the behaviors 
that are characteristic of the virtues. As I shall use the terminology, a person who stands 
fast in battle performs a fine action, even if she stands fast in battle because she wants to 
avoid the painful penalties that come with deserting does an action.  However, such a 
person does not perform a fine action as such, since fine actions as such are not only are 
actions that are characteristic of virtues, but actions that are done qua instantiations of a 
moral ideal.   Acting finely as such requires doing what is fine and doing it because it is 
fine.  
 
III.  Spirit, Honor, and Honorability   
 
III.1 Spirit’s Love of Honor  
 
I first want to establish that the spirited agent, qua spirited (that is, qua having spirited 
desires), can pursue the honorable; that is, I want to show that, in virtue of having certain 
spirited desires, an agent non-instrumentally desires to live up to particular moral ideals.  
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If this is right, then--given that motivation by the fine is identical to motivation by the 
honorable—the spirited person can have the distinctive motive involved in fine action.  
To show that some spirited desires pursue the honorable, I want to examine spirit 
in a somewhat roundabout way.  Aristotle emphasizes that young people (neoi) have a 
spirited aspect (Rhet. 2.11 1389a3-15), and this suggests that young people’s motivational 
attitudes can tell us something about the motivational and evaluative capacities of spirit.  
Consider the following passage:44  
(a) [The young (neoi)] are passionate (thumokoi), hot-tempered, and carried away 
by impulse (hormê), and are apt to give way to spirit (thumos); (b) for (gar) on 
account of their love of honor (philotimian) they cannot endure to be slighted, and 
become indignant when they think they are being wronged. (c) They are lovers of 
honor (philotimoi), but of victory (philonikoi) especially; (d) for (gar) youth 
appetitively desire (epithumei) superiority, and victory is a kind of superiority. (e) 
And (their desire for) both of these is greater than their desire for money, to which 
they attach only the slightest value, because they have never yet experienced 
want… (Rhet. 2.12 1389a3-15) 
 
Here, Aristotle says that young people love honor and victory ([c], [d]). He makes it clear 
that their desire for victory is not a spirited desire but rather an appetitive desire; the 
youth appetitively desire victory, insofar as (gar (d)) they appetitively desire (epithumei, 
(d)) superiority, a type of victory.45 Aristotle claims throughout his works that the object 
of appetite is pleasure; appetite always pursues what is pleasant.46 Presumably, then, 
young people appetitively desire victory and superiority in the sense that they desire the 
pleasures of these things. (And indeed, a passage at EN 7. 4 discusses those who have an 
                                                
44 In addition to being moved by spirit, young people are moved by appetite:  “The young, as to character, 
are ready to appetitively desire (epithumêtikoi) and to carry out what they desire. Of the bodily appetites 
they especially obey sensual ones and of these they are incontinent. Changeable in their appetites and soon 
tiring of them, they appetitively desire excessively, but soon cool; for their wishes (boulêseis), like the 
hunger and thirst of the sick, are keen rather than strong.” (Rhet. 2.12 1389a3-7) 
45 Aristotle considers a distinctively appetitive love of victory at EN 7.6, where he discusses a kind of 
appetitive incontinence with respect to the pleasures of victory (EN 7.4 1148a22-29).  
46 Appetite “is the cause of all actions that appear pleasant” (Rhet. 1.10 1369b15-16); appetite is “of the 
pleasant and painful” (EN 1111b17); appetite is “a desire for what is pleasurable” (DA 2.3 414b5-6).  
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excessive appetite for the pleasures of victory and honor,47 which confirms that, for 
Aristotle, appetitive desires for such things do exist.48)  
While young people’s desires for victory are distinctively appetitive desires, their 
concern with honor (philotimian) that the passage mentions does not seem to be 
appetitive; it is not a desire for the pleasures of honor, and so differs from the sort of 
desire for honor discussed at EN 7.6. Evidence that their concern for honor is spirited 
rather than appetitive is found in the connection the passage makes (at [b]) between 
young people’s desires for honor and their susceptibility to indignation in the face of 
slights. This is because Aristotle relegates indignation in the face of insults to the domain 
of anger (orgê) (Rhet. 2.2 1378a31-3), an emotion that is spirited (not appetitive) (De 
Anima 1.1 403a30 and Top. 8.1 156a32, 4.5 126a8-10, 2.7 113b1).49 
So the Rhetoric’s description of young people suggests that spirit can make one 
an honor lover, where this love is not reducible to a concern for the pleasures of honor. 
But if these spirited desires are not desires for honor’s pleasures, how exactly should we 
understand them?  We might think that the spirited person desires medals, awards, and 
good reputation for themselves; her final end is not the pleasure of these awards but 
rather the awards themselves. While this love of external honors might be part of the 
story concerning spirit’s love of honor, it cannot be the whole story. On the contrary, an 
examination of spirit’s essentially social nature—in particular the way that nature is 
                                                
47 “Hence some appetites and pleasures are for fine and excellent kinds of things, such as wealth, profit, 
victory, and honor.  About all these and about the things in between people are blamed not for experiencing 
an appetite and love for them, but for doing so in a excessive way.” (EN 7.4 1148a24-29) 
48  Aristotle also talks about appetites for learning at NE 1111a30-1 (cf. Rhet. 1371a33) and appetites for 
health at 1111a30-1. Presumably, these appetitive desires are desires for the pleasures associated with 
learning and with health.  
49 Again, this doesn’t rule out an appetitive concern with honor. It is possible that young people have both 
appetitive and spirited concerns with honor. My point here is that the particular desires for honor that 
Aristotle discusses in this passage are spirited rather than appetitive.  
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manifested in shame (aidôs), a moral phenomenon that Aristotle ties to spirit—reveals 
that young people’s spirited desires involve a concern with what I, following Aristotle, 
have called “the honorable”; they desire to instantiate a moral ideal, and not merely to 
acquire external honors.   
 
III.2 In What Does Spirit’s Love of Honor Consist? Spirit’s Love of Honor as a Love of 
Honorability  
 
To see that spirit’s concern with honor includes a concern with the honorable (and not 
just with external honors), let us look at a passage where Aristotle discusses the proper 
upbringing of citizens:  
In fact, however, arguments seem to have enough influence to stimulate and 
encourage the cultivated ones (eleutherious) among the youth, and perhaps to 
make virtue take possession of a well-born character that truly loves what is fine; 
but they seem unable to turn the many toward the fine and good. For the many 
naturally obey fear, not shame (aidôs); they avoid what is base because of the 
penalties, not because it is disgraceful (aischron). For since they live by their 
feelings (pathei), they pursue their proper pleasures and the sources of them, and 
avoid the opposed pains, and have not even a notion of what is fine and truly 
pleasant, since they have had no taste of it. (EN 10.9 1179b5-17, translation 
Irwin) 
 
Here Aristotle contrasts the concerns of the many and the youth to set up a contrast 
between motivation by the pleasant and painful on the one hand, and motivation by a 
sense of shame on the other. The association the passage makes between young people 
and shame (a connection echoed elsewhere—see EN 4.9, for example) has the potential 
to tell us something about the particular sense in which spirit makes young people honor 
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lovers. This is because shame both involves the desire for a certain kind of honor and is a 
spirited attitude.  Let us look at these aspects in turn.  
First, shame involves the desire for a certain kind of honor. In Aristotle’s 
definitions of shame, he explicitly connects shame50 with honor (or dishonor): shame is 
“an impression (phantasia) concerning dishonor (adoxias) and that for its own sake but 
not for the sake of its results” (Rhet. 2.6 1384a); “[w]e are ashamed (aischunontai) when 
we suffer or have suffered or are about to suffer the sorts of things that bring on dishonor 
(atimian) and reproach…” (2.6 1384a13).51  Insofar as shame is an aversion towards 
dishonor, it goes hand in hand with a certain kind of desire for honor.   
Second, shame is a type of spirited desire. The strongest support for the claim that 
shame is a spirited disposition comes from Aristotle’s claim that spirit, as the desire 
through which we feel friendship, is an essentially social desire. Consider the following 
passage:  
[Thumos] is the capacity of the soul by which we feel friendship (philoumen). A 
sign of this is that one’s spirit is roused more against those with whom one is 
familiar (sunêtheis) and against friends (philous) than against those whom one 
does not know (agnôtas), when one takes oneself to be slighted.  Therefore 
Archilochus for instance, when reproaching friends, correctly addresses his spirit 
in these words:  ‘For surely thou art plagued on account of friends.’  (Pol. 7.6 
1327b38-1328a6) 
 
According to this passage, it is spirit by which we first feel friendship; it is a desire 
through which we form special attachments to friends and to the familiar (sunêthesis).52 
                                                
50 Or a sense of disgrace (aischunê).  Aristotle seems to use “shame” (aidôs) and “sense of disgrace” 
(aischunê) interchangeably. Cf. EN 4.9, where his argument is valid only if he identifies the two.   
51 Cf. Rhet. 2.6 1383b13-14:  A sense of disgrace (aischunê) is some sort of pain (lupê) or uneasiness 
concerning the things that appear to carry dishonor (adoxian).”  
52 The connection between spirit and the forming of attachments for what is familiar is reminiscent of a 
similar connection that Plato draws in the Republic, when Socrates suggests that the spirited auxiliaries will 
have the proper sentiments towards what is familiar (oikeion) to them or what is “their own.” Socrates says 
that the guardians must be spirited if they are to be brave, and then stresses that this spirited nature must 
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The suggestion here is that spirit is the desire through which we conceive of ourselves as 
members of a social ordering, and develop attachments to fellow members of that 
ordering. Aristotle, like Plato, thinks that spirit makes us sensitive to group identities; it 
furnishes us with friendly feelings for what is our own or familiar (oikeion).  
The fact that spirit is the desire through which we form attachments with what is 
oikeion is important, because it suggests that shame is spirited. For shame too essentially 
involves sensitivity to one’s social standing and the way a community views oneself. 
Consider, for example, Aristotle’s claim that the opinion of others looms large in shame:  
They are more ashamed of things that are done before their eyes and in broad 
daylight; whence the proverb, ‘The eyes are the abode of shame.’ (Rhet. 1384a30, 
quoting Euripides)   
 
Aristotle says that the presence of actual observers heightens the feeling of shame, 
suggesting that shame is inextricably bound up with the views of others, that it operates 
in an essentially social context. Given the connection between spirit and community, 
shame is likely a spirited desire.  
If I am right that shame is a spirited desire and that it involves a concern with 
honor, then presumably the shame motivational framework that Aristotle ascribes to 
young people at EN 10.9 is connected with the spirited concern with honor he ascribes to 
young people in the Rhetoric 2.12 passage. Thus, we should examine shame to see what 
light it might shed on the nature of young people’s spirited concern with honor.   
                                                
combine gentleness towards those who are familiar to them (tous oikeious) and harshness towards their 
enemies. He then appeals to dogs as animals that get right this combination of these sentiments: “you know 
that well-bred dogs are perfectly gentle to their familiars (sunêtheis) and acquaintances (gnôrimous), and 
the reverse to stranger…When a dog sees someone it doesn’t know (agnôta), it gets angry before anything 
bad happens to it. But when it knows someone (gnôrimon), it welcomes (aspazetai) him, even if it has 
never received anything good from him” (Rep 2 375a-376b). On the spirited quality of dogs, see 375a.  
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Shame often manifests itself before an audience (recall the Euripides quotation), 
but it is not simply a concern for good reputation or external honors. After all, the 
audience involved in shame may be no more than the detached perspective of the person 
experiencing shame, and such “self-reflective” shame suggests that shame as a whole 
transcends a crude concern with public honors or good public opinion.  To see this, 
consider two passages from the Odyssey that, as Bernard Williams53 points out, exhibit 
self-reflective shame. At Od 2.64-5, Telemachus tells the Ithaca assembly that the poorly-
behaving suitors should “be outraged themselves (autoi) and feel shame in the face of 
other men who live around.”54 As Williams notes, Telemachus is not repeating himself.55 
Later, at 6.310-20, Nausikaa fears what people will say if they see her with an attractive 
stranger, and that there will be an uproar; but she then goes on to say, “And I myself 
would think badly of a girl who acted so.”56  
  These examples indicate that shame involves a person regarding herself as falling 
short. Nausikka, having internalized the moral norms of her society, makes a self-
evaluative judgment in the normative terms of her society. This is significant, because it 
suggests that shame has a concern with the honorable, a concern with living up to one’s 
particular moral standards or ideals. This sort of desire is not crudely dependent on her 
receiving praise or honors; on the contrary, shame implies that agents actually internalize 
the moral judgments of the community, and use these moral judgments as standards that 
they have non-instrumental reason to live up to.   (Indeed, were shame simply a concern 
with honor, it would be very hard to explain the discriminating aspect of shame—the fact 
                                                
53 Williams, 82-4. 
54  “Nemessêthête kai autoi, allous t’aidesthête periktionas anthrôpous.” 
55 Williams, 83.  
56 “hôs ereousin, emoi de k' oneidea tauta genoito.kai d' allêi nemesô, hê tis toiauta ge rhezoi,hê t' aekêti 
philôn patros kai mêtros eontôn,andrasi misgêtai, prin g' amphadion gamon elthein.” 6.285 
 60 
that shame concerns not just anybody’s views of ourselves, but rather the views of the 
people we respect and admire.57)    
Spirit’s connection to friendship (philoumen—recall the quote from the Politics) 
can help illuminate the character and development of shame attitudes. In books 8 and 9 of 
the EN, Aristotle discusses the development of friendships (philia) and gives significant 
attention of the development of friendships that happen early in an agent’s upbringing. 
On a charitable interpretation of that account, one that coheres well with our own moral 
experience and one that best explains his comments on shame, an agent’s love for her 
family or friendship carries with it an internalization of the standards they set.58 Because 
                                                
57 Aristotle on the discriminating character of shame:  
Now since shame is the imagination of disgrace, in which we shrink from the disgrace itself and not from 
its consequences, and we only care what opinion is held of us because of the people who form that opinion, 
it follows that the people before whom we feel shame are those whose opinion of us matters to us.  Such 
persons are:  those who admire us, those whom we admire, those by whom we wish to be admired, those 
with whom we are competing, and those whose opinion of us we respect. (Rhet. 2.6 1384a22-27)   
58 In support of this idea, consider the account of moral development that Rawls puts forward in A Theory 
of Justice. This is of course, a much different time period than Aristotle, but I’m not sure how much that 
matters. We’re looking for an interpretation of Aristotle that is plausible, and Rawls nicely articulates what 
I think we have encountered in our own moral experience. Rawls discusses three stages of morality, the 
first stage corresponding to morality developed in the family, the second stage corresponding to the 
morality developed at the level of community, and the third stage corresponding to the morality developed 
at the level of principles. Rawls, like Aristotle, draws attention to the fact that parents love and benefit their 
children, and that children recognize this and respond to it with love: He suggests that when children come 
to love their parents, they form the desire to be the sort of people their parents want them to be, to do the 
things their parents want them to do. In cases where they fall short of this ideal, they feel “guilt”—an 
emotion that Rawls distinguishes from shame, but which nevertheless bears important similarities to it.  
[G]iven the nature of the authority situation and the principles of moral psychology connecting 
the ethical and natural attitudes, love and trust will give rise to feelings of guilt once the parental 
injunctions are disobeyed. Admittedly in the case of the child it is sometimes difficult to 
distinguish feelings of guilt from the fear of punishment, and especially from the dread of the loss 
of parental love and affection. The child lacks the concepts for understanding moral distinctions 
and this will reflect itself in his behavior. I have supposed, however, that even in the child’s case 
we can separate (authority) guilt feelings from fear and anxiety (Rawls, 407). 
Rawls suggests that attachments formed during childhood supply children not only the desire to receive 
praise from parents, but also a concern to live up to the model of character and behavior that their parents 
put forward for them. This latter concern is not reducible to a concern for parent’s affection or good 
opinion; if it were, it would be difficult to explain children’s feelings of guilt (as opposed to fear or anxiety) 
when they fall short of their parents’ expectations.  
 Like Aristotle, Rawls stresses that such family attachments, as well as attachments in community, 
result from the benefits that people receive from family and community. This development is not merely 
one of association or reinforcement, but rather a development of genuine love and friendship:    
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of the internalization that results from such love, the agent adopts these moral standards 
as goals worth pursuing for their own sakes: she will view the recommended actions as 
worth doing independently of the praise or external honors they might bring. This is the 
sense in which a child’s friendly attitudes bring about a concern with honorability.   
So spirit’s essentially social context—its connection to friendship and the development of 
social relations---explains how spirited agents develop a concern with honorability.  In 
short, spirited agents, in virtue of the love they have for their family and community 
members, non-instrumentally desire to uphold and instantiate the practices, actions, and 
character traits which make up the moral ideal they have internalized from their family 
and community. In this way, they desire the honorable; they do not merely desire external 
honor. When they fall short of these moral ideals, they experience shame.  
Indeed, this claim that spirited people can aim at the fine as such coheres nicely 
with the Rhetoric’s claim that young people are apt to pursue the fine:  
 
[a] In their actions, they choose to do fine things over useful things 
(sumpherontôn); [b] for they live more by their character rather than by 
calculation (logismô), with calculation being of the useful, and virtue being of the 
fine. [c] At this age more than any other they are fond of their friends and 
companions, because they delight in living in company and [d] as yet judge 
(krinein) nothing by utility (pros to sumpheron) not even their friends.  [e] All 
their mistakes are in the direction of doing things excessively. (Rhet. 1389a34-
1389b3) 
 
The passage suggests that young people actually judge actions as fine and perform 
actions because they judge them as fine. This seems to be the implication that they judge 
                                                
Because we recognize that they wish us well, we care for their well-being in turn.  Thus we 
acquire attachments to persons and institutions according to how we perceive our good to be 
affected by them. The basic idea is one of reciprocity, a tendency to answer in kind. Now this 
tendency is a deep psychological fact. Without it our nature would be very different and fruitful 
social cooperation fragile if not impossible (Rawls, 433). 
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(krinein) nothing by utility [d]; given the passage’s earlier contrast between the fine and 
the useful [a], the cognitive verb at [d] suggests that they do judge actions according to 
those actions’ fineness; that is, they judge actions as fine, and perform those actions for 
that reason. Young people, we have seen, have spirited natures, and spirited agents want 
to do what is honorable and what will be honored.  If, then, I am right about these 
connections between spirit and honorability on the one hand, and honorability and the 
fine on the other, we should not be surprised by the Rhetoric’s claim that young people 
pursue fine actions under the description “fine.”  
 
 
 
III.3 The Spirited Agent’s Pursuit of Honorable Actions 
 
So one of the ways in which spirit makes a person an honor lover is in its imparting to the 
spirited agent a general desire to do what is honorable and to be a person of moral worth.   
Of course, someone with a general desire to do what is honorable will not succeed in 
doing what is honorable if she does not know which particular actions are honorable. 
Spirited agents learn from social norms and honor practices59 which actions are honorable 
ones, and so they can focus their general desire for honorability on actions that are 
genuinely honorable. In a good society, the behaviors characteristic of the virtues are 
what are honored, and so the spirited agent will focus her desires for honorability on the 
types of actions associated with temperance, courage, and justice.  
 
                                                
59 What is praised and honored tends to promote the common good (EN IV.2 1122b15-23). 
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IV.  Citizen Bravery  
 
In his discussion of bravery, Aristotle discusses five conditions that resemble full bravery 
but fall short of full bravery. Among the conditions he discusses is “citizen bravery,” a 
kind of bravery that is the closest of the pseudo forms to the real thing.    I want to look at 
this discussion because, on one interpretation of the passage, it lends support to the 
connections I made in the foregoing sections between certain spirited desires and the 
pursuit of the fine as such. Here is the citizen bravery passage: 
 
Others are also called brave, according to five ways. [a] Citizen (politikê) bravery 
comes first, for it looks most like bravery. [b] For (gar) citizens seem to endure 
dangers on account of the penalties inflicted by law and public disgrace, and 
because of the honors (dia ta ek tôn nomôn epitimia kai ta oneidê kai dia tas 
timas); and on account of this they seem to be the bravest, among whom the 
cowards are dishonored and the courageous honored… [c.i] This is the most like 
the [full] bravery described earlier, [c.ii] since it comes about on account of virtue 
(di' aretên ginetai) [c.iii] (for (gar) it comes about on account of shame  (di' aidô) 
and [c.iv] on account of a desire for fineness (kai dia kalou orexin) [c.v] (namely 
honor (times gar)) and by aversion from disgrace (phugên oneidous), which is 
something shameful (aischrou ontos). [d] Into this class someone might also put 
those compelled by their superiors.  [e.i] But they are worse, [e.ii] insofar as not 
on account of shame (ou di' aidô) but on account of fear they act (alla dia phobon 
auto drôsi), [e.iii] and they flee not the shameful but the painful (pheugontes ou to 
aischron alla to lupêron). For their superiors compel them, just as Hector does:  
‘If I notice anyone shrinking back from the battle, nothing will save him from 
being eaten by dogs.’   Commanders who strike any troops who give ground, or 
who post them in front of ditches and suchlike, do the same thing, since they all 
compel them. [f] It is necessary that one be brave not on account of compulsion 
but because [bravery] is fine (dei d' ou di' anagkên andreion einai, all' hoti 
kalon). (EN 3.8 1116a16-1116b5) 
 
To support his claim that citizen bravery is closest to genuine bravery, Aristotle argues 
that it comes about “on account of virtue” [c.i.-c.ii]. He then explains (see explanatory 
“gar” at [c.iii]) this claim about its origins in virtue by asserting that citizen virtue comes 
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about on account of shame [c.iii] and a desire for fineness (kalou) [c.iv], where the latter 
is glossed as a desire for honor  [c.v].   
 Note that we can read the passage in such a way that it illustrates the connections 
I have drawn between spirit, the fine, and honorability. At [c.iv], Aristotle connects 
aiming at fineness with aiming at honor. If we understand this connection as that between 
aiming at fineness and aiming at the honorable, then [c.iv] lends support to my claim that 
pursuing the honorable is a way of being motivated by the fine as such. The passage also 
gives some hints that the brave citizen’s pursuit of the fine is grounded in spirit.  For the 
passage emphasizes shame as the primary motivational framework governing citizen 
bravery (see, for example, [c.iii], [e.ii], and [e.iii]), and as we’ve seen in the foregoing 
discussion, shame is a spirited motivational framework.  If this is right, then it is not 
unreasonable to think the brave citizen’s desire for fineness is ultimately grounded in 
spirited motivational attitudes. 60  
   
V.  Appetite and the Fine  
 
So far I have discussed spirited desires, and have argued that spirited desires can attach to 
fine actions and fine actions as such. I now want to turn to the case of appetitive desires. 
                                                
60 Thus, I disagree with C.C.W. Taylor’s interpretation of this passage: “Where, then, lies the difference 
between true courage and mere civic courage? The difference, such as it is, must be this: the courageous 
person has fully internalized the values from which he or she acts, whereas the values motivating civic 
courage are external. The primary motivations of the civically courageous person are the desire for honor 
and the desire to avoid disgrace, i.e. to be favorably regarded, and to avoid being unfavorably regarded by 
others. …Shame is primarily the fear of being disgraced in the eyes of others; it is thus the mirror image of 
the desire for honor, to stand well in the eyes of others, which in the case of civic courage is the form which 
desire for the fine takes (a28-9). The person of civic courage is thus motivated primarily by considerations 
of social standing, by contrast with the person of true courage, who is motivated primarily by 
considerations of standing in his or her own eyes. The courageous person cares above all about what he or 
she sees as fine, not what others see as fine, and similarly for avoiding what he or she sees as disgraceful” 
(Taylor, 186). 
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Can appetitive desires attach to acting finely as such? That is, can appetitive desires 
prompt one to do the behaviors characteristic of the virtues, and moreover do them out of 
a non-instrumental concern to do what is honorable or be an honorable person?  
The answer to this question is complicated. On the one hand, Aristotle makes 
clear that pleasure is the ultimate end of appetite, and thus pleasure will be part of the end 
of any appetitive desire.  On the other hand, he suggests that, at least in the virtuous 
person, ‘pleasures from fine action’ is part of the description under which appetite 
pursues pleasures. The content of some of the virtuous person’s appetitive desires 
necessarily include ‘the fine,’ and on these grounds appetite pursues fine action in a non-
instrumental way.  Thus, there is a sense in which appetite pursues the fine as such.   My 
goal in this section is to make these ideas clearer.  
Aristotle consistently says that the object of appetite is pleasure. Appetite “is the 
cause of all actions that appear pleasant” (Rhetoric 1.10 1369b15-16); appetite is “of the 
pleasant and painful” (EN 1111b17); appetite is “a desire for what is pleasurable” (DA 
2.3 414b5-6). The pleasures that appetite pursues is not restricted to bodily appetites, but 
rather includes pleasures of all kinds. This is clear from EN 7.4, where Aristotle discusses 
those who have an excessive appetite for the pleasures of victory and honor.61 Aristotle 
also talks about an appetite for learning at EN 1111a30-1, Rhet. 1371a33, and for health 
at 1111a30-1.  
Recall that in the Rhetoric, Aristotle says that the fine is that which “being good, 
is pleasant because it is good” (Rhetoric 1366a33-4). I want to focus on the second part 
of this claim, the claim that the kalon is pleasant because it is good. One way of reading 
                                                
61 “Hence some appetites and pleasures are for fine and excellent kinds of things, such as wealth, profit, 
victory, and honor.  About all these and about the things in between people are blamed not for experiencing 
an appetite and love for them, but for doing so in a excessive way” (EN 7.4 1148a24-29). 
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this is that fine action is pleasant to the agent because the agent regards the action is 
good. On this interpretation, a person’s taking pleasure in fine action is not a matter of 
that agent taking pleasure in (e.g.) returning deposits. Rather, what she takes pleasure in 
is the goodness of the action. If the agent can take pleasure in something’s goodness, 
presumably she can also take pleasure in its fineness. And Indeed, Aristotle seems to 
describe just this when he says that the temperate person “enjoys the [abstinence] itself” 
(EN 2.3 1104b7).  The idea seems to be that the virtuous person sees her abstinence or 
standing fast as a case of acting finely, and takes pleasure in it as such so that she takes 
pleasure in (e.g.) returning deposits and standing fast in battle under the description ‘fine 
activity.’ 
How does an agent come to take pleasure in doing the fine thing under that 
description? Presumably, she will be habituated in doing fine activity with a view to 
acting finely.  The trainee will be told, for example, that the goal in all action is to act 
finely and that one ought to do courageous or just or temperate activity not simply 
because these activities are advantageous or themselves enjoyable, but because they are 
instances of fine activity. In this way, the trainee is continually reminded that these 
activities are to be pursued as instances of fine activity. When the trainee performs 
activities like standing fast in battle or repaying a debt she will be guided by a father, a 
teacher, or some other rule-maker who will, in each instance, tell her, ‘This is what acting 
finely requires of you now.’ Because these sorts of judgments accompany the learner’s 
performance of these activities, the learner comes to see her actions as instances of fine 
action. Moreover, so Aristotle seems to think, and so a plausible theory of psychological 
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development would say, frequent exposure to virtuous activity will make one come to 
delight in that activity’s fineness.62 63 
The upshot of this is that what the developing moral agent comes to desire is not 
just pleasure, but pleasure from fine activity, such that her belief that the activity is fine is 
critical for her to enjoy it. Insofar as her appetitive desires pursue the pleasure that comes 
with fine action, under that description, appetitive desires’ pursuit of fine actions is of 
fine action as such. Of course, appetite would not pursues the fine activities if those 
activities ceased to be pleasant. Nevertheless, appetite’s pursuit of the pleasures of fine 
action is not merely instrumental; there is a tighter connection between appetite’s pursuit 
of fine action and pleasure than that of instrumental means to external end.  
 
 
 
VI.  Conclusion 
 
 
 
In this chapter, filled out some of the details of my interpretation of a reason-responsive 
alogon by examining the evaluative capacities of spirited and appetitive desire. I argued 
that spirited desires and appetitive desires can pursue the fine as such. To make this 
argument for spirited desires, I argued that spirited desires are the desires through which 
we form attachments to what is familiar (oikeion), attachments that lead one to pursue 
                                                
62 “The character of one’s pleasure depends on what is enjoyed, and what the virtuous man enjoys is quite 
different from what the nonvirtuous enjoy…Specifically, what the virtuous man enjoys…is the practice of 
the virtues undertaken for its own sake.  And in cases such as the facing of danger…..the actions which the 
practice of the virtues requires could only be enjoyed if they are seen as noble and virtuous and the agent 
delights in the achievement of something fine and noble.” (Burnyeat 77). 
63 Though Aristotle takes attachment to the fine to have this sort of rational aspect, he does not make it a 
condition of loving the fine that a person be able to give a reasoned defense of what (say) makes 
courageous (as opposed to cowardly) action good. In other words, nothing in his characterization of the fine 
says anything that requires the virtuous agent to be able to offer a reasoned defense of why one action 
rather than another counts as fine. 
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what I called ‘honorability.’ Such a concern is, I argued, a concern with the fine (kalon). 
To make the argument for appetitive desires, I argued that virtuous moral agents take 
pleasure in fine activity under the description “fine activity”, so that their appetites pursue 
as an end not pleasure simpliciter but pleasure from virtuous activity.   
 If what I have said here is correct, then it appears that spirited and appetitive 
desires’ have the evaluative capacities required for the alogon to be sensitive to the fine 
as a value.  In the next chapter, I’ll further my argument that the alogon has these 
capacities by examining in greater detail the kind of cognition involved in non-rational 
desire.  
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CHAPTER 4 
THE COGNITION INVOLVED IN NON-RATIONAL DESIRE 
 
I. Introduction 
 
In this chapter I examine the nature of the cognitions underlying Aristotelian emotions by 
addressing the question of whether phantasia  (appearance) can all by itself serve as the 
cognition underlying human emotions (pathê), or whether belief (doxa) is necessary. 
Based on an analysis of phantasia, I argue that phantasia is sufficient to serve as this 
cognition.  
 Getting clear on the nature of the cognition underlying human emotions is 
important, since the emotions have an important connection to the non-rational desires,64 
By looking at the cognitive dimensions of emotions, we can better understand the 
cognition that characterizes the non-rational desires. One of the things that will emerge 
from the discussion is that phantasia can have rather sophisticated content, and thus that 
human emotions and (and so presumably desires), whether they rest on mere phantasia or 
on belief, can have sophisticated content. They can, for example, represent complex 
actions as fine.  
 The chapter proceeds as follows. First, I set out the debate between phantasia-
based and belief-based views of Aristotelian emotions. Next, I argue that Rhetoric I gives 
                                                
64 Aristotle clearly thinks that some appetitive and spirited desires are emotions. For example, he calls 
appetite (epithumia) an emotion (pathos) at EN 2.5 1105b22, DA 1.1 403a30, Top. 8.1 156a32, and clearly 
relies on the equivalence at EN 3.1 111b1 and V.8 1135b21).  Anger, a paradigmatic emotion, is a special 
kind of spirited desire (DA 1.1 403a30, Top. 8.1 156a32). At least for many emotions, desires make up part 
of the emotion. Anger, for example, involves the desire for revenge (Rhet. 2.2 1378a32) and fear involves 
some sort of desire for safety (Rhet 2.6 1383a5-8).  Both emotions and non-rational desires belong to the 
alogon (IX.8 1168b20).   
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us a reason to think that phantasia-based views are correct. Next, I offer an analysis of 
phantasia to reply to an objection that phantasia lacks the cognitive sophistication to 
represent the objects of the emotions. According to my analysis of phantasia, phantasiai 
can have the sort of sophisticated cognitive content that Aristotelian emotions have.  
  
II. Can Emotions (Pathê) Rest on Phantasiai?  
 
In the Rhetoric, Aristotle’s must sustained discussion of the emotions,65 Aristotle makes 
clear that human emotions are essentially cognitive: they involve seeing the world in a 
particular way. In his definitions of several emotions, he uses ‘phantasia’ or some 
cognate of ‘phantasia’66 to describe the cognitive state of the emotion. For example: 
Anger may be defined as a desire accompanied by pain, for what appears to be 
revenge (timôrias phainomenês) on account of an apparent slight (dia 
phainomenên oligôrian) at the hands of men for whom it is not fitting to slight 
oneself or one’s friends (tou oligôrein mê prosêkontos). (Rh. 2.2 1378a30-2) 
 
Let fear (phobos) be a certain pain or disturbance from an appearance (ek 
phantasias) of a destructive or painful evil which is about to happen. (Rh. 
2.21382a21-2) 
 
For confidence is the contrary of fear and what causes confidence is the contrary 
of what causes fear; hence, it is anticipation (elpis) with appearance (phantasias) 
of safety (tôn sôtêriôn) being near, and the absence or remoteness of fearful 
things. (Rh 2.5 1383a17-8)  
 
Pity is a kind of pain at what appears to be a destructive or painful evil 
                                                
65 If the orator is going to be successful in modifying the emotions of his audience, the orator must know 
what emotions actually are and how they really work, It follows that the Rhetoric must give the orator 
practical advice that tracks (what Aristotle regards as) a correct account of the emotions.  It will do not 
good, after all, for the orator to know merely what the common man thinks about the nature and workings 
of emotions if the common man is wrong about these things. If Aristotle is going to accomplish his stated 
aim of giving useful advice to the orator who wants to persuade, he needs to present his own view of the 
emotions and not merely the common view. Sihvola, Cooper, and Nussbaum put this point nicely. Sihvola, 
32, Cooper [3], 240, Nussbaum [1], 82-3.  
66 E.g. forms of phainesthai. Aristotle uses phantasia as the noun corresponding to phainesthai (DA 
428a7,14; 428b1, 3; 433a28).  
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(phainomenôi kakôi phthartikôi ê lupêrôi) for someone undeserving to be struck 
by it (tou anaxiou tugchanein), [an evil which] one could expect oneself or 
someone near to oneself to suffer, and this when it appears near (touto hotan 
plêsion phainêtai).  (Rh 2.8 1385b13-6) 
 
Envy is pain at apparent prosperity (eupragiâi phainomenêi) as consists of the 
good things already mentioned: we feel it towards our equals not with the idea of 
getting something for ourselves, but because the other people have it. (Rh 2.10 
1387b23-4) 
 
The subject of each of these emotions represents her situation as being a certain way: the 
angry person has a representation of a slight, the fearful person has a representation of 
future pain, and the confident person has a representation of safety.  
In De Anima 3.3 Aristotle sharply distinguishes phantasia from belief (doxa). 
There he describes phantasia as a mental capacity that, by retaining and synthesizing 
sense perceptions, enables subjects to perceive things as being some way or another. It is 
less rational than belief and supposition in that it does not depend on having certain 
rational faculties. For example, animals can have phantasia but not belief or supposition.  
DA 3.3’s distinction between phantasia and belief has led some commentators to 
argue that when the Rhetoric uses phantasia or its cognates to describe emotions, 
Aristotle is saying that phantasia in the DA 3.3 sense—that is, phantasia as a sub-rational 
mental state that falls short of belief —is sufficient for emotion; belief is not required.67  
Thus, on this view, what DA 3.3. calls phantasia can underlie the emotions. Call this 
                                                
67 This is Gisela Striker’s View: 
What serves as the defining feature—the differentia specifica, as it were—is in almost all cases an 
impression or appearance (phantasia)—that a terrible evil is near, that someone has suffered an 
undeserved misfortune, that one has been treated with disrespect, and so on—which causes the 
pain of disturbance. It is evident that Aristotle is deliberatively using the term “impression” rather 
than, say, “belief” (doxa) in his definitions in order to make the point that these impressions are 
not to be confused with rational judgments. Emotions are caused by the way things appear to one 
unreflectively, and one may experience an emotion even if one realizes that the impression that 
triggered it is in fact mistaken. (Striker, 291)   
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interpretation of emotions in the Rhetoric the “phantasia-based view” of emotions, since 
it says that DA 3.3 phantasia is a possible cognitive basis for an emotion.   
According to another camp of commentators, when the Rhetoric uses phantasia or 
its cognates to describe emotions, it is using a non-technical notion of phantasia, one that 
is roughly equivalent to what DA 3.3 calls “belief” (doxa). 68  According to this view, the 
Rhetoric is not referencing DA 3.3 phantasia and arguing that it can underlie emotion.  
Instead, Aristotle thinks only DA 3.3. belief can underlie emotion.  Call this second camp 
the “belief-based view,” since it says that D.A 3.3 belief, and not DA 3.3 phantasia, is the 
lowest possible cognitive basis of an emotion.   
We should take a closer look at Aristotle’s distinction between phantasia and 
belief in DA.33 to see what is at stake in deciding between the phantasia-based view and 
the belief-based view of Aristotelian emotion.   
Neither, again, can phantasia be ranked with the faculties, like knowledge or 
intellect, which always judge truly; it can also be false. It remains, then, to 
consider whether it be doxa, as doxa may be true or false. But doxa is attended 
(akolouthei) by conviction (pistis), for it is impossible to hold doxai without being 
convinced of them (gar doxazonta hois dokei mê pisteuein); but no brute (thêriôn) 
is ever convinced, though they may have imagination. Further, every doxa implies 
conviction, conviction implies that we have been persuaded (pistei de to 
pepeisthai), and persuasion implies reason (peithoi de logos). Among brutes, 
however, though some of them have phantasia, none have reason. It is evident, 
then, that phantasia is neither doxa joined with sensory perception nor doxa 
through sensation, nor yet a complex of doxa and sensation, both on these 
grounds and because nothing else is the object of opinion but that which is the 
object of sensory perception… (DA 3.3 428a18-23). 
  
                                                
68 This is Nussbaum’s view:  
Further pursuit of the question shows clearly, however, that no technical distinction between 
phantasia and believing is at issue in any of these analyses of emotion: phantasia is used, in the 
rare cases where it is used, simply as the verbal noun of phainesthai “appear”. The passage 
contains no suggestion that phantasia is being distinguished from doxa, belief. ….In other words, 
what is stressed is the fact that it is the way  things are seen by the agent, not the fact of the matter, 
that is instrumental in getting emotions going. Intentionality, not absence of commitment, is the 
issue (Nussbaum [2], 307).  
See also Dow.  
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Aristotle says that to have a belief, one must be convinced (pistis), and being convinced 
requires that one have been persuaded (pepeisthai). Persuasion in turn requires reason 
(logos).  To have a phantasia, by contrast, one need not be convinced and so having a 
phantasia does not require logos. For this reason, phantasia, but not doxa, is available to 
animals. 69  
 Unfortunately, there are several ways to interpret this distinction between 
phantasia and belief. According to some interpreters,70 DA 3.3’s distinction between 
phantasia and belief tracks the distinction between a cognitive attitude that does not 
involve assent and a cognitive attitude that does involve assent. In support of this 
interpretation, these interpreters appeal to the following passage: 
But there are false appearances about which we can at the same time have true 
belief (hupolêpsis). For example, the sun appears (phainetai) only a foot in 
diameter, but we are convinced (pepisteutai) that it is larger than the inhabited 
word:  in this case, therefore, either, without any alteration in the thing and 
without any lapse of memory on our part or conversion by argument we have 
abandoned the true belief (doxan) which we had about it. (DA 3.3 428b1-5) 
  
When the sun strikes me as being a foot wide, I don’t assent to the proposition that the 
sun is a foot wide, since I believe that the sun is actually much larger. So, commentators 
conclude, appearances must be the sorts of attitudes that don’t involve assent.  
                                                
69 In the Theaetetus, Socrates presents belief (doxa) as the result of silent inner thinking (dianoeisthai) 
(189E-190A; cf Sophist 263E-264A and Philebus 38C-E). Here, belief is the upshot if a kind of dialectical 
self-examination—the product of the soul asking itself questions and giving answers.  
70 Alexander of Aphrodisias also takes the phantasia /doxa distinction to track the Stoic distinction between 
phantasia and assent (suykatathesis). Alexander, DA 67, 16-20. Nussbaum also takes this view: “The real 
difference here between phantasia and belief here seems to be just the difference that the Stoics will bring 
forward as the difference between phantasia and belief:  in the former case, the sun strikes me as being a 
foot wide, but I don’t commit myself to that, I don’t accept or assent to it.  In the latter case, I have a 
conviction, a view as to how things really are.  The same contrast seems to be at work in our emotion 
examples. The loud noise strikes the brave man as something terrible, but, being a brave man, he doesn’t 
accept that it is in fact terrible; he judges that it is not so terrible” (Nussbaum [1] , 84). See also Cooper [3], 
269-70. 
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According to an opposing camp of interpreters, the distinction between DA 3.3’s 
phantasia and doxa does not track the distinction between a cognitive attitude without 
assent and a cognitive attitude with assent.  Instead, the contrast is between different 
kinds of assent. Whereas appearances are often accompanied by automatic, non-reflective 
assents, the assents characteristic of beliefs necessarily are the product of reflections that 
support the proposition in question.  
This interpretation can accommodate the passage about the sun appearing a foot 
wide. What this passage says, according to this interpretation, is that phantasia need not 
lead to assent.  In particular, in cases where the phantasia that p conflicts with a doxa that 
not p, the doxa that not p can prevent assent to the phantasia. In cases where there is no 
conflicting belief, however, the appearance will be assented to (albeit in a non-reflective 
way).  
Given these two interpretations of DA 3.3, appearance-based views—views that 
take DA 3.3. phantasia to be the lowest possible cognitive state for emotion—thus break 
into two kinds.  According to one appearance-based view, emotions can rest on mere 
phantasia in the sense that the content of emotions need not be assented to at all. 
According to the other appearance-based view, emotions can rest on mere phantasia in 
the sense that they can rest on appearances that are unreflectively assented to; the content 
of the emotions does not require the reflective assent characteristic of belief.   
Correspondingly, there are two possible belief-based views. According to one 
belief-based view, emotions necessarily rest on belief and not phantasia insofar as they 
necessarily involve assent.  According to another belief-based view, emotions necessarily 
rest on belief and not phantasia insofar as they necessarily involve reflective assent. This 
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second belief-based view is implausible, given weakness of will. Therefore, we can put it 
to the side.  
I want to argue in favor of appearances views, though I will not argue for a 
particular version of appearance views in this chapter.   
 
III.  A Consideration in Favor of Appearances Views 
 
One reason to think that Aristotle’s discussion of the emotions in Rhetoric 2 employs the 
technical notion of phantasia—the DA 3.3 sense of ‘phantasia’ that distinguishes it from 
belief—is that a bit earlier in Rhetoric (at 1.11 1370a28) Aristotle clearly distinguishes 
phantasia from belief :71   
 
[1] Of the appetites some are irrational, some are with reason (tôn de epithumiôn 
hai men alogoi eisin hai de meta logou). [2] By “irrational” I mean those which 
do not arise from any supposition (ek tou hupolambanein). [3] Of this kind are 
those known as natural; for instance, those originating in the body, such as the 
appetite for nourishment, and a separate kind of appetite answering to each kind 
of nourishment; and those connected with taste and sex and touch in general; and 
those of smell, hearing, and vision. [4] Rational appetites are those which we have 
been persuaded to have (meta logou de hosas ek tou peisthênai epithumousin); 
there are many things we desire to see or get because we have heard of them and 
been persuaded (akousantes kai peisthentes). [5] Further, pleasure lies in the 
sensory perceptions  (en tôi aisthanesthai) of a certain emotion (tinos pathous); 
but appearance (phantasia) is a feeble sort of sensory perception (aisthêsis tis 
asthenês), and there will always be in the mind of a man who remembers or 
expects (memnêmenôi kai tôi elpizonti) something the appearance (phantasia) of 
what he remembers or expects (hou memnêtai ê elpizei). If this is so, it is clear 
that memory and expectation also (kai hêdonai hama memnêmenois kai 
elpizousin), being accompanied by sensory perception (epeiper kai aisthêsis), may 
be accompanied by pleasure. It follows that anything pleasant is either present and 
perceived, past and remembered, or further and expected, since we perceive 
present things, remember past ones, and expect future ones  (hôst' anagkê panta 
                                                
71 Nussbaum disagrees: “The distinction between phantasia  and doxa seems to be introduced in one 
passage in Book I (1370a28) but is altogether absent from Book 2. In general, the account shows no 
awareness of the more technical psychological distinctions of the De Anima.” (Nussbaum [2], 321, n. 16).  
 77 
ta hêdea ê en tôi aisthanesthai einai paronta ê en tôi memnêsthai gegenêmena ê 
en tôi elpizein mellonta: aisthanontai men gar ta paronta, memnêntai de ta 
gegenêmena, elpizousi de ta mellonta). (Rh I.11 1370a25-1370b1. Translation 
Roberts with my modifications.)  
 
Rational appetite (appetite meta logou), unlike an irrational appetite, results from 
supposition (ek tou hupolambanein), and persuasion (ek tou peisthênai)  ([2], [4]). We 
will immediately recall that Aristotle at DA 3.3 presents a similar cluster of concepts.  
There he says that belief (doxa) and supposition (hupolêpsis) involve conviction (pistis), 
conviction involves being persuaded (pepeisthai), and being persuaded involves logos. 
Aristotle’s comments in Rhet 1.11 about non-rational appetite also recall the DA 
3.3 discussion. Rhet 1.11 ties phantasia closely with sensory perception, saying that 
phantasia is a feeble sort of sensory perception ([5]). In DA 3.3, Aristotle also connects 
phantasia and perception: phantasia is about what perception is about (DA 3.3 428b12) 
and is a change brought about by the functioning of perception (428b25-6; 429a1).  
The similarity of the associations that we find in Rhetoric 1.11 and DA 3.3 
strongly suggest that Rhetoric 1.11 relies on a view that is similar to the one in DA 3.3.  
This gives us some reason to think that ‘phantasia’ in the Rhetoric’s definitions of the 
emotions is the same as the phantasia in the DA. 3.3. Thus, barring any objections to 
taking phantasia as the cognition involved in emotion, Rhetoric I gives us reason to 
prefer an appearances based emotion over a belief-based view.  
 
IV. An Objection to Appearances Views  
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According to Dow,72 when Aristotle in the Rhetoric uses ‘phantasia’ to describe 
emotions, he cannot be invoking the DA 3.3 technical conception of phantasia. His 
argument rests on the claim that the phantasia of DA 3.3 lacks the cognitive 
sophistication to do the sorts of things that Aristotle says that emotions can do.   To make 
this argument, Dow starts from a feature of phantasia to which I have alluded: its 
connection to perception (aisthêsis).  Phantasia is about what perception is about (DA 3.3 
428b12-1373) and is a “change brought about by the functioning of perception” (428b25-
6; 429a1). Aristotle doesn’t make clear in DA 3.3 how we should interpret these claims, 
but Dow interprets them as meaning that the objects of DA 3.3 phantasia include “only 
things that can be objects of sensory perception.”74 This is a problem of the technical 
reading, Dow argues, because the objects of sense perception are substantially more 
limited than the objects of emotion. Specifically, emotions involve:  
(1) Abstract objects  
 
(2) Things as being in the future.  
 
(3) Causal properties of objects.  
 
(4) States of affairs.  
 
 
Anger involves the appearances of abstract objects like revenge and slight, and 
(according to Dow) “[n]one of these seems to a possible objects of aisthêsis, as would be 
required for phantasia proper.”75 Along the same lines, fear involves the appearance of 
future harm, and Dow doubts that “something’s being in the future can be part of what 
                                                
72 Dow, Jamie. “Feeling Fantastic? Emotions and Appearances in Aristotle.” Oxford Studies in Ancient 
Philosophy. 37 (2010), 143-75. 
73 hê de phantasia kinêsis tis dokei einai kai ouk aneu aisthêseôs ginesthai all' aisthanomenois kai hôn 
aisthêsis estin (DA 3.3 428b12-13). 
74 Dow, 170-1. 
75 Dow, 171. 
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‘appears.’”76 In the emotion of shame, the object of shame is recognized as something 
that will bring disrepute, but this involves discriminating the causal properties of objects, 
a type of discrimination that Dow says perception cannot do. Finally, pity involves the 
pitying person seeing himself or someone close to him suffer the same thing as the pitied 
person. Dow thinks this is problematic for those who want to align Rhetoric phantasia 
with DA 3.3 phantasia, since Aristotle in the DA says that phantasia does not involve 
asserting one thing of another (3.8 432a10-11). 
To address Dow’s objection we need to look more closely at what Aristotle takes 
phantasia to be, what sorts of objects it can take, and how it is related to sense 
perception.   As we shall see, while phantasiai have sense perceptions in their causal 
ancestries and depend on sense perception for some of their contents, they nonetheless 
can have contents that go beyond what is perceived. In fact, so I will suggest, part of what 
it is to be a phantasia is to have content that goes beyond what is perceived. It follows 
that, contrary to Dow’s claim, the objects of phantasiai are not restricted to the objects of 
sense perception. Moreover (and this is the important part) an examination of phantasia 
faculty’s characteristic operations suggests that the objects of phantasia can be quite 
sophisticated, and sophisticated in a way that makes them able to have emotional content.   
 
V. An Interpretation of Phantasia 
 
I will argue for the following account of phantasia: phantasia (1) is a non-reflective 
appearance that, (2) while having sense perception in its causal ancestry and depending 
                                                
76 Dow, 171. 
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on sense perception for some of its content, (3) has content that goes beyond what is 
perceived by the senses.  
 
V.1 Phantasia as Non-Reflective Appearance 
 
Phantasia corresponds with the verb ‘to appear’ (phainesthai), a connection Aristotle 
explicitly cites in DA 3.3 428a13-4. We can thus understand phantasai as a type of 
appearance.  It is a type of appearance because there may be appearances that do not 
count as phantasiai in the DA 3.3 sense. If, for example, something appears to us on the 
basis of reflective reasoning, the appearance would not be a phantasia in the DA 3.3 
sense.77  78  
 
V.2 Phantasia as Having Sense Perception in its Causal History and Depending on Sense 
Perception for Some of its Content 
 
Phantasiai are changes (kinêseis) that occur as a result of the activity of perception 
(428b25-6; 429a1) and are about what perception is about (DA 3.3 428b12-130).79 To 
understand the nature of phantasia’s relationship to perception, we thus should examine 
perception.   
                                                
77 This is because one of the conditions for being a phantasia in the DA 3.3 sense is that it not result from 
reasoning. This is the upshot of the contrast with belief at DA 3.3. 
78 Aristotle does mention “deliberative phantasia” (bouleutikê  phantasia), a phantasia that results from 
deliberation. This expands the scope of phantasia in a way that I am not concerned with here. “Thus 
perceptual (aisthêtikê) phantasia, as we have said, belongs in the other animals, whereas deliberative 
(bouleutikê) phantasia is in deliberative animals (en tois logistikois). For the task of deliberation is whether 
to do this or that and pursuing the greater good necessarily involves a single measurement.  Hence it is 
possible to make one out of many images)” (434a6-10). 
79 hê de phantasia kinêsis tis dokei einai kai ouk aneu aisthêseôs ginesthai all' aisthanomenois kai hôn 
aisthêsis estin (DA 3.3 428b12-13). 
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Perception is a kind of alteration of the perceiver: “perception comes about with 
<an organ's> being changed and affected … for it seems to be a kind of alteration” (DA 
2.5 416b33–34). In this alteration, the perceiver takes on the form of the perceived object 
and thereby becomes like the object in some way (417a18-20, 418a3-6). Crucially, not 
just any sort of correspondence between a perceiver and object will do; Aristotle insists 
that the sense organ is potentially like the object (417a18-20, 418a3-6; 3.2 425b22-3; 3.4 
429a15-7). Because the sense is potentially like the perceived object at the outset and 
during the sensation it becomes like the object in actuality, the content of perceptual 
states are identical with their causes. For this reason, perception is infallible (DA 3.3 
427b12, DA 2. 6 418a11-14). 
Perception has an objective aspect insofar as it involves a causal interaction 
between a perceptual organ and the perceived object whereby the organ receives 
perceptual forms.  But it also involves a subjective aspect insofar as it involves the 
subject representing the environment as being a certain way; when someone perceives, 
she makes some sort of judgment or discrimination (krinei, 2.6 418a14, 3.3 427a20-21).  
What is perception of? For starters, it is limited to the objects of the special (idion) 
senses of sight, hearing, taste, and touch. This perception of special sensibles is 
perception of things “in themselves” (kath hauta 2.6 418a24), and includes perception of 
colors, odors, sounds, tastes, and tactile qualities. Moreover, perception is limited to 
particulars of these special sensibles—to this particular redness as opposed to redness in 
general80-—and to present (not past or future) objects.81  
                                                
80 DA 2.5 417b22-3  
81 “By perception we apprehend (gnôrizomen) neither what is future nor what is past, but only what is 
present” (De Memoria 449b13-5). 
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The special senses are unified in a way that allows a perceiving subject to discern 
different special sensibles as belonging to the same object. Because of the convergence 
afforded by the unity of sense, a subject can simultaneously perceive (by sight) whiteness 
and (by taste) sweetness (DA 425a30-b3), and, connecting the perceptions together, 
perceive that the white is sweet (DA 418a20-23; 425a21-2; 23-7; 30-b4). Thus, the unity 
of the special senses is presumably what allows perceiving subjects to organize the visual 
array into objects. Such organization need not be on the conceptual level; it may simply 
involve clustering different sensory properties together so as to apprehend them as 
belonging to a single object. A perceiving subject who, encountering a man, experiences 
a cluster of sensory properties--whiteness, round shape, a sound of such-and-such pitch, 
etc,--will represent a white, rounded, such-and-such pitched thing.  
Aristotle’s language does not always make clear that perception is limited in the 
ways that I’ve suggested. For example, in addition to perception of special sensibles 
(perceptions of things “in themselves” (kath hauta)), he mentions “incidental perception” 
(kata sumbebêkos 2.6 418a7-30). As illustrations of incidental perceptions, he gives the 
example of perceiving that the white is the son of Diares (2. 6 418a20-3, 425a21-2) and 
perceiving common (koina) sensibles –e.g. perceiving motion, rest figure, magnitude, 
number and unity (DA 3.1 425a14-6). Perceiving that the white is the son of Diares is not 
an act of sense perception strictly speaking, since the son of Diares is not the object of 
any of the special senses. Similarly, perceiving that something is in motion is also not an 
act of sense perception strictly speaking, since perception is limited to present objects and 
apprehending motion involves an awareness of the thing at an earlier time.  
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When Aristotle refers to incidental perception, he is using ‘perception’ in a loose 
sense. He notes these stricter and looser senses at DA 2.6 418a24-5 when he says that 
perception of special sensibles is perception strictly speaking (kuriôs): 
Of the two kinds of things perceptible in themselves (kath’ hauta) the special 
sensibles are sensible strictly speaking (kuriôs) (DA 2.6 418a24-5). 
  
While he suggests here that common sensibles (koina) are perceived in themselves, later 
(at 3.1 425a15) he says that they are perceived only incidentally. The latter view is his 
more considered view.  
 With this rough account of sense perception in hand, we can examine Aristotle’s 
characterization of phantasiai as changes (kinêseis) that result from perception. Crucial to 
understanding this claim is the phantasia faculty’s role in storing sensory perceptions in a 
subject’s perceptual apparatus, perceptions that can be marshaled up at a later time. These 
stored perceptions are phantasiai, changes that are formed simultaneously with the 
activity of perception but are retained (emmenein, DA 3.3 429a4) beyond the relevant 
episode of perceptual activity.  
Aristotle discusses the phantasia faculty’s activity of storing sensory images in 
his discussion of dreams (paradigmatic examples of phantasiai):  
In blooded animals, as the blood becomes calm and separated out, the change 
belonging to perceptions from each sense organ is preserved (sozomenê).  This 
makes dreams connected, makes things appear to the dreamer, and brings it about 
that they seem to see on account of the changes descending from sight, to hear on 
account of those coming from hearing, and so on with those that proceed from the 
other organs.  For also when one is awake, it is because of the change from there 
arriving at the starting point that one seems to be seeing, hearing, and perceiving. 
(De Insomniis 3, 461a25-b1 translation Lorenz) 
 
Aristotle is concerned with explaining why some dreams are especially well-connected. 
To do so, he appeals to the calmness of the blood in which sensory perceptions are 
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preserved (sozomenê). These stored perceptions—the changes in the perceptual faculty 
that constitute phantasiai--are marshaled up during sleep, and they have sensory effects 
similar to the original sensory impressions: “For also when one is awake, it is because of 
the change from there arriving at the starting point that one seems to be seeing, hearing, 
and perceiving.” 
 The case of dreams illustrates the way in which phantasiai have sensory 
perceptions in their causal ancestries. Dreams are the result of the phantasia faculty 
storing sensory impressions in the perceptual apparatus and marshaling them up when the 
subject is asleep. In section IV.3 I’ll examine other cases of phantasiai, including 
remembering, anticipating prospects, perceiving common sensibles, and conceptualized 
perceiving, and in each case we’ll see that these phantasiai causally derive from sense 
perception in some way.  
The case of dreams also illustrates how the character of a phantasia mental state 
can derive from the content of the sense perception on which it is based. When the 
subject dreams of a white object, the content of her dream—whiteness--is due to the 
whiteness of a former sensory impression. It is in this sense that the phantasia is about 
what my sense perception is about (DA 3.3 428b12-130). The examples surveyed in IV.3 
will further illustrate the ways in which the character of a phantasia can depend on the 
character of the sense perceptions from which it is derived.  
 
V.3 Phantasia as Having Content that Goes Beyond what is Perceived 
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While phantasia is dependent on sense perception–both causally, by deriving from sense 
perceptions, and in terms of its character--it can have content that goes beyond what is 
being perceived. This will prove to be important, insofar as it will illustrate the 
sophistication of phantasia’s objects relative to perception’s objects.  
The case of dreams nicely illustrates how phantasiai have objects that go beyond 
what one perceives at a given time.  When one dreams of a white object, one is not 
perceiving the white object, since one’s eyes are closed. The whiteness that makes up the 
content of the dream thus goes beyond what the subject perceives.  
A phantasia does not simply involve content that one is not perceiving at the 
moment of the phantasia; it also can involve content that is never perceivable. Memory 
(mnêmê)—a case of phantasia82-- provides an illustration of this. Just as in the case of a 
dream of a white thing, the memory of the white thing is a change in the perceptual 
faculty such that the perception of the white thing is preserved (sozomenê). This 
phantasia of the white thing is then marshaled up at a later time and represents the white 
object when it is no longer in view. As in the dreams case, the whiteness that makes up 
part of the content of my memory derives from the whiteness of the original perception.  
My memory of a white thing has content that goes beyond what is being 
perceived, since in memory I represent the white thing even when there is no white thing 
to perceive. But the content of my memory goes beyond the content of what I am 
perceiving in another way. This is because a memory does not simply represent the object 
that was, as a matter of fact, perceived in the past. In addition to this, it represents the 
object as something represented at some earlier time in the past (De Memoria 2 452b23- 
453a4). ‘In the past’ is part of the content of my phantasia, but ‘in the past’, not being a 
                                                
82 Remembering is the having of a phantasia as a likeness of what it is based on (De Memoria 451a15). 
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special sensible, can never be part of a perception. Phantasia thus can involve content 
that is not perceivable at all.  
The case of apprehending prospects—another case of phantasia—illustrates a 
further way in which phantasia can involve content that is not even in principle 
perceivable. Consider the following passage where Aristotle discusses a lion that, upon 
perceiving a deer, anticipates a future meal: 
Nor do other animals find pleasures from these senses, except coincidentally. 
What a hound enjoys, for instance, is not the smell of a hare, but eating it; but the 
hare’s smell made the hound perceive it. And what a lion rejoices in (chairein) is 
not the sound of the ox, but eating it; but since the ox’s sound made the lion 
perceive that it was near (hoti d' eggus esti), the lion appears to enjoy the sound. 
Similarly, what pleases him is not the sight of a deer or a wild goat, but that he 
will have food (all' hoti boran hexei). (EN 3 1118a19-25, Translation Irwin) 
 
Aristotle says that what pleases the lion is that he will have food (all' hoti boran hexei). 
This lion’s cognition cannot be a perception strictly speaking, because it is not possible to 
perceive an event in the future. This cognition cannot be a belief, either, since animals do 
not have beliefs.83  The cognition is a phantasia.  
Aristotle doesn’t say precisely how the lion acquires a phantasia of a future meal, 
but, given what we’ve seen about the phantasia faculty’s role of storing sensory 
perceptions, we can tell the following story. The lion’s apprehension of the deer as a 
future meal is causally dependent on prior sensory impressions (namely, the impressions 
of deer and deer-eating.), sensory impressions that have been stored as phantasiai and 
drawn up when a current sensory impression (e.g. the scent of a deer) triggers the 
phantasiai. The character of the resulting phantasia is due to the content of previous 
sensory impressions. 
                                                
83 DA 3.3 428a18-24. 
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That phantasia can store sequences of sensory perceptions is clear from a passage 
in the De Insomniis where Aristotle suggests that sense perceptions can be preserved in a 
way that leaves in tact their order and complexity.  
[A]s most of the blood travels down to its source, the changes present within it—
some potentially, some actively—travel down with it.   They are so disposed that 
in this change, that one will emerge from the blood, and as this one perishes, that 
one.  They are disposed towards one another like the artificial frogs that rise to the 
surface of water as salt is being dissolved.  In a similar way, these changes are in 
us potentially, and become active when what arrests them is relaxed.  (De 
Insomniis 4, 461b11-21, translation Lorenz)  
 
In this passage, Aristotle is describing dreaming, and he suggests that the stored sensory 
perceptions tend to be ordered in particular ways: the perceptions are stored in such a 
way that the activation of one stored perception is disposed to follow the activation of 
some other stored perception, and that one is disposed to follow another, etc.    
What determines the order or structure of these sense perception? Aristotle 
suggests that they are based on similarity, opposition, and proximity in our original sense 
perceptions:  
 
In recollecting, then, we undergo some one or other of the earlier changes, until 
we undergo the one that is habitually followed by the change in question. It is for 
this reason also that we hunt for that which follows in the sequence, beginning in 
thought with the now or with something else, and with something similar to the 
thing in question, something opposite to it, or something proximate to it.  
Recollection occurs for this reason:  for the changes that belong to these things are 
in some cases the same ones, in other cases they occur together, in yet other cases 
the one change contains part of the other, so that after the earlier one only a little 
remains to be undergone. (De Memoria 2, 451b10-21, translation Lorenz, italics 
mine) 
 
In this passage, Aristotle is concerned with explaining how we can recollect 
something—i.e. deliberately recall something—and how we can be reminded of 
something. He argues that stored sense perceptions that are similar, opposite, or 
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proximate to each other tend to be marshaled up together.  A song that I hear reminds me 
of a happy time, because the song triggers a memory I have of the song, and drawn up 
with that memory is a memory of a temporally proximate event—viz., the happy time. 
The important point is that, according to this passage, we preserve sense perceptions 
according to associations that we form from sensory experience, associations that are 
based on the similarity, opposition, and proximity that we experience in our sensations.   
The lion’s phantasia of a future meal has content that goes beyond what is 
immediately perceived. For starters, it involves apprehending something that is not 
present (eating a deer). It also involves apprehending something as in the future. ‘In the 
future’ is part of the content of the lion’s phantasia, but ‘in the future’, not being a 
special sensible, can never be part of a perception. Phantasia thus can involve content 
that is not perceivable at all.   
 Cases of what Aristotle calls “common perception” illustrate yet more examples 
of the ways in which phantasia can involve content that goes beyond what a subject 
perceives. Take the perception that this object is moving.  Because moving is an event 
that happens over an interval of time, it is not strictly speaking something that can be part 
of the content of a perception. How then does a subject perceive motion?  Phantasia 
plays the critical role. My impression that x is moving from location A to location B to 
location C is constituted by multiple stored sense perceptions of x at earlier times—a 
stored perception of x at location A at time t1, a stored perception of x at location B at t2, 
etc.). Again, the character of my phantasia that x is moving will derive to some extent 
from the content of the sense perceptions on which the phantasia is based, but it will not 
be exhausted by these perceptions’ contents, since none of these contents include motion.  
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As a final illustration of how phantasia can have content that goes beyond what is 
perceived, consider phantasia’s role in conceptualized perceptions—perceptions like 
‘Diares is a man’ that involve apprehending objects as falling into certain sortal 
categories. In the Posterior Analytics, Aristotle suggests that if a subject has multiple 
experiences of a cluster of certain sensory perceptions and so is able to form multiple 
memories of this complex perception, then a person can acquire a rudimentary concept or 
universal that those perceptions instantiate.  
[1a] So from perception there comes memory (mnêmê), as we call it, and from 
memory (when it occurs often in connection with the same thing), experience 
(empeiria); [1b] for memories that are many in number form a single experience 
(empeiria mia). [2a] And from experience or from the whole universal stabilized 
in the soul (pantos êremêsantos tou kaholou en têi psuchêi) [2b] (the one apart 
from the many, whatever is one and the same in all those things) (tou henos para 
ta polla, ho an en hapasin hen enêi ekeinois to auto), [3] there comes a principle 
of skill (techné) and of understanding (epistémé)—of skill if it deals with how 
things come about, of understanding if it deals with what is the case. (An. Post 
2.19 100a6-9. Translation Barnes) 
 
The passage posits connections between perception, memory, experience, and universals. 
We’ve already discussed the connection between perception and memory: memories arise 
when we marshal up past sensory impressions that we have stored in the perceptual 
faculty. The connections between memories, experience, and universals are more 
complex.  Suppose I have a memory of a man. Pre-conceptually, this memory amounts to 
my representing a white, rounded such-and-such pitched thing. Aristotle’s idea seems to 
be that after frequent encounters with other white, rounded, such-and-such pitched things, 
I acquire more memories of such things and that these memories, when apprehended 
together, count as having an experience of a man ([1b]). Aristotle immediately transitions  
(at [2a]) from talking about the experience of one thing to a universal of that thing, 
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suggesting that that experience of x things constitutes having a grasp of the universal ‘x.’ 
Note that having (e.g.) the universal ‘man’ does not presuppose that one have a linguistic 
ability to apply ‘man’ to instances of the universal. It simply involves the ability to 
discriminate white, rounded, such-and such pitched things as belonging to a certain sortal 
category.  
My having a universal is causally dependent on previous sense perceptions that I 
have stored in my perceptual faculty. Moreover, the universal  ‘white, round, such-and-
such pitched sort of thing’ has the content it does because of the sense perceptions that 
caused it.  Were the sense perceptions different, the content of my universal would be 
different. 
Perceiving that the white is a man is not, strictly speaking, a case of perception, 
since man is a universal term, and perception is restricted to particulars. But in virtue of 
phantasia’s role in concept development, we can have mental states that go beyond what 
is immediately perceived.84 
                                                
84 I should make clear a point about the nature of these universals, since Aristotle makes clear that certain 
sorts of universals are the domain of nous, not of phantasia. Aristotle thinks that thought is what grasps 
essences—what flesh is, as opposed flesh (429b10-8).  
Now, since magnitude (to megethos) is not the same as the essence of magnitude (to megethei 
einai), nor water the same as the essence of water (and in this way also in the case of many other 
things, though not all of them. For in some cases the thing and its essence is the same), we judge 
the essence of flesh and flesh itself either with different things or with the same thing but in 
different ways. For flesh is not apart from matter, but like “snub-nosed” it is a particular form in a 
particular matter.  It is, then, with the sense faculty that we judge heat and cold and all those 
qualities of which flesh is a certain proportion). But it is with another thing, either separate from 
sense, or related to it as the bent line when it is straightened out in related.  (DA 3.4 429b10-17) 
The intellect is necessary for an agent to grasp the essence of flesh; an agent who merely has perception can 
in some sense aware of flesh but not recognize flesh for what it essentially is.  
 We might understand the difference here as the difference between Locke’s “real” and “nominal” 
definitions. Nominal definitions are rough and ready definitions that appeal to superficial, sensible features; 
a nominal definition of gold might appeal to gold color, shininess, and malleability. Real definitions, by 
contrast, are what give the causal, robust, explanatory nature of things; a real definition of gold will specify 
the atomic number of gold that explains why it has the sensible features it does.  When Aristotle says that 
we can extract universals from sense perception he must mean nominal universals; correspondingly, when 
he says that animals lack universals, he must be referring to real universals.  
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So something’s being in the future, something’s being in the past, motion, and 
universals are not even potential objects of sense perception but nonetheless can be part 
of phantasia.  Phantasia thus can have sophisticated content that perception cannot have.  
 
V.4 Conclusion 
 
I’ve tried to show the ways in which phantasia is dependent on sense perception –both 
causally, by deriving from sense perceptions, and in terms of its character--but can have 
content that goes beyond what is being perceived.  Aristotle must present phantasia to 
make up for the limitations of sense perception, for it is clear that there are many mental 
states that have sophisticated content that perception cannot account for. Perception may 
explain my perceiving that this is white, but it does not explain my connecting this 
perception with (e.g.) a man, since man is not a special sensible and hence cannot be the 
object of perception strictly speaking. While Aristotle doesn’t explicitly state that such 
cases require him to postulate phantasia, an examination of phantasia suggests that 
phantasia is nicely situated to supply a subject with content that goes beyond what is 
immediately being perceived by the senses.  
A reasonable conclusion to draw from this is that Aristotle designed phantasia to 
account for those non-reflective mental states that contain contents that go beyond what 
is given in sense perception.  If this is right, then it’s also reasonable to think that being a 
phantasia is in part a matter of having content that goes beyond what is immediately 
perceived.  
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The discussion shows that phantasia can have rather sophisticated mental content, 
content that sense perception cannot have.  In the next section, we’ll see how some of the 
aforementioned operations of phantasia allow phantasiai to have (at least some of) the 
sort of the specific content that underlies emotions. 
 
VI. Addressing Dow’s Challenge 
  
According to Dow, when Aristotle in the Rhetoric uses ‘phantasia’ to describe emotions, 
he cannot be invoking the conception of DA 3.3, because  (on Dow’s view) emotions 
involve certain sorts of objects that phantasia cannot take on. These objects include: (1) 
abstract objects, (2) things as being in the future, (3) causal properties of objects, and (4) 
states of affairs. Having developed an account of phantasia, we can now assess Dow’s 
claim.  Can the foregoing account of phantasia account for (1)-(4)?   
Consider (2): things as being in the future. Recall our discussion of a lion that 
apprehends the prospect of eating a deer. What pleases the lion is that he will have food 
(all' hoti boran hexei) (EN 3 1118a19-25). This cognition cannot be a perception strictly 
speaking, because one cannot directly perceive an event in the future, and it cannot be a 
belief, since animals do not have beliefs.85 Thus, the cognition must be a phantasia. So a 
phantasia can represent an object as being in the future. 
  Consider (3): causal properties of objects. When a person experiences shame, the 
object of shame is recognized as something that will bring about disrepute. (1383b13-4). 
We saw that the faculty of phantasia preserves sensory affections in an orderly way, a 
way that reflects the associations the perceiver makes from the similarity, opposition, and 
                                                
85 DA 3.3 428a18-24 
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proximity of her perceptions. Now, causal relations are ordered and associated with each 
other in important ways:  causes precede effects and causes are consistently conjoined 
with their effects. Given the proximity of causes and effects, cause and effect 
relationships can be represented by phantasia. Phantasia can represent (e.g.) adultery as 
causing disrepute by conjoining sense perceptions of adulterous relationships with sense 
perceptions of (e.g) jeers, condemnation, etc. Aristotle’s theory of associations between 
sense associations thus endows phantasia with the cognitive sophistication to represent 
causal properties of objects.  
 Consider (4): states of affairs. We’ve seen that even perception can be 
propositional: I can perceive that this white is sweet. We’ve seen that phantasia involves 
propositional thinking as well:86 I can perceive that the white is the son of Diares (DA 
418a20-3, 425a21-22). Note that this propositional thinking needn’t involve linguistic 
ability. It need only involve the ability to connect subjects and predicates and to 
discriminate certain sorts of things from others. 
 Finally, (1): abstract objects. Anger involves appearances that include slight and 
revenge.  We saw earlier that phantasia is responsible for certain sorts of concepts. One 
can acquire the concept ‘man’ from raw sense data and memory. Can we say something 
similar for the abstract objects that occur in Aristotle’s definition of the emotions?  
Take the concept of revenge. To acquire this concept, an animal will begin with 
particular sensory impressions that include the perception of one animal striking another, 
                                                
86 If, as I argue, phantasia can involve propositional content, what does Aristotle mean when he says at 3.8 
432a10ff that phantasia does not involve asserting one thing of another? One possibility is that Aristotle is 
here talking about a particular sort of phantasia—contemplating mental images (phantasmata).  See 
Sorabji  [2], 19:  “In cannot detract from the clear example of propositional appearance that the sun is only 
one foot across that Aristotle later goes on to contrast appearance with affirming or denying (phasis, 
apophasis) something as true or false…Aristotle has so often described appearance as liable to be false, that 
in this passage he must be talking about a different type of appearance, namely contemplating mental 
images (phantasmata)…”  
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where the strike is not preceded by an instigating strike. The animal will then perceive the 
struck animal assert himself against its perpetrator. This sequence of sensory impressions 
constitutes a perception of revenge, a perception that, when coupled with other stored 
perceptions of revenge, constitutes the concept of revenge.87  
Phantasia also seems sufficient to get the concept of safety that surfaces in the 
definition of confidence. Confidence is the emotion opposed to fear, and fear is 
specifically directed at future pains.88  It follows that safety is understood as a haven from 
pains. It is not difficult to see how sensory perceptions could form the basis for a concept 
of safety so construed. Even animals can perceive pain and pleasure, and, given their 
ability to store impressions and make associations, they can come to associate certain 
situations with pleasure and others with pain. If a deer has frequent brushes with a lion, 
the deer will come to associate lions with pain. Correspondingly, the deer will come to 
associate places not frequented be lions with safety.  
                                                
87 In support of this idea that animals have the concept of slight and revenge, consider the following 
passages from EN 3.2:  
Those who say decision is appetite or spirit or wish or some sort of belief would seem to be 
wrong.  For decision is not shared with nonrational animals, but appetite and spirit are shared with 
them. (EN 3.2 111b11-3, translation Irwin [2]) 
Aristotle says that decision cannot be appetite or spirit, since appetite and spirit are common (koinon) both 
to rational and non-rational beings, but decision belongs to rational beings only.  For the argument to work, 
Aristotle must be saying that animals and humans partake in a very similar spirited desire.  After all, if the 
spirit of animals were substantially different in kind from the spirited desire of humans, then a proponent of 
the view that decision is spirited desire could resist Aristotle’s argument by saying that decision is the 
distinct sort of spirit present in humans.   
 Now, the spirit of animals and the spirit of human beings cannot be identical, for we’ve seen that 
spirited desires in humans can involve evaluation that goes beyond the pleasant, and Aristotle clearly 
denies such evaluation to animals (Pol. 1.2). If animals’ spirited desires do not involve the sophisticated 
sort of evaluation of human desires, and if animal spirited desire and human spirited desire must, for the 
purposes of Aristotle’s argument, be similar, what serves as the common feature that unites animal and 
human spirit?   
 I propose that Aristotle is unifying them in terms of some of their content—specifically, the part 
of the content involving revenge. In the animal cases, there will be no linguistic expression for this object.  
88 Rh. 2.2 1382a21-2 
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Prosperity (eupragia)89 and worth (axios)90 are both concepts that surface in the 
content of emotions. Now, animals cannot have the appearance of prosperity or worth, 
since they have perception of pleasant only (Pol. 1.2).   However, perhaps human 
phantasia, because it is enriched by conceptual resources provided by the distinctively 
human desiderative part, can have concepts like prosperity and worth. Evidence that 
Aristotle holds this view comes from Eudemian Ethics 1235b19-30: 
[1] There is also a question as to whether what is loved (to philoumenon) is the 
pleasant or the good.  [2] If we love what we appetitively desire (epithumoumen) 
(and that is specially characteristic of love, for "None is a lover (erastês) who 
does not love (philei)"), and appetite is for what is pleasant, on this showing it is 
the pleasant that is loved. [3] Whereas if we love what we wish for (to 
boulometha), it is the good (to agathon). [4] But the pleasant and the good are 
different things.  [5] We must attempt to decide about these matters and others 
similar to them, taking as a starting point the following. [6] The thing desired 
(orekton) and wished for (boulêton) is either the good or the apparent good (to 
agathon ê to phainomenon agathon). [7i] That is why also the pleasant is desired 
(orekton), [7ii] for it is an apparent good, [7iii] since some people think it good, 
and to others it appears good even though they do not think it so (phainomenon 
gar ti agathon. tois men gar dokei, tois de phainetai k'an mê dokêi), [7iv]  (for 
appearance and opinion are not in the same part of the soul (ou gar en t'autôi tês 
psuchês hê phantasia kai hê doxa)). [8] Yet it is clear that both the good and the 
pleasant are dear (philon). 
 
 
At [7iii] Aristotle contrasts someone who thinks (dokei) pleasure is good with someone 
who does not think pleasure is good but nonetheless suffers an appearance (phainetai) 
that pleasure is good. Here, phantasia and doxa are clearly different cognitive attitudes; 
indeed, they are in different parts of the soul [7iv]. What is important for our purposes is 
that Aristotle insists that phantasia, no less than doxa, involves concepts like ‘good’.  
                                                
89 Prosperity is mentioned in the definition of envy: “Envy is pain at apparent prosperity (eupragiâi 
phainomenêi) as consists of the good things already mentioned: we feel it towards our equals not with the 
idea of getting something for ourselves, but because the other people have it.” (Rh 2.10 1387b23-4) 
90 Worth is mentioned in the definition of pity: “Pity is a kind of pain at what appears to be a destructive or 
painful evil (phainomenôi kakôi phthartikôi ê lupêrôi) for someone undeserving to be struck by it (tou 
anaxiou tugchanein), [an evil which] one could expect oneself or someone near to oneself to suffer, and 
this when it appears near (touto hotan plêsion phainêtai)”  (Rh 2.8 1385b13-6). 
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People suffer appearances of pleasure as good, and they suffer these appearances even 
whey they do not think pleasure is good [7iii]. This shows that phantasia can have 
content like “the good” and yet fall short of the belief threshold. 
How does phantasia acquire concepts like “the good”?  Aristotle does not say, but 
presumably the acquisition outlined in Posterior Analytics 2.19 plays an important role.  
For there he presents it as a model for acquiring concepts in general, and gives no 
indication that it is restricted to only a subset of concepts.  
 Given that phantasia can have content that includes the objects listed in Dow’s 
(1)-(4), I conclude that Dow’s challenge to appearances-based readings fail.  The 
sophisticated content of the emotions does not pose a challenge to appearance-based 
views of the emotions.  
 
VII. Conclusion: Implications for My Interpretation of the Reason-Responsive Alogon 
 
Let me sum up what I have tried to accomplish in this chapter.  I began by addressing the 
question of whether phantasia can serve as the cognition underlying human emotions. To 
answer this question, I first noted that Rhetoric I suggests that Aristotle has a clear 
distinction between phantasia and doxa in mind, and thus, barring any objections to 
appearance-based views of the emotion, we should assume that Aristotle holds an 
appearance-based view of the emotions in the Rhetoric.  
I then presented Dow’s claim that phantasia lacks the cognitive sophistication to 
account for the complex content of emotions.   To assess this claim, I explored phantasia 
in detail, offering the following account: phantasia (1) is a non-reflective appearance 
 97 
that, (2) while dependent on sense perception, (3) has content that goes beyond what is 
available in sense perception. To establish this account, I examined the different 
operations of phantasia in dreams, memory, apprehending prospects, common perception 
and conceptualized perception.  These operations suggested that phantasia can have 
objects that go beyond sense perception to include rather sophisticated objects:  objects 
like abstract objects, propositions, causal properties, and evaluative properties. Thus, 
contrary to Dow’s assertion, phantasia can have the content characteristic of the 
emotions.  
That phantasia can have sophisticated content is important, because it shows that 
even when the cognitions involved in emotions (and, given the close connection between 
emotion and desire, also desires) rest on phantasia and not belief, they can nonetheless 
have sophisticated contents. Given the cognitive sophistication not only of belief but also 
of phantasia, there is no reason to think that the objects of appetite and spirit need to be 
crude. On the contrary, there is every reason to think that the cognitions underlying 
appetites and spirited desires can include contents like fineness and goodness. We can 
appetitively desire to stand fast in battle qua something pleasant and fine or have a 
spirited desire for the fineness of refraining from an unhealthy indulgence.  
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CHAPTER 5  
ARISTOTELIAN DECISION (PROHAIRESIS) 
 
I. Introduction 
 
So far I have argued that one can have non-rational desires— appetites  (epithumia) and 
spirited desire (thumos)—that prompt one to do fine actions qua fine. In this chapter, I 
want to look at the specific motivational attitude of Aristotelian decision (prohairesis). 
The goal is to see to what sorts of psychological capacities are involved in the production 
of a decision. 
Section II examines two different interpretations—a deflationary and a robust 
interpretation—of decision. Section III argues that these interpretations have very 
different implications for whether intellectually deficient people like slaves, women, and 
children can decide on virtuous activities. In section IV I argue in favor of a robust 
account of decision by arguing in favor of a robust account of wish (boulêsis), decision’s 
underlying desiderative element.  According to the interpretation I put forward, 
Aristotelian decision is a rather intellectual thing: it arises out of deliberation about the 
constituents of happiness, and as such is available only to intellectually sophisticated 
individuals.  
 
II.  Decision (Prohairesis)   
 
II.1 Introduction to Decision  
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Aristotle says that a decision is a matter of desiring to do what deliberation has shown to 
be conducive to some wished-for end (EN 3.2 1111b26-30).  More specifically, a 
decision is the product of (i) a wish (boulêsis) 91 for some practically remote end and (ii) 
deliberation (bouleusis) about the means to (ta pros)92 that end. When deliberation 
identifies means, then—assuming the means are practicable—the agent decides to 
perform those means. Thus, an agent wishes to be healthy; discovers from deliberation 
that medicine will make her healthy; and so decides to take medicine.  
 Aristotle thinks that both the alogon and the deliberative soul plays a role in 
an agent’s having and acting on a correct decision.93  However, commentators disagree 
about the alogon’s and deliberation’s respective roles, and in particular their roles in 
producing the wishes that underlies decisions. Because this disagreement has large 
implications for the nature of decision, we ought to take a closer look at what Aristotle 
tells us about wishes. 
 
II.2 Aristotle’s Two Claims about Wish 
 
                                                
91 EN 3.3, 1112b15-17; 6.2 1139a31. Aristotle most explicitly states that wish is the desiderative element 
involved in decision at EE 2.10:  “Since, then, decision is neither opinion (doxa) nor wish (boulêsis) singly 
nor yet both (for no one decides suddenly, though he thinks he ought to act, and wishes suddenly), it must 
be compounded of both, for both are found in a man deciding” (EE 2.10 1226b2-5). But see also EN 3.2 
1111b20 where Aristotle says that though boulêsis is not prohairesis, “it is apparently close to it;” cf. EN 
3.3 1113a10-4): “We have found, then that what we decide to do is whatever action, among those up to us, 
we deliberate about and desire to do. Hence also decision will be deliberative desire to do an action that is 
up to us; for when we have judged [that it is right] as a result of deliberation, we desire to do it in accord 
with our wish” (Translation Irwin [2]).   
92 Note that means can include both instrumental means and constitutive means.  
93 “It is clear that a prohairesis will not be correct in the absence of phronêsis, or in the absence of virtue; 
for the one causes us to do (poiei prattein) the end (telos), the other causes us to do the things leading to the 
end (ta pros to telos)” (6.13 1145a3-6). As  I will show in chapter 6, when Aristotle says that the decision 
will not be correct in the absence of virtue and in the absence of phronêsis, by “virtue” he means the 
desiderative aspect of paradigmatic virtue. 
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Aristotle makes two distinctive claims about wish that distinguish it from non-rational 
desire.  (1) We wish only for what we think to be good (oietai einai spoudaion), whereas 
we can have an appetite for something we do not think to be good (EN 1136b7-8; Cf. 
Rhet. 1369a3, cf. EE 1223b7, 32-33) and (2) Wish, but not non-rational desire, is 
connected to reason, a connection seen in wish’s placement in the rational part of the soul 
(the non-rational desires appetite (epithumia) and spirit (thumos) are in the non-rational 
part), and in Aristotle’s statement that wish moves an agent “according to reasoning” 
(kata ton logismon),” whereas appetite moves “even contrary to reasoning” (para ton 
logismon) (DA 3.10 433a21-6).  
These two formal characterizations actually tell us rather little about wish. Take 
(1), the claim that we only wish for what we think to be good. What is the kind of 
thinking to be good at issue here? For example, must the thought have a certain kind of 
causal history—say, one involving explicit reasoning about what is good for oneself—or 
can the thought be generated in some other way? Or consider (2): Granting that wish has 
a connection to reason, what exactly is the nature of this connection? Must a desire be the 
result of some sort of reasoning if it is to count as a wish? If so, what kind of reasoning? 
If not, in what way is wish connected to reason? Deflationary and robust accounts have 
very different answers to these questions.  
 
II.3 Deflationary Accounts of Wish on (1) and (2) 
 
The essential feature of deflationary accounts of wish is that they deny that reflective 
reasoning about the human good plays an essential role in the generation of a wish; they 
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offer interpretations of (1) and (2) that distinguish wish from appetite in some way other 
than by connecting wish to reflective reasoning. Here I’ll focus on three deflationary 
accounts of wish: Fortenbaugh’s,94  Broadie’s,95 and Mele’s. 96  
According to Fortenbaugh’s deflationary reading of (1) and (2), the distinction 
between wish and appetite amounts to the fact that the former, but not the latter, is 
“cognitive,” where by “cognitive” he means “involving judgment or belief (doxa)”. 
Though Fortenbaugh never officially defines judgment and belief and so never spells out 
precisely what it is to “involve judgment or belief”, he seems to take it is a necessary and 
sufficient condition for a mental state’s involving judgment or belief that it have 
propositional content and be alterable by language. Contrasting mental phenomena that 
are cognitive in this sense with “non-thinking” bodily urges that have physiological 
causes and are alterable only by force, Fortenbaugh puts wish into the former category 
and appetite into the latter.  
Fortenbaugh maintains that the fact that wish rests on judgment or belief connects 
wish with rationality (feature (2) of wish), because, only a rational being can make a 
judgment; non-rational animals are restricted to appearance (phantasia). But he insists 
that the judgment underlying a wish need not be consciously entertained by the agent, 
and that it need not be the product of reasoning about the good. For this reason the kind 
of thinking to be good referred to in (1) can be non-conscious and the result of non-
rational habituation.  
Broadie offers a deflationary reading of (1) and (2) that distinguishes wish from 
appetite in a different way. According to Broadie, whereas an appetitive desire for X does 
                                                
94 Fortenbaugh. W.W. Aristotle on Emotion. 2nd ed. London: Duckworth, 2002. 
95 Broadie, Sarah.  Ethics With Aristotle. Oxford: OUP, 1991. 
96 Mele, Alfred. “Aristotle’s Wish,” Journal of the History of Philosophy 22 (1984), 139-56. 
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not rest on any reason that supports X as worth pursuing, a wish for X does rest on such 
reasons; this, Broadie suggests, is what claim (1)—the claim that a wish for X involves 
thinking X to be good—amounts to. On her view, when one wishes for X, one opens 
oneself up to the question of why pursuing X would be good, whereas when one has an 
appetitive desire for X, one is not subject to questions about why one desires X: it is 
simply the case that one wants X, and if someone asks why one appetitively desires X, 
then that person misunderstands what it is to have an appetitive desire.       
Broadie thinks that it is because a wish is potentially backed by reasons that wish 
bears a connection with rationality. This is because (so she says) only a rational being can 
have a grasp of why it would be good for (e.g.) Troy to have won the Trojan War (her 
example) 97; this grasp of reasons is what allows rational beings, but not non-rational 
beings, to have wishes. But she also maintains that the reasons backing a wish for X need 
not be consciously stated by the agent; what is required of the bouletic agent98 is that ex 
post facto she can explain why she desired to do what she desired to do: she can offer 
reasons that explain why she desired X. Furthermore, Broadie insists that these reasons 
need not be the result of reasoning about the good, but rather can be reasons an agent has 
because of non-rational habituation. This feature firmly puts Broadie’s account in the 
deflationary camp. 
                                                
97 “[To have a wish that Troy had not been taken] one has to have a sense of the past and an understanding 
of why things would have been better had it been different. No one could wish for no reason that Troy had 
not been taken…in the way in which one can just want a drink of water or to return a blow” (Broadie 107, 
italics hers). 
98 By “bouletic agent” I mean an agent qua wishing.  
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Finally, Mele argues that wish, but not appetite, is “conditioned by” a conception 
of the good or “doing well” (eupraxia);99 this, on Mele’s view, is what Aristotle means 
by claim (1). Mele doesn’t say exactly how he conceives of a conception of the good, but 
presumably, a conception of the good specifies a general list of goods and includes some 
sense of those goods’ relative weights.  
Mele argues that it is because a wish expresses a conception of the good that wish 
has a special connection to reason (2).  This is because, as Mele points out, Aristotle 
thinks that regarding something as an instantiation of one’s conception of the good is not 
possible for non-rational animals; it is possible for human beings alone.100 In support of 
this claim that possessing a conception of the good is something distinctive of human 
beings, Mele cites the passage from Pol. 1.2  passage we’ve already looked at: 
The reason why man is a political animal (politikon) to a fuller extent than any 
bee or any herding animal is obvious. Nature, as we often say, makes nothing in 
vain, and man is the only animal whom she has endowed with the gift of speech. 
And whereas mere voice is but an indication of pleasure and pain, and is therefore 
found in other animals (for their nature attains to the perception of pleasures and 
pain and the intimation of them to one another, and no further, the power of 
speech is intended to set forth the expedient and inexpedient, and therefore 
likewise the just and the unjust. And it is characteristic of man that he alone has 
any sense of good and evil, of just and unjust, and the like, and the association of 
these101 makes a family and a city (hê de toutôn koinônia poiei oikian kai polin). 
(Pol. 1.2 1253a7-17) 
 
                                                
99 In Mele’s words “…the practical intellect of a deliberator does have a conception of eupraxia or 
happiness, and one’s wishes, along with the choices derived from them, are conditioned by this conception” 
(Mele, 145).  
100 “[W]ish alone of the three species of desire depends upon a conception of the good, and this is 
something which rational beings alone have (Cf. Pol. 1253a15-18:  ‘It is characteristic of man that he alone 
has any sense of good and evil of just and unjust and of the like…’” (Mele, 147). 
101 “Of these” may mean “in these matters” (i.e. in matters concerning the good, as opposed to matters 
concerning the pleasant). Alternatively, “of these” may refer to those animals with a sense of the good (as 
opposed to a sense of the merely pleasant).  
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Mele maintains that the conception of the good that informs a wish need not be 
explicit in an agent’s mind, and need not be the result of reasoning about the good.102 
While the conception may be the result of reasoning—and indeed, in the case of the 
practically wise (phronimos) agent, it will be supported by such reasoning—it may also 
be the result of non-rational habituation. Thus the account’s status as deflationary. 
These, then, are the three deflationary accounts. All accounts try to explain 
features (1) and (2) without drawing any essential connection between having a wish and 
engaging in reasoning about the good.   
 
II.4 Robust Accounts of Wish on (1) and (2) 
 
On the robust reading of (1) and (2), (1) and (2) make it a condition of having a wish for 
X, but not an appetite for X, that the desire result from, or be sustained by, reasoning 
about the good that issues in the conclusion that X is in fact good. Thus, according to 
robust accounts, the sort of thinking to be good referenced in (1) is thinking that arises 
out of reasoned reflection: a desire counts as a wish only if that desire is sustained by 
reasoning that yields reasons for thinking that X is in fact good.  
These reasons must issue from reason itself and be arrived at independently of the 
non-rational part’s own “reasons” or commitments, and so cannot be “thoughts” that arise 
out of non-rational moral habituation. Whatever “thoughts” non-rational desires involve, 
they are not thoughts based on reason’s reasons, and so don’t count as wishes. This view, 
then, makes the connection to rationality referenced in (2) a very strong connection: 
                                                
102He explicitly distances himself from the view that “wish must itself be the result of deliberation about 
one’s overall good” (Mele, 147). The rejected view he refers to is the account Irwin offers in Irwin [6], 257.  
 106 
having a wish involves taking a reflective attitude towards one’s final ends; it involves 
trying to figure out through reasoning about the human good which ends are actually 
worth going for, rather than simply taking one’s ends for granted. 
Terence Irwin defends a robust account. According to Irwin, wishes are desires of 
the rational part of the soul that are informed by deliberation (bouleusis) about the 
components of the good.103 On Irwin’s view, one starts out with a few general ideas about 
the good, and from deliberation grasps the categories of goods and actions that make up 
the good. These results of deliberation then make up a conception of the good that 
informs any desires that count as wishes.  
 
III. Implications of the Debate for Deliberatively Imperfect Agents’ Prohairetic 
Abilities 
  
The debate about wish has important implications for deliberative imperfect agents’ 
abilities to make decisions. If robust accounts of wish are right that wish rests on 
deliberation about the constituents of the human good, then it will be very difficult for 
rationally deficient agents to have prohairetic motivation. After all, the robust view places 
rather strict rational requirements on wish and so on decision, and as a result prohairetic 
agency will be hard to come by for deliberatively deficient agents. By contrast, if 
deflationary accounts are right, then it is much easier for rationally deficient agents to 
have the wishes that are pre-requisites for virtuous decisions.  After all, on deflationary 
views, having the wishes involved in decisions does not require reasoning about the good 
or having a rationally-derived conception of the good. Rather, it simply requires having 
                                                
103 Irwin [1], 173-5. See also Cooper [1], 242.  
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from moral upbringing certain desiderative dispositions. Assuming basic instrumental 
reasoning skills, people should be able to focus these wishes onto particular actions.  
 Given that robust and deflationary accounts of wish have very different 
implications for our question of whether deliberatively deficient individuals can make 
decisions, we have reason to decide between the two accounts. But how do we decide 
between them, given that Aristotle’s explicit exposition about wish is too indeterminate 
to favor one account over the other?104  
 
IV. The Deflationary and Robust Accounts on Slaves’ Bouletic Capacities 
 
IV.1 Introduction 
 
In this section, I argue that an hitherto unmined source can help us on this front. I will 
argue that Aristotle’s comments about slaves—in particular, his remark that they fail to 
partake of “living according to decision” (tou zên kata prohairesin, Pol. 3.9 
1280a34)105—may advance our understanding of wish in a way that supports the robust 
over the deflationary account. The remark ultimately implies, I argue, that Aristotle 
denies wishes to slaves and thus makes it a criterion of any good account of wish that 
                                                
104 Examining Aristotle’s account of virtue of character may seem to be one way to decide between the two 
accounts. For example, if Aristotle describes virtue of character as a primarily non-rational condition, then, 
given the connection between virtue and decision, we have reason to doubt the robust interpretation of 
wish. However, many passages about virtue of character that are cited as evidence for a non-rational 
interpretation of virtue have alternative interpretations that make Aristotle’s account of virtue consistent 
with the robust account of wish. Elsewhere in my dissertation, I argue that passages often cited as evidence 
for a non-rational account of virtue can actually be interpreted in such a way that makes virtue something 
very rational.   
105 The Pol. 3.9 passage, in full, is as follows: “But a city exists not for the sake of mere living  (tou zên 
monon) but rather of living well (eu zên). Otherwise there could be a city of slaves or of other (allôn zôôn) 
animals. There is no such thing because they do not partake (metechein) of happiness nor live according to 
prohairesis (tou zên kata prohairesin)” (1280a31-4).  
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wish be something unavailable to slaves. A problem for deflationary accounts is that they 
fail to meet this criterion: they cannot make sense of Aristotle’s denial of wish to slaves. 
Moreover, this failure of deflationary accounts suggests, we shall see, that wish involves 
the sort of sophisticated rational activity that the robust account implies. That’s the 
argument. If it’s right, then we can make some progress in our understanding of wish.  
The argument proceeds as follows. In IV.2, I show that deflationary accounts 
must attribute wishes to natural slaves, whereas robust accounts need not. In sections V 
and VI, I argue that the claim that natural slaves “fail to live according to decision” 
implies that slaves do not have wishes. I first argue that the claim is best interpreted as 
saying that natural slaves lack the rational capacities needed to make decisions. I then 
show that the best explanation for Aristotle’s asserting this is that he denies slaves 
wishes. The fact that deflationary accounts attribute wishes to slaves gives us reason, I 
argue in VII, to favor robust over deflationary accounts. 
 
IV.2 Deflationary Accounts on Natural Slaves’ Bouletic Capacities 
 
I now want to turn to the following question: given the deflationary and robust accounts’ 
descriptions of wish, do legally free natural slaves’ desires count as wishes? That is, if 
deflationary accounts of wish are right, should we describe legally free natural slaves’ 
desires as wishes? What if robust accounts are right?  To answer these questions, we will 
need to take a closer look at slaves and the sort of desires they have. The reason for 
restricting the analysis to legally free natural slaves will become clear in sections V and 
VI.  
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Aristotle’s statements about natural slave moral psychology suggest that at least 
some of slaves’ desires are cognitive phenomena alterable by means such as language 
(Fortenbaugh’s account of wish), rest on or presuppose reasons (Broadie’s account), and 
depend on a conception of the good (Mele’s account).  Thus, if any of the deflationary 
accounts of wish are correct, then slaves’ desires count as wishes.  
The following passage from the Politics makes clear that slaves’ desires are 
cognitive in Fortenbaugh’s sense:  
Hence it is clear that the master ought to be the cause of virtue in the slave, but 
not as possessing that art of mastership which teaches a slave his tasks. Hence 
those persons are mistaken who deprive the slave of reasoning (logou) and say to 
use command (taxei) only; for one should admonish (nouthetêteon) slaves even 
more than children (paidas) (Pol. 1.13 1260b5-7). 
 
Here, Aristotle suggests that masters ought to use reasoning (logou) as means for 
directing slaves; they ought to admonish (nouthetêteon) slaves. Now, if slaves’ desires 
were brute non-thinking forces or bodily sensations—Fortenbaugh’s appetitive desires—
then there would be no reason for Aristotle to recommend reasoned admonition as the 
appropriate way to alter slaves’ desires: it is useless, after all, to use cognitive means like 
reasoned speech against a bodily sensation or feeling.  By insisting that masters use 
reasoned admonition on slaves, the passage suggests that slaves’ desires are cognitive in 
Fortenbaugh’s sense and thus are the sort of desires that Fortenbaugh’s deflationary 
account identifies as wishes.   
A passage from the Rhetoric about the proper relationship between slaves and 
masters suggests that slaves’ desires can rest on the kinds of reasons that Broadie 
connects with wish. Consider the Rhetoric’s claim that masters should not punish slaves 
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without offering an explanation (logos) that justifies punishment and so prevents slaves 
from becoming angry: 
And [men grow mild (praoi gignontai)] if they believe that they themselves are in 
the wrong and are suffering justly (ean adikein oiôntai autoi kai dikaiôs 
paschein), since men no longer think then that they are suffering without 
justification (para to prosêkon nomizousi paschein); and anger (orgê), as we have 
seen, is this. Hence we ought always to chastise beforehand (prokalazein) with 
words (tôi logôi):  if that is done, even slaves are less aggrieved by the actual 
punishment. (Rhet. 2.3 1380b16-20) 
 
This passage seems to say that masters can prevent a slave from getting angry by 
explaining to the slave why she deserves punishment. The fact that slaves can follow 
these explanations and adjust their emotional responses as a result suggests that their 
desires are potentially supportable by reasons.  After all, were their desires not potentially 
supportable by reasons, it’s not clear why offering a slave a justificatory logos for his 
punishment would affect her desire for revenge, the kind of desire involved in anger.106  
Presumably, the reason that the justificatory logos is effective is that it shows the slave 
that what she took as a reason for being angry—viz., that she has been wronged—does 
not actually hold; the justificatory logos causes the slave to see the situation in a new 
light, and thus removes what she earlier took as a reason for desiring revenge. By 
insisting that masters offer a justificatory logos to slaves, then, Aristotle suggests that 
slaves’ desires rest on reasons and thus are the sort of desires that Broadie’s account 
identifies as wishes.   
What about Mele’s account? We saw earlier in our discussion of Mele’s account 
that Aristotle makes it a distinguishing feature of human beings that they have a 
                                                
106 See Aristotle’s discussion of incontinence with respect to spirit at EN 7.6, where he mentions insults and 
belittlement (b12-13). Given that elsewhere Aristotle associates insults and belittlement with anger (Rhet. 
2.2), the agent at EN 7.6 who acts incontinently on spirit appears to be acting out of anger in particular.  
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conception of the good (Pol. 1.2 1253a8-16). This suggests that slaves can have a 
conception of the good, because Aristotle insists that slaves are human beings (1254a16, 
1259b27-8). Aristotle’s classification of slaves as humans, combined with Pol. 1.2’s 
insistence that it is a distinguishing feature of human beings suggests that slaves, as 
human beings, can have a conception of the good.107  Given that Mele says that wishes 
are desires that rest on a conception of the good, Mele’s account predicts that slaves will 
have wishes.   
So it follows that, on any of the deflationary accounts, slaves’ desires meet the 
necessary criteria to be wishes. It follows that deflationary accounts must attribute wishes 
to slaves.   
  
IV.3 Robust Account on Slaves’ Bouletic Capacities 
 
If the robust account of wish is right, then do slaves have wishes? Since the robust 
account maintains that wishes are desires that essentially arise out of, or are sustained by, 
reasoning about the good, answering this question requires that we determine whether 
slaves can engage in such reasoning. 
The passage that is crucial in this regard is Aristotle’s claim that natural slaves 
lack entirely (holôs) a deliberative faculty (bouleutikon).108 To interpret this claim, we 
need to examine Aristotle’s notion of deliberation (bouleusis). Deliberation, he says, is 
                                                
107 There is no indication that the Pol. 1.2 passage restricts the capacity to have a conception of the good to 
perfectly rational human beings; on the contrary, the passage suggests that the capacity to have a 
conception of the good is something that every human being qua human being has. This seems to be the 
upshot of the passage’s point that the capacity for speech is closely related to the capacity to have a 
conception of the good.  
108  Pol. 1.13 1260a10-14. 
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concerned not about ends but about what “promotes” or “forwards” a given end; we 
deliberate peri tôn pros ta telê (EN 3.3 1112b12). He compares a practical deliberator in 
this respect to a doctor:  “A doctor, for instance, does not deliberate about whether he will 
make healthy, or a public speaker about whether he will persuade, or a politician about 
whether he will produce good order, or any others about the end.  Rather, we lay down 
the end, and then examine how and by what means (to pôs kai dia tinôn) it will come 
about” (3.3 1112b12-17).  
 These “things promoting the end” (ta pros ta telê) include not just instrumental 
means but also constitutive means, instrumental means being the efficient cause of an 
end, and constitutive means being that which counts as achieving the end.109 
Deliberation, moreover, has two spheres of application: craft (technê) and action (praxis).  
For our purposes, there are two relevant differences between the spheres. First, in craft, 
the deliberator deliberates about the means—either instrumental or constitutive—to some 
limited end (say, a pot); by contrast, in action the deliberator deliberates about means—
again, both instrumental and constitutive—to happiness or “doing well” in general 
(eupraxia) (EN 6.5 1140b6-7). Second, deliberation in craft is not prescriptive in the way 
that deliberation in action is. When deliberation in the realm of action identifies X as 
means to eupraxia, it thereby prescribes X, because eupraxia is necessarily the end we 
pursue (EN 1.2 1094b6, 1.4 1095a14-20). By contrast, the end of craft need not be 
something that we necessarily pursue, and so the conclusion of deliberation in craft is not 
essentially prescriptive.  
                                                
109 Thus, for example, it is from instrumental deliberative reasoning that I discover that the instrumental 
means to my attending the Pistons game include my getting into my car and driving to the Palace of 
Auburn Hills, and it is through constitutive means-end reasoning that I discover that the constitutive means 
to my attending the Pistons game includes my watching the 1st quarter, the 2nd quarter, etc. 
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 Instrumental deliberation in both craft and action are fairly straightforward, as is 
constitutive deliberation in craft, so we needn’t go into examples here. Constitutive 
deliberation in action is more interesting. There are two kinds:110  “particular action 
constitutive deliberation”, where the deliberator considers how to instantiate her 
conception of the good in the specific ethical context in which she find herself, and 
“blueprint constitutive deliberation,” where the deliberator tries to form a conception of 
the good by deliberating about the components of the human good.  In particular action 
constitutive deliberation, the means the deliberator tries to identify is the particular action 
to be done here and now that puts into practice her conception of the good. Identifying 
this action will be challenging in moral contexts where there are a variety of competing 
goods at stake. In such cases, deliberation is required to determine which of the various 
goods deserves the agent’s concern. This deliberation can be rather complicated and 
involved, if these goods have a complicated relation to each other within one’s 
conception of the good, or if the particular moral context presents the goods in an 
irregular combination. 
In “blueprint constitutive deliberation,” the means the deliberator seeks are the 
components that make up happiness. Such a deliberator asks questions like the following: 
does happiness include contemplation as a major part? Does it include friendship?111 This 
                                                
110 For an articulation of these two types of deliberation see McDowell, 32-3. 
111 This is the sort of deliberative inquiry that characterizes Aristotle’s ethical works. He describes the 
inquiry undertaken in the EN as a sort of ‘political science’ (1094b11), and later says that political science 
is the same state as practical wisdom (phronêsis) (1141b23-4). It is clear as early as EN 1.2 that he takes the 
EN to be an inquiry into the nature of the ultimate end for man,  saying that we must try to grasp ‘in 
outline’ the ultimate good, and that such a search belongs to political science (1094a25).  His subsequent 
dialectical turn (1095a17) toward the endoxa concerning the highest good makes sense if the EN is 
inquiring into the constituents of ultimate good.  This evidence suggests that Aristotle sees the EN as a 
deliberative investigation about the constituents of the human good. For an argument against this reading 
see Broadie, chapter 4.  
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is the sort of reasoning about the good that robust accounts, but not deflationary accounts, 
make essential to wishes. 
With these different kinds of deliberation in mind, we can now return to the 
interpretive question of interest: how ought we to interpret Aristotle’s claim that slaves 
lack entirely (holôs) a deliberative faculty (bouleutikon)?  One restraint governing our 
interpretation is this: any plausible interpretation must be something that Aristotle could 
have reasonably believed, given the empirical evidence available to him. That is, charity 
requires that we not attribute to him any views that would have conflicted with empirical 
evidence that would have been obvious to him. 112 
For this reason, an unrestricted interpretation of the claim—an interpretation that 
denies slaves the ability to engage in any and all kinds of deliberation—is not plausible. 
As I suggested in chapter 5,113 the empirical data about slaves in ancient Athens suggests 
that Aristotle had every reason to regard slaves as capable of both instrumental and 
constitutive means-end deliberative reasoning in craft.  Simply put, Aristotle couldn’t, 
without facing blatant evidence to the contrary, have denied that slaves engaged in 
activities requiring the adaptability and deliberative understanding that characterizes craft 
knowledge. And indeed, Aristotle himself declares that Asians—a group he describes as 
especially naturally slavish (Pol. 3.14 1285a19-22)—are both intelligent (dianoêtika) and 
“technical” (technika) (Pol. 7.7 1372b27-8).  
 So we must set aside the unrestricted interpretation. If slaves suffer from a 
deliberative incapacitation, it cannot be an incapacitation that extends to craft: it must be 
one in the sphere of action. Now, this incapacity in the sphere of action could not include 
                                                
112 This is a constraint that Malcolm Heath (2-3) places on an interpretation of Aristotle’s theory.  
113 Chapter 5, p.15 
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an incapacity with respect to instrumental deliberation. To see this, consider the naturally 
slavish Triballoi tribesperson who, according to Aristotle, thinks that sacrificing her 
father is a fine and choiceworthy action.114 Suppose she has a desire to sacrifice her 
father. Will she have the instrumental deliberative skills to figure out how to do this? The 
answer is obviously yes. After all, as we’ve seen, natural slaves clearly had abilities for 
instrumental deliberation in craft, and it would be extremely odd for them to have such 
skills in craft but not in action: why would this kind of reasoning break down in one 
sphere but not in the other? 115  There doesn’t seem to be a principled way of attributing 
an instrumental deliberative incapacity in the one sphere but not in the other, and for this 
reason we should think that Aristotle regarded slaves as capable of instrumental 
deliberation in action.  
Slaves’ deliberative incapacity, then, must be an incapacity with respect to 
constitutive deliberation in action. We saw that there are two types of this particular kind 
of deliberation: particular action constitutive deliberation, where the goal is to implement 
a conception of the good in a particular ethical context, and blueprint constitutive 
deliberation, where the goal is to form a conception of the good by identifying the 
components of happiness. Unlike the case of deliberation in craft, or instrumental 
deliberation in action, both of these deliberative capacities are somewhat sophisticated: 
they are capacities that develop relatively late in human development. Moreover, unlike 
the other kinds of deliberative capacities, it seems that Aristotle could have denied these 
                                                
114 “And in the same way, in certain places it is fine (kalon) to sacrifice one's father, e.g. among the 
Triballoi, but without qualification (haplôs) it is not fine (kalon). But possibly this indicates not “where” 
but “for whom,” for it makes no difference where they may be: for everywhere it will be fine (kalon) to the 
Triballoi, since they are Triballoi” (Top. 2.11 115b22-6). 
115Heath makes this point. I have taken this example about the Triballoi from his discussion. Heath, 4.  
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two sorts of deliberative capacities without committing himself to a view that starkly 
conflicted with empirical evidence.   
It seems, then, that the following interpretations are plausible interpretations of 
Aristotle’s claim that slaves entirely lack a deliberative faculty. It could mean: that slaves 
lack the ability to identify how to instantiate a given conception of the good; that they 
lack the ability to deliberate over the constituents of happiness; or that they lack both the 
ability to identify how to instantiate a given conception of the good and the ability to 
deliberate over the constituents of happiness. All three of these interpretations are 
consistent with what Aristotle tells us about slaves’ deliberative capacities and (unlike the 
unrestricted interpretation) don’t conflict with the empirical evidence that would have 
been readily available to Aristotle.  
This conclusion about possible interpretations of slaves’ deliberative deficiencies 
is important, because it shows that the defender of the robust account need not identify 
slaves’ desires as wishes. For having a wish on the robust account requires the capacity 
for blueprint constitutive deliberation, and we’ve seen that Aristotle’s comments about 
slaves’ deliberative capacities can be read so as to deny slaves that capacity; they can be 
read as denying slaves the capacity to reason about the good. If we interpret Aristotle’s 
comment that slaves lack a deliberative faculty in such a way, the comment implies that 
slaves are restricted to taking for granted the conception of the good they receive by 
nature or from upbringing; they cannot take a reflective stance towards their ends and 
revise that conception.  
This marks an important difference between deflationary and robust accounts. If 
deflationary accounts are right, then one is committed to attributing wishes to slaves, as 
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Aristotle’s description of slaves’ moral psychology indicates that slaves have the kind of 
desires that deflationary accounts identify as wishes.  By contrast, if robust accounts are 
right, then one is not committed to attributing wishes to slaves, as there are possible 
interpretations of slaves’ deliberative incapacities that make it consistent to say that 
slaves lack wishes. This difference between the accounts will prove to be crucial for 
deciding between them.  
 
V.  Politics 3.9: Slaves Do Not  “Live According to Decision” 
 
Aristotle makes an important claim in Pol. 3.9 when he says that slaves do not partake of 
(metechein) living according to decision (tou zên kata prohairesin) (1280a31-4). The 
claim is important, because if we interpret it as saying that natural slaves are by nature 
incapable of making decisions (as this section argues we should), we can potentially learn 
something about slaves’ bouletic capacities.  
Slaves’ capacities for making decisions potentially implies something about their 
bouletic capacities because decision is necessarily the product of (i) a wish (boulêsis) 116 
for some end and (ii) deliberation about the means to (ta pros)117 that end. To illustrate, 
an agent wishes to be healthy; discovers from deliberation that medicine will make her 
healthy; and so decides to take medicine. It follows from the structure of decision that if 
                                                
116 EN 3.3, 1112b15-17; 6.2 1139a31. Aristotle most explicitly states that wish is the desiderative element 
involved in decision at EE 2.10:  “Since, then, decision is neither opinion (doxa) nor wish (boulêsis) singly 
nor yet both (for no one decides suddenly, though he thinks he ought to act, and wishes suddenly), it must 
be compounded of both, for both are found in a man deciding” (EE 2.10 1226b2-5). See also EN 3.2 
1111b20 where Aristotle says that though wish is not a decision, “it is apparently close to it.” Cf. EN 3.3 
1113a10-4: “We have found, then that what we decide to do is whatever action, among those up to us, we 
deliberate about and desire to do. Hence also decision will be deliberative desire to do an action that is up 
to us; for when we have judged [that it is right] as a result of deliberation, we desire to do it in accord with 
our wish” (Translation Irwin [2]).   
117 Such means can include both instrumental and constitutive means. See section II.2. 
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slaves cannot make decisions it is because they cannot have wishes or because they 
cannot adequately engage in the deliberation that such wishes prompt.118  In the next two 
sections, I’ll exploit this connection between decision and wish to argue that the Pol. 3.9 
passage ultimately denies slaves wishes.   
 
V.1  Overview of the Pol.  3.9 Passage 
 
Pol 3.9 comes in an argument about the nature of justice in a city. Aristotle begins by 
noting that justice is “equals for equals and unequals for unequals” (Pol 3.9 1280a11-13). 
That is, it is a condition in which people of equal worth have equal shares in city offices 
and power and where people of unequal worth have unequal shares in city offices and 
power.  
He notes that this formula doesn’t tell us much. After all, what do we use to 
measure the personal worth of the city’s members? This depends, Aristotle says, on the 
true end of the city.  If the city’s purpose is the accumulation of possessions, then 
personal property is the true measure of a man’s worth; in this case, the oligarchs are 
correct to say that wealth should determine political power.  
But in fact Aristotle thinks that the oligarchic conception of justice is flawed, and 
he thinks it is flawed precisely because oligarchs misunderstand the purpose of the city. 
The oligarchs think that the purpose of the city is the acquisition of possessions, but this 
                                                
118 Aristotle says that there is no decision without a state of character (6. 1139a17-b13), and so in principle 
a third explanation for failing to make decisions is that slaves lack states of character. I do not treat this as a 
serious possibility, however, because it seems rather unlikely. A state of character results from the 
repetition of similar activities (EN 2.1 1103a26-b25, 2.2 1104a11-b3), and Aristotle seems to think that 
even animals (some of them at least) live by habit (Pol. 7.13 1332b3-4). Thus, he seems to think that even 
animals can develop some sort of rudimentary state of character. 
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is wrong; the true purpose of the city, Aristotle says, is “not mere life” (tou zên monon) 
but the “good life” (eu zên), which crucially includes the exercise of the virtues.119 Since 
the good life involves exercising the virtues, a true city is one that aims to bring about 
virtue in the citizens.120   
If Aristotle’s argument about the city’s true purpose is to convince the oligarch, 
he needs to show that the oligarchic conception of the city’s purpose doesn’t hold up to 
common sense. He does this by offering the following line of reasoning: 
…a city exists not for the sake of mere living  (tou zên monon) but rather for the 
sake of living well (eu zên). Otherwise there could be a city of slaves or of the 
other (allôn zôôn) animals. There is no such thing because they do not partake 
(metechein) of happiness nor of living according to decision (tou zên kata 
prohairesin). (Pol. 3.9 1280a31-4)  
 
Aristotle says that if the true purpose of the city were merely the acquisition of life’s 
necessities, there could be a city of animals or of slaves. After all, animals and slaves can 
engage in cooperative behavior that is aimed at acquiring basic needs; they can come 
together for the purpose of “mere living.” And yet, Aristotle notes, we don’t apply the 
label “city” to groups of animals or slaves who live cooperatively in this way. This fact 
suggests, Aristotle thinks, that everyone implicitly recognizes that the true city aims not 
at mere living but at living well.  
 
V.2 Slaves Do Not Live According to Decision: Interpretive Options 
 
                                                
119 The good life consists in “good actions” (Pol. 3.9 1281a2). (Cf. Pol. 7.1-3, especially 7.1 1323b21-9) 
Because the good life consists mainly in being virtuous and doing virtuous acts, a true city, insofar as it is a 
city that aims at the good life, is a city that aims at producing the virtues in its citizens.  
120 “This makes it clear that a city must concern itself with goodness if it is to be truly and not merely for 
convenience called a city. Otherwise the community becomes an alliance….and its law becomes a treaty, 
and a ‘guarantor of reciprocal rights’ as Lycophron the sophist said, instead of being what makes the 
citizens good and just men” (Pol 3.9 1280b6-11). 
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What does Aristotle mean when he says that “slaves do not live according to decision”? 
The meanings of both the subject and predicate of the phrase are not immediately clear. 
Take the subject: slaves. As we’ve seen, Aristotle recognizes two kinds of slavery—legal 
and natural. The predicate “do not live by decision” also admits of a variety of meanings. 
To fail to “live by decision” might mean to not be the sort of being who is capable of 
making decisions at all and hence to be a being who is incapable of action (praxis); into 
this category fall children and non-rational animals.121 Alternatively, to fail to “live 
according to decision” might mean to not be able to make those decisions that one would 
make in conditions of legal freedom. Into this category would fall anyone who is forced 
by some authority to act against her will, or anyone who is forced because of non-ideal 
social or economic circumstances to preoccupy herself with procuring basic necessities.   
Note that how we interpret the predicate has implications for how we interpret the 
subject. For example, if we interpret “not living according to decision” as “lacking the 
natural constitution required to make decisions,” then the slaves referred to here are 
presumably natural slaves and natural slaves as such. By contrast, if we interpret “not 
living according to decision” as “not being able to make those decisions that one would 
make in conditions of legal freedom,” then presumably the slaves referred to here are 
legal slaves and legal slaves as such. 
Given these different ways of understanding the subject and predicate of the 
phrase “slaves do not live according to decision”, there seems to be two122 possible points 
that Aristotle could be making when he says that slaves fail to live according to decision: 
                                                
121 EN 3.2 1111b18, 12, 1.9 1099bb32-1100a5, 6.1 1139a19-32.   
122 One might think that there is a third possibility: “living according to decision” refers specifically to a 
sort of political decision-making activity, one where there is collective deliberation about the good of the 
community. The problem with this interpretation is that it doesn’t fit well with EE  1.1 1214b6, where 
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Interpretation (A) 
When Aristotle says that slaves fail to live according to decision, he is saying that slaves 
(like the animals with which they are grouped) have a rational deficiency that prevents 
them from making decisions; lacking the capacity to make decisions, they are not capable 
of genuine action. Because this interpretation appeals to a natural property of slaves 
(namely, their deficient rational capacities), it requires us to understand the slaves in 
question as natural slaves; whether they are legal slaves in addition doesn’t matter.  
Interpretation (B) 
When Aristotle says that slaves do not live according to decision he is referring to legal 
slaves and is saying that these slaves are unable to decide on activities they value for their 
own sakes. The idea is that slaves’ legal status requires them to devote all their time and 
energy either to serving their master’s needs or to procuring the necessities of life, and 
they thus lack the sort of lifestyle required to pursue activities that they view as 
intrinsically worthwhile. While the life of enslavement is compatible with making certain 
decisions—namely decisions aimed at external ends—it is not compatible with making 
the decisions that are most relevant to virtue and happiness, since the latter decisions are 
for fine (kalon) actions, and these actions require leisure.123   
                                                
Aristotle also uses the phrase “living according to decision.” The EE context is clearly not a political one; 
the passage in question is about the individual. Given that “living according to decision” clearly does not 
have a political meaning in the EE, we should not inject such a meaning into our reading of Pol. 3.9.  
123 Here a qualification is in order. While Aristotle says that leisure is not necessary for virtuous action 
(1334a22-8), he seems to think that lack of leisure limits one’s ability to express a virtuous character.  
Someone who is legally enslaved or someone who takes up a menial occupation is limited in what they can 
do: though their choices are strictly speaking free, they are “mixed” in the sense that they involve voluntary 
and involuntary elements. Aristotle says that in such mixed cases, it is hard to tell the difference between 
the virtuous and the vicious decision (cf. 1110a11-19, 1115b7-10, 1116a29-b3). So it’s reasonable to think 
that a lack of leisure constrains one’s capacities for virtuous expression. For a discussion of this issue see 
Irwin [7], 411-414.  
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Because (B) says that a particular social condition—namely, legal enslavement—
prevents slaves from having certain kinds of decisions—namely decisions on activities 
they regard as ends in themselves, it requires us to understand the slaves as legally 
enslaved. It doesn’t automatically tell us whether the slaves are also natural slaves.  
How do we decide between (A) and (B) as the best interpretation of Pol. 3.9? A 
good way to decide is to see whether the 3.9 passage or its argumentative context gives 
us reason to think that 3.9 is concerned with legally-free natural slaves, naturally-free 
legal slaves, or natural slaves who are also legally enslaved.  If the slaves in question are 
legally-free natural slaves, then we can rule out (B), since (B) only makes sense if the 
slaves are legally enslaved. By contrast, if we can show that the slaves are naturally free 
legal slaves, we can automatically rule out (A), since (A) only makes sense if the slaves 
are natural slaves. (Note that we cannot rule out (B) by just showing that the slaves are 
natural slaves, since it is compatible with (B) that the slaves are both legally and naturally 
enslaved.)  
An examination of the passage suggests that the slaves in questions are at least 
natural slaves. To see this, note Aristotle’s grouping of slaves with the “other animals” 
(allôn zôn). Here, he seems to be using zôn in the sense of “lower animal” and not in the 
sense of “member of genus ‘animal.’” (After all, adult Greek males are members of the 
genus ‘animal,’ and Aristotle certainly doesn’t think that positing a city of them is an 
absurdity.) Thus, in calling the slaves in question “other animals” (allôn zoon), Aristotle 
is somehow assimilating slaves to lower animals. So the slaves in question are natural 
slaves—deficient beings who (like all lower animals) benefit from being ruled by 
another. 
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Does Aristotle take these slaves to be legally enslaved as well?  The 
argumentative structure of Pol 3.9 suggests not. Consider the structure: 
(i) Assume that the city is nothing more than a cooperative union of individuals 
aimed at securing life’s necessities (Assume that the purpose of a city is “mere 
living”). 
(ii)  Slaves and animals engage in cooperative behavior aimed at securing life’s 
necessities. (Slaves an animals can come together for the purpose of “mere 
living” 
(iii)  So (from i and ii), slaves and animals should be able to form cities.  
(iv)   But we don’t think that there can be cities of animals or slaves, as animals 
and slaves do not partake (metechein) of happiness nor live according to 
decision (tou zên kata prohairesin). 
(v)  Thus, (i) must be false: the purpose of a city is not “mere living.” 
 
To determine whether the slaves referenced in (ii), (iii), and (iv), in addition to being 
naturally enslaved, are also legally enslaved, we should favor those interpretations of the 
slaves’ legal status that meet two conditions. First, the interpretation should make the 
claim in (ii) rather straightforward. For Aristotle in Pol. 3.9 speaks as if his audience 
knows from experience what a community of slaves aimed at mere living would look 
like; he does not speak as if he is introducing a strange counterfactual thought 
experiment. Second, the interpretation should be one on which Aristotle’s oligarch 
opponent will readily accept premise (iv). After all, when Aristotle offers (iv), he seems 
to assume that his oligarchic opponent will reject outright the notion of a city of animals 
or slaves.  
What understanding of the slaves’ legal status can meet both of these conditions? 
If we understand slaves as legally free natural slaves, then we get a plausible 
interpretation. For the slaves in question will be natural slaves who freely occupy their 
native lands and engage in cooperative behavior. There is nothing strange or 
counterfactual about this; indeed, it describes the life of most non-Greeks.  On this 
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reading, then, the city of slaves that Aristotle asks the oligarch to consider is a 
straightforward scenario, one for which the oligarch has a ready reference point: viz., the 
communities of Celts, Scythians, Thracians, etc. that surround Greece.  In this way, 
interpreting the slaves in (ii), (iii) and (iv) as legally free makes (ii) totally 
straightforward. Moreover, if we understand the slaves in (ii), (iii), and (iv) as legally 
free, Aristotle’s oligarchic opponent has reason to accept (iv). For the communities of 
legally-free natural slaves that engaged in cooperative living and that were prevalent 
around Greece  (consider the tribes and cultures making up Northern Europe) were 
perceived by Greeks not as cities but rather as wild tribes or despotic empires.  Aristotle 
himself calls these groups  “apolitical” (apoliteuta) (Pol. 7.7 1327b29). 
It seems, then, that we ought to understand the slaves at Pol. 3.9 as legally-free 
natural slaves. With that in mind, let us return to the ways we can interpret the claim that 
such slaves fail to “live according to decision.” We can rule (B) out, because it relies on a 
legal feature of the slaves in question, and our analysis of 3.9 has shown that the slaves in 
question are legally free.  That leaves us with (A): slaves (like animals and children) lack 
the natural constitution required to make any decisions at all; they do not live a life of 
action.   
 
VI.  Pol. 3.9: Evidence of Natural Slaves’ Bouletic Restrictions 
 
Why cannot slaves make decisions? We’ve seen that decision is a matter of desiring to do 
what deliberation has shown to be conducive to some wished-for end (EN 3.2 1111b26-
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30).  More specifically, it is the product of (i) a wish (boulêsis) 124 for some practically 
remote end and (ii) deliberation (bouleusis) about the means to (ta pros)125 that end. It 
follows that if slaves cannot make decisions, this is because (i) they cannot have wishes 
or because (ii) they cannot adequately engage in the deliberation that such wishes prompt. 
I want to argue that  (i) is crucial to understanding why slaves cannot make decisions: 
slaves cannot make decisions because they are not, on Aristotle’s view, the kind of beings 
who can have wishes. 
In order to see this, let’s assume the opposite—that slaves can have wishes—and 
see whether we can explain their inability to make decisions by attributing to them an 
incapacity with respect to the deliberation that those wishes prompt: granting that slaves 
can have wishes, can we explain slaves’ wholesale inability to make decisions by 
attributing to them an inability to engage in the deliberation that their wishes prompt?  
Consider again the naturally slavish Triballoi tribesperson who, according to 
Aristotle, thinks that sacrificing her father is fine and choiceworthy. As we’ve seen, 
slaves clearly had the instrumental reasoning ability to identify the instrumental means to 
ends such as sacrificing one’s father. So a failure of instrumental reasoning should not 
render the slave incapable of deciding to sacrifice her father.  
                                                
124 EN 3.3, 1112b15-17; 6.2 1139a31. Aristotle most explicitly states that wish is the desiderative element 
involved in decision at EE 2.10:  “Since, then, decision is neither opinion (doxa) nor wish (boulêsis) singly 
nor yet both (for no one decides suddenly, though he thinks he ought to act, and wishes suddenly), it must 
be compounded of both, for both are found in a man deciding” (EE 2.10 1226b2-5). But see also EN 3.2 
1111b20 where Aristotle says that though boulêsis is not prohairesis, “it is apparently close to it;” cf. EN 
3.3 1113a10-4): “We have found, then that what we decide to do is whatever action, among those up to us, 
we deliberate about and desire to do. Hence also decision will be deliberative desire to do an action that is 
up to us; for when we have judged [that it is right] as a result of deliberation, we desire to do it in accord 
with our wish” (Translation Irwin [2]).   
125 Note that means can include both instrumental means and constitutive means.  
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To explain the Triballoi slave’s inability to decide to sacrifice her father, Malcolm 
Heath126 appeals to the role that particular action constitutive deliberation plays in 
making a decision. What prevents a slave from deciding on some action in a given case, 
Heath suggests, is that her ethical context presents her with a wide range of moral 
considerations that she cannot adequately take into consideration; while she wishes to act 
finely, she cannot be adequately sensitive to the moral complexities of a given situation 
in a way that does justice to her conception of the good. In short, she lacks the particular 
action constitutive deliberative capacity to identify the action that instantiates her 
conception of the good.127 
The problem with this explanation for slaves’ inability to make decisions is that it 
only works in tough moral cases—cases where there are multiple moral goods at stake, 
thus complicating the ethical context. The explanation does not work in cases that are 
ethically straightforward from the agent’s point of view, and so it does not explain Pol. 
3.9’s wholesale denial of decisions to slaves. To see this, consider a slave who wishes to 
act finely, and situate her in a scenario that’s morally straightforward from her point of 
view—i.e., a scenario where there’s no question as to what action instantiates her 
conception of the good. If the slave has a proper conception of the good, such a case 
might be one where the choice in question is between pursuing some bodily pleasure and 
helping some friend in need. In this case, there’s no question about what constitutes fine 
                                                
126 Heath 6.  
127 In Heath’s words: “Consider a simple case of practical reasoning. I see a destitute person who is hungry 
and has nothing to eat. I recognize that it would be kalon to help him, and want to do so. How can I help?  I 
could help by giving him food; and here is some food. So I shall give him this food. But perhaps that would 
be wrong. Here is some food, but the food belongs to someone else—and it would be disgraceful to 
steal…A practical reasoner must consider, not just what can be done to implement a goal, but what can be 
done consistently with the action still being fine, and since virtuous action is performed because of (or for 
the sake of) the kalon.  Practical reasoning must integrate a multiplicity of morally relevant considerations” 
(Heath, 6). 
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action, and so no constitutive deliberation is needed to sift through competing moral 
considerations and identify the action that instantiates her conception of the good.  The 
slave’s conception of the good is all by itself sufficient for directing the slave to the right 
action: helping her friend.  
Note that this point doesn’t presuppose that a slave’s conception of the good is 
fully worked out. It simply grants that the slave’s conception of the good has some sort of 
significant content; such content need only be a list of certain worthwhile goods and 
some grasp of rules of priority between these goods. Once a slave has this kind of 
“rough-and-ready” conception of the good, then there will be ethical contexts in which 
this conception automatically directs her to a particular action; no constitutive 
deliberation is needed.  
Aristotle seems willing to attribute to slaves such a rough-and-ready conception 
of the good. We’ve seen from Pol. 1.2 that human beings, and thus slaves, can make 
evaluations that include concepts like ‘goodness.’ Moreover, as we’ve seen from his 
comment about the Triballoi tribespeople, natural slaves can evaluate things as fine: the 
Triballoi people think that sacrificing their fathers is fine, and so presumably include this 
in their conception of the good.  If such people have even a minimum conception of the 
good, then in cases where there are not a lot of competing goods at stake, their conception 
will be sufficient to guide them to a particular action. 
What begins to emerge from this discussion is the following. If we grant slaves 
wishes, as we have been doing up until now, it’s problematic to try to explain slaves’ 
inability to make decisions by attributing to them an inability to engage in the 
deliberation—either instrumental or constitutive--that such wishes prompt. The source of 
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the problem is that as human beings slaves are eligible for a conception of the good, and 
such a conception seems sufficient to guide slaves to particular actions in cases that are 
morally straightforward.  
One might try to resolve this puzzle by revising the interpretation of Pol. 3.9 so as 
to say that slaves cannot form decisions in morally complex cases—cases where there are 
a variety of competing moral considerations.  On this proposal, Pol. 3.9 denies slaves the 
capacity to make decisions that require sensitivity to a broad range of moral 
considerations—the sort of decisions that require particular action constitutive 
deliberation.  
The problem with this move is that it seems to makes it a condition of taking part 
in city life that one have the ability to determine, in every possible case, what action 
instantiates one’s conception of the good. But recall that Aristotle introduces the claim 
that slaves cannot live according to decision as support for the view that slaves cannot 
form cities (see discussion of 3.9’s argumentative context in V.2).   If we follow the 
proposed interpretation of 3.9, then Aristotle at 3.9 is making it a condition of taking part 
in city life that one be able to make decisions in significantly complex moral cases. This 
places an extremely high intellectual condition on members of cities: depending on 
Aristotle’s particular view of practical deliberation, it requires either that the rulers of a 
city have a fully-worked out conception of the good that is spelled out as an exhaustive 
set of rules of conduct128 applicable to any and all moral cases, or that they have the 
                                                
128 This is the picture of practical reasoning advocated by “rule-case” interpreters like Irwin and Cooper. 
According to the “rule-case” interpretation, the practical deliberator determines how she should act by 
applying rules to cases, the rules taking the form of “In such-and-such conditions, one should do such-and-
such”, and the cases being individual ethical contexts where those conditions obtain. This set of rules 
specifies all the content of a person’s conception of the good.  For a more detailed description of the “rule-
case” interpretation, see Cooper [2], 97.   
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moral perception just “to see”129 what particular action in any and every ethical context 
instantiates their conception of the good. Requiring such abilities of individuals makes 
something like omniscience a requirement for city life. Given that Aristotle’s oligarchic 
opponent has no reason to grant the assumption that a kind of omniscience is required for 
participation in city life, Aristotle on the proposed interpretation of Pol. 3.9 offers an 
unconvincing argument. Thus, charity to Aristotle requires us not to interpret Pol. 3.9 
along the proposed lines.    
It follows that while an impairment with respect to particular action constitutive 
deliberation may explain slaves’ failure to make decisions in particular cases—
specifically, those cases where determining what constitutes doing well is complicated—
it cannot explain Pol. 3.9’s strong claim that slaves don’t make decisions at all.  
So far we have been holding fixed the assumption that slaves can have a wish and 
have looked to see whether we can explain their inability to make decisions by attributing 
to them a deliberative incapacity with respect to wishes.  And we’ve seen that we cannot 
appeal to an instrumental or particular action constitutive deliberative incapacity to 
explain this denial. That is, holding fixed the assumption that slaves can have a wish, we 
cannot reasonably appeal to either an incapacity with respect to instrumental deliberation 
or an incapacity with respect to particular action constitutive deliberation to explain 
slaves’ comprehensive inability to make decisions, their inability (shared with animals) 
make any sort of decision at all.  
So why cannot slaves make decisions? This is the critical question. Having 
exhausted other possibilities, I maintain that the best explanation for Aristotle’s claim 
                                                
129 This is the picture of practical reasoning as a type of “moral perception” is advocated by opponents of 
the “rule-case” picture. See, for instance, McDowell, 27-33.  
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that slaves do not make decisions is feature (i): slaves cannot make decisions because 
they are not, on Aristotle’s view, the kind of beings who can have a wish. This seems 
necessary to make sense of Aristotle’s wholesale denial of decisions to slaves.  
 
VII. No Wish for Slaves: Implications for the Deflationary and Robust Accounts of 
Wish 
 
VII.1  Defeat of Deflationary Account; Preliminary Support for Robust Account 
 
This conclusion that slaves cannot have wishes provides an important criterion of any 
plausible account of wish. In particular, it entails that any plausible account of wish must 
be able to explain slaves’ inability to form wishes. The problem with deflationary 
accounts is that they do not meet this criterion: on their accounts of wish, slaves’ desires 
count as wishes. For as we saw earlier (section III), slaves’ desires are cognitive 
phenomena alterable by means such as language, they rest on reasons, and they depend 
on a conception of the good. In attributing wishes to slaves, deflationary accounts fail a 
crucial criterion of any plausible account of wish.  
Moreover—and this is important—it appears that the failure of deflationary 
accounts to meet this criterion has something to do with their failure to posit a direct, 
robust, connection to reason.130  For we have seen that non-rational desires—the sort of 
desires our analysis has shown to characterize natural slaves—can be of a rather 
                                                
130 It cannot be that slaves lack an ability to form a wish simply because they lack the “internal calm” 
required to form a desire for something at a distance; the fact that slaves can implement and execute long-
term projects and strategies show that slaves were capable of having desires for “practically remote” 
objects, suggesting that it is not a lack a foresight that explains their inability to have a wish. 
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sophisticated sort: they can involve propositional thought and be alterable by cognitive 
means like language, they can rest on reasons, and they can make up a conception of the 
good. What this means is that any plausible account of wish must make the connection to 
reason that distinguishes wish from non-rational desire rich enough to distinguish wish 
from a class of desires that are themselves pretty sophisticated. The particular way that 
deflationary accounts fail this criterion suggests that a stronger connection to reason is 
needed. 
We saw in our examination of slaves’ deliberative capacities that the robust 
account can make good sense of Aristotle’s denial of wish to slaves. The triumph of the 
robust account and the failure of the deflationary account in this regard provide 
preliminary support for the robust account’s thesis that wishes essentially involve 
reasoning about the good.  
 
VIII. Back to Decision 
 
If the argument that I’ve given is right, then we have reason to favor the robust account’s 
thesis that Aristotelian wish is a rather intellectual thing. Having a wish involves 
recognizing the object of one’s wish as part of one’s good, and recognizing it as so on the 
basis of reasoning about one’s good.  It follows that decision, to the extent that it rests on 
a wish, also requires the capacity to deliberate about the human good. The prohairetic 
agent, insofar as she is a bouletic agent, is someone who takes a reflective attitude 
towards her own desires, someone who, rather than taking her ends as a given, tries to 
determine which ends are actually good for her.  
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Given the robust account of decision, do slaves, women, and children have the 
capacity to make decisions? I answer this question in chapter 7.  
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CHAPTER 6  
ON THE APPARENT NON-RATIONAL PORTRAIT OF PARADIGMATIC 
VIRTUE 
 
 
I. Introduction  
 
In chapter 5 I argued in favor of a robust interpretation of wish. I argued that for a desire 
to be a wish, it must result from deliberation about the constituents of the human good. It 
must result from reason stepping back and examining, on its own independent grounds, 
what is worth going for. 
If the robust interpretation of wish is right, then paradigmatic virtue thus turns out 
be a very intellectual sort of thing. This might seem to fit poorly with certain passages in 
the ethical works where Aristotle seems to construe virtue as primarily a non-rational 
condition. Call this non-rational portrait of virtue “anti-intellectualism” about virtue.  If 
anti-intellectualism is right, then pre-rational pleasure and pain training, not phronêsis- 
informed deliberation about ends, supplies the virtuous agent with the ends that underlie 
her virtuous decisions.  
The seeming textual evidence for anti-intellectualism, and corresponding non-
rational interpretation of that evidence, is the following:  
 
1) 1.13: Division of Soul and Corresponding Division of the Virtues. In EN 1.13 
Aristotle, immediately after dividing up the soul into the non-rational part and the 
rational part, seems to assign virtue of character to the non-rational part, in 
 135 
contrast with phronêsis, which he assigns to the rational part (1.13 1103a5-8). 131 
Someone tempted by anti-rationalism might interpret this assignment of virtue to 
the non-rational part as an indication that virtue of character is primarily a non-
rational condition, a condition in which not reason but rather non-rational desire 
has the role in virtue of supplying the agent with the wishes that underlie her 
decisions.  
 
2) EN 2.1-2.3: Acquisition of Virtue of Character. Aristotle appears to contrast 
habituation with teaching as modes of acquiring virtues, and he suggests that this 
contrast corresponds to the contrast between virtue of character on the one hand 
and intellectual virtue on the other.132 The fact that Aristotle distinguishes 
between habituation and teaching may suggest that habituation, unlike teaching, 
does not involve training of one’s rational part. And indeed, Aristotle’s own 
description of habituation in 2.1-3 emphasizes not training of reasoning capacities 
but rather training in pleasures and pains,133 suggesting that habituation involves 
training of the non-rational part in particular. If virtue of character is acquired 
primarily via pleasure and pain training, it seems that non-rational desire, not 
deliberative excellence, plays the role in virtue of supplying the virtuous agent’s 
wishes.  
 
3) EN 6.12 and 6.13: Division of Labor between Virtue and Phronêsis. Several 
passages in 6.12 and 6.13 posit a division of labor between virtue and phronêsis 
whereby virtue makes the end (skopos) or decision (prohairesis) right and 
phronêsis the things “forwarding” or “promoting” that end or decision (ta pros to 
telos, ta pros touton).134 On an anti-intellectualist interpretation, the contrasting 
                                                
131 “If we ought to say, then, that [the non-rational part] also has reason, then the [part] that has reason as 
well [as the non-rational part] will have two parts, one that has reason to the full extent by having it within 
itself, and another [that has it] by listening to reason as to a father. Virtue too is divided according to this 
difference; for we call some of them virtues of intellect, others virtue of character—wisdom, good sense, 
and phronêsis on the one hand counting on the side of virtues of intellect, open-handedness and temperance 
counting among those of character” (1.13 1103a2-8, italics mine). 
132 Virtue, then, is of two kinds, virtue of intellect, and virtue of character. Virtue of intellect arises mostly 
from teaching, that is why it needs experience and time. Virtue of character results from habit; hence its 
name ‘ethical’, slightly varied from ‘ethos’ (2.1 1103a15-17).  
133 Because of this, our whole concern is necessarily with [pleasure and pains], for it makes no small 
difference with regard to action whether someone feels pleasure and pain in a good way or a bad way… So 
that for this reason too the whole concern both for virtue and for political expertise is pleasures and pains; 
for someone who behaves well in relation to pleasure and pain will be good, while someone who behaves 
badly in relation to them will be bad (2.3 1105a6-13, italics mine).   
But we must take someone’s pleasure or pain following on his actions to be a sign of his state.  For if 
someone who abstains from bodily pleasures enjoys the abstinence itself, he is temperate; if he is grieved 
by it he is intemperate.  Again, if he stands firm against terrifying situations and enjoys it, or at least does 
not find it painful, he is brave; if he finds it painful, he is cowardly.  For virtue of character is about 
pleasures and pains (2.3 1104b5-10).  
134 The passages, in full, are as follows: 
 Further, the ergon is brought to completion according to (kata) a person’s having phronêsis and virtue of 
character; for virtue makes the goal (skopon) correct, while phronêsis makes correct what leads to it (ta 
pros touton) (6.12 1144a7-9). 
The decision (prohairesis), then is made correct by virtue, but the doing of whatever by the nature of things 
has to be done to realize that decision is not the business of virtue but of another ability” (6.12 1144a20-2) 
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structure of these division of labor passages implies that whatever “makes right” 
an agent’s distinctively virtuous ends and decisions is something quite different 
from phronêsis—something of a non-rational sort, for example. Similarly, the 
division of labor seems to assign reason specifically to the domain of calculating 
instrumental means to these non-rational ends—reason discovers the actions that 
“forward” or “promote” these ends, but it does not select the ends themselves. So 
interpreted, these passages deny that phronêsis has the leading role because it 
supplies the virtuous agent with the ends that underlie her decisions and desires.  
 
Taken together, the textual evidence outlined in (1)-(3) may be construed as saying that 
virtue is a primarily non-rational condition, a condition in which reason’s primary role is 
an ancillary one of specifying instrumental means to ends. 
The challenge facing my robust interpretation of wish, then, is the following:  if, 
as I argued in chapter 5, it is phronêsis-informed deliberation about ends that supplies a 
virtuous agent with her wishes, why does Aristotle seem to construe virtue as a primarily 
non-rational condition? Why does he assign virtue of character to the non-rational part of 
the soul? Why does he construe habituation, the mode of acquisition for virtue of 
character, as a process wholly devoid of intellectual elements? And finally, why in 6.12 
and 6.13’s division of labor passages does he contrast virtue with phronêsis, seemingly 
construing virtue’s end-setting aspect as something non-rational and relegating phronêsis 
to the domain of technical means-end reasoning?   
In this chapter I present an answer to these questions, one that has two main 
components. The first component involves drawing attention to the mode of presentation 
with which Aristotle presents virtue of character in the EN. The second component 
                                                
It is clear, even if [phronêsis] did not lead to action (praktikê), that there would be a need for it because of 
its being a virtue of its soul-part, and because a decision (prohairesis) will not be correct in the absence of 
phronêsis, or in the absence of virtue; for the one causes us to do (poiei prattein) the end (telos), the other 
causes us to do what forwards the end (ta pros to telos) (6.13 1145a3-6) 
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involves presenting a particular interpretation of Aristotle’s discussion of virtue and 
phronêsis in 6.12 and 6.13. 
  With regard to Aristotle’s mode of presentation in the EN, I will argue that 
Aristotle presents virtue of character in a selective manner, focusing on virtue’s non-
rational aspects in the early books, and not making fully clear virtue’s significant rational 
aspect until book VI. He seems to present virtue in this selective manner for the purposes 
of teaching, desiring to convey the important roles that both non-rational desire and 
reason play in virtue, and thinking it pedagogically superior to present these two elements 
in relative isolation from one another. Thus, in the early books we find Aristotle focusing 
primarily on virtue’s non-rational aspects, and thus presenting a mere part or aspect of 
virtue.  We should not conclude that the non-rational portrait of virtue offered in EN 1.13 
and 2.1-3 is a more or less accurate representation of virtue as a whole.  
In fact, so I will argue, Aristotle in book 6—particularly in 6.12 and 6.13-- 
substantially builds upon the early books’ account of virtue by emphasizing the leading 
moral role that phronêsis plays in virtue.  In book VI Aristotle builds upon the earlier 
books’ non-rational portrait of virtue in a way that offsets the initial portrait of virtue as 
something primarily non-rational. To support this claim, I will offer alternative 
interpretation of 6.12 and 6.13 that does not support anti-intellectualism. According to 
my alternative interpretation, Aristotle in 6.12 and 6.13 makes clear phronêsis’ role in 
selecting the ends that underlies the virtuous agent’s decisions.135   
The conclusion to be drawn from Aristotle’s selective mode of presentation and 
my interpretation of 6.12-3 is that the textual evidence outlined in (1)-(3) does not pose a 
                                                
135 Although book VI is commonly considered as belonging to the EN and not to the EE, there is some 
uncertainty as to whether it in fact chronologically belongs to the EN. Here, I’ll assume that book VI is part 
of the EN.   
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real threat to the robust interpretation of wish. (1) and (2) aren’t a problem, because they 
represent Aristotle account of virtue of character before he fills out virtue’s substantial 
rational aspect. Moreover, the passages discussed in (3) are not a problem, because they 
can be interpreted in a way that supports, rather than refutes, the robust account of wish.   
My aim in this chapter is to argue that that we need not read the textual evidence 
outlined in (1)-(3) as entailing anti-intellectualism. That is, my goal in this chapter is to 
argue that the passages outlined in (1)-(3) do not present an insurmountable problem for 
the robust account of wish, and may reasonably be read in a way that supports the robust 
account.  
 
II. Aristotle’s Selective Manner of Presentation and the Early Books’ (Incomplete) 
Account of Virtue  
 
II.1 Evidence of a Selective Manner of Presentation  
 
Having established the two kinds of virtues in 1.13—the virtues of character and the 
virtues of intellect—Aristotle begins book II with an examination of virtue of character. 
This examination appears to run up until book VI, when Aristotle moves on to discuss the 
virtues of intellect, including phronêsis. But despite his announcement at 6.1 1139a1-3 
that, having discussed the virtues of character, it is time to turn to the intellectual virtues, 
136 Aristotle clearly does not take his account of virtue to be completed by the end of 
                                                
136 “After we divided the virtues of the soul, it was said that some are virtues of character and some of 
intellect. And so, having completed our discussion of the virtues of character, let us now discuss the others 
as follows, after speaking first about the soul” (6.1 1139a1-3). 
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book 5. This is because he takes phronêsis itself to play a role in virtue of character, as is 
clear from the following definition of virtue he gives at 2.6 1106b36:  
Virtue, then, is a state (hexis) involving decision (prohairetikê), lying in a mean 
relative to us, a mean determined by reason, namely the reason by which the 
phronimos would determine it” (horismenê logo kai ho an ho phronimos 
horiseien) (2.6 1106b36-1107a2).  
The reference to the phronimos in the 2.6 definition signals to the reader that an 
examination of phronêsis will be necessary to complete the account of virtue of character.  
And indeed, we see Aristotle at 6.1 acknowledging just this fact:  
Since we said earlier that we must decide on (airesthai) the mean condition, not 
the excess or deficiency, and that the intermediate condition is as the correct 
reason (logos orthos) says, let us now determine what it says (6.1 1138b18- 20, 
italics mine).  
 
Aristotle’s reference to the “earlier” claim that one must choose the mean action 
according with correct reason is a clear allusion back to 2.6 1106b36-1107a2’s official 
definition of virtue,137 and that definition’s reference to the phronimos’ “reason” that 
determines the mean. Aristotle in the 6.1 passage is acknowledging that the official 
definition’s reference to the reason of the phronimos entails that a discussion of phronêsis 
is necessary to complete the account of virtue, since the correct reason that determines 
the mean is nothing other than phronêsis.138  It is on these grounds that Aristotle proposes 
to investigate phronêsis in 6.    
Assuming that the foregoing is correct, then it’s reasonable to think that Aristotle 
intends his reference to phronêsis in 2.6 1106b36-1107a2’s official definition of virtue to 
act as a placeholder until he can, via a full discussion of phronêsis in book 6, present 
virtue’s intellectual aspect and hence complete the account of virtue of character. 
                                                
137 See also a reference to correct reason (orthos logos) at 2.2 1103b32-4 
138 “And the correct reason (orthos logos) is phronêsis” (6.13 1144b23-4). 
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Aristotle, recognizing that virtue involves both a non-rational and a rational element, 
consciously holds off until book 6 to discuss the rational element in detail.  The result is 
that the early books’ account of virtue is incomplete, insofar as it represents only one 
aspect of virtue: its non-rational aspect.   
Presenting the components of virtue in a selective manner makes sense, if 
Aristotle thinks that the different elements of virtue have an important role. For one way 
that one can bring to the fore (e.g.) non-rational desire’s role and its importance in virtue 
is by discussing it in isolation from virtue’s other element.   
 If, as I have argued, it is reason, rather than non-rational desire, that supplies the 
agent with the wishes that underlie her virtuous decisions, what makes non-rational desire 
so important that Aristotle sees it crucial to treat non-rational desire in isolation, and do 
so at the significant length that he does? To answer this question, we ought to look at 
three roles in virtue that Aristotle clearly attributes to non-rational desire, roles that don’t 
involve supplying an agent with her wishes, but which are roles that Aristotle nonetheless 
has reason to emphasize.  
 
II.2 Roles for Non-Rational Desire 
 
Let us reflect on three roles for non-rational desire in virtue. (1) A controlled state of the 
non-rational part is a pre-requisite for the formation of a prohairesis. If an agent’s non-
rational part is dominated by unruly desires or willful activity, a prohairesis is unlikely to 
form at all. (2) A controlled non-rational part allows for the ready execution of reason’s 
prohaireseis. An uncontrolled non-rational part may issue in desires that conflict with 
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reason’s prohaireseis, causing an agent to act against the action prescribed by the 
prohairesis. (3) A well-ordered non-rational part allows reason to do its work without 
distortion; a poorly-ordered non-rational part can corrupt the reasoning of the rational 
part so as to lead reason to issue in a bad prohairesis. (4) A well-ordered non-rational 
part is partly constitutive of virtue. Let us examine these four roles in detail. 
Starting at the most basic level, a good condition of an agent’s non-rational part is 
important because it facilitates the formation of a prohairesis in the first place. If an agent 
is in a state of constant pre-occupation with unruly desires demanding immediate 
satisfaction, then the agent lacks the sort of “internal calm” needed for an agent to go 
through with forming a prohairesis; in such cases, the agent will act straightaway on 
impulse. It seems to be for this reason that Aristotle says that young people should not be 
students of political science. Because youth tend to be emotional, they lack the internal 
calm that provides the mental space required to form prohaireseis and thus do not engage 
in ethical action on prohairesis.139  
In addition to being crucial for the formation of a prohairesis, a good condition of 
one’s non-rational part is necessary for the ready execution of a prohairesis. We’ve seen 
that when the non-rational part of the soul is in good condition, its desires “agree with 
reason in everything” (1.13 1102b28); the non-rational part obeys the rational part and is 
ready to fall in line with the prohaireseis issued by reason. By contrast, when the non-
rational part fails to be in a good condition, its desires conflict with the recommendations 
                                                
139 “Since [a young person] lives according to his feelings (kata pathos), his study will be futile and useless, 
for the end [of political science] is action, not knowledge. It does not make a difference whether the man is 
young in age or immature in character since the deficiency does not depend on age, but results from 
following his feelings in this life and in a given pursuit; for an immature person, like an (kathaper) 
incontinent person, gets no benefit from his knowledge.” 1095a2-10). Note that Aristotle compares young 
people to incontinent people does not say that they are incontinent people. Presumably they are like 
incontinent people because they tend to act on impulse, and presumably they fail to be identical to 
incontinent people because they fail to form prohaireseis in the first place. 
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of the rational part, potentially causing the agent to act against her prohairesis. This is the 
condition of continent and incontinent people whose non-rational parts “clash and 
struggle with reason” (1.13 1102b 18) and have “impulses in contrary directions” (1.13 
1102b22).  Such conflict potentially tempts the agent to act against her prohairesis, 
threatening the goal of ethical action on prohairesis.  
A third way in which a well-ordered non-rational part is important for the 
achievement of ethical action:  a well-ordered non-rational part helps ensure that the 
prohaireseis that reason forms are correct prohaireseis. If a person has excessive 
appetites for (say) bodily pleasure, her reason may as a result adopt false value judgments 
about pleasure and so fail to arrive at the correct prohairesis; in this way a bad non-
rational part can corrupt the reasoning processes that lead to an agent’s prohaireseis. 
Aristotle emphasizes this potential “distorting” effect of non-rational desire, pointing out 
that a person must have controlled appetites if her reason is to arrive at the proper 
reasoned conception of the good. Passages abound in the Ethics about the “deception” 
(apatê) about the end comes out because of pleasure (3.4 1113a33); our deliberations 
concerning pleasure in particular may be “bribed” or “biased” (adekastoi) (2.9 1109b7). 
In such passages, Aristotle suggests that, given our inclination for pleasure, a well-
controlled state of non-rational desire is crucial for us to form and maintain the grasp of 
the end furnished by phronêsis. This seems to be what he has in mind when he describes 
an inseparable connection between temperance and phronêsis:  “This is also how we 
come to give temperance (sôphrosunê) its name, because we think that it preserves 
phronêsis (sôzousan tên phronêsin) (6.5 1140b 12-4).140 Here, Aristotle suggests that a 
                                                
140 3.4 1113a33: “To most people, however, pleasure would seem to cause deception, since it appears good 
but is not.” 2.9 1109b7: “And in everything we must beware above all of pleasure and what is pleasant; for 
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controlled state of one’s non-rational part has a sort of “preservative power”141, a power 
to preserve the conception of the good recommended by reason; presumably it preserves 
such a conception of the good by keeping in check influences that can potentially corrupt 
an agent’s reasoning, influences like appetitive pre-occupation with bodily pleasures.142  
Finally, non-rational desire has a constitutive role in virtue. Recall that the human 
function is a practical life of what possesses reason (tou logon echontos), where 
reasoning comes in two kinds: (i) reason-responsiveness (epipeithes logôi) of the alogon 
and (ii) deliberation. To the extent that a good condition of the alogon is part of the 
human function, it follows that well-ordered non-rational desire is partly constitutive of 
virtue.  
 These four roles for non-rational desire make clear that Aristotle has reason to 
emphasize non-rational desire. He has reason to employ a selective manner of 
presentation, because such a manner is effective at conveying the importance of non-
rational desire in virtue. 
 
II.3 Implications of the Selective Manner of Presentation  
 
                                                
we are biased in its favor when we come to judge it.  Hence we must react to it as the elders reacted to 
Helen, and on each occasion repeat what they said; for if we do this, and dismiss it, we shall be in less 
error” (translation Irwin [2]). See also 6.12 1144a34: “For inferences about actions have a principle, “Since 
the end and the best good is this sort of thing” (whatever it actually is-let it be any thing for the sake of 
argument). And this [best good] is apparent only to the good person; for vice perverts us and produces false 
views about the principles of actions. Evidently, then, we cannot be phronimon without being good” 
(translation Irwin). 
141 Richard Sorabji uses this phrase. Sorabji [1], 213.  
142 It is important to stress that the fact that non-rational desires must be in a controlled state if one is both 
to acquire and preserve the correct conception of the good, we do not commit ourselves to saying that non-
rational desires are themselves the source of this conception of the good. The source of this conception of 
the good, as I argued in chapter 1, is phronêsis-informed reasoning; a controlled state of the non-rational 
part is simply a necessary pre-requisite for reason to be able to do its proper work.  
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If we take seriously the possibility that the early books’ account is substantially 
incomplete, we immediately see that the textual evidence outlined in (1) and (2) does not 
by itself pose a problem to intellectualism. Take the passages outlined in (2). There, we 
see Aristotle emphasizing the role of habit and pre-rational pleasures and pain training in 
the acquisition of virtue, but we do not see him mentioning the role of reasoning or 
deliberative training.  The selective manner of interpretation helps explain this in a 
manner friendly to intellectualism; Aristotle doesn’t mention deliberative or reasoning 
capacities not because they play a relatively unimportant role, but rather because he is 
here focusing on only one aspect of virtue—its non-rational aspect—and hence is 
focusing on only one aspect of virtue’s acquisition—its non-rational aspect.   
Or consider (1): Aristotle’s assigning of virtue to the non-rational part in 1.13 and 
separating it from phronêsis. Again, the selective manner of interpretation has an 
intellectualism-friendly explanation for Aristotle’s associating virtue with the non-
rational part. Aristotle assigns virtue to the non-rational part not because he takes the 
intellect to have only a minimal role in virtue, but rather because he is here focusing only 
on the non-rational aspect of virtue.  
Given Aristotle’s selective mode of interpretation in the EN, we should wait until 
book 6’s discussion of the rational elements of virtue before deciding whether virtue is a 
primarily non-rational condition. For book 6 may offer clues on the rational elements of 
virtue that show that the nonrational portrait of virtue in the early books is substantially 
incomplete. Book 6 may fill out the early books’ picture of virtue in a way that gives 
reason the role of specifying the agent’s ends. The anti-intellectualist interpretation relies 
on the assumption that book 6 only makes a minor addition to the account of virtue of 
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character offered in the early books of the EN. It assumes that book 6 simply fleshes out a 
technical ability that phronêsis adds to virtue, and that the early books’ account of virtue 
is therefore more or less a complete account.  
But does anything in book 6 suggest that Aristotle there assigns reason the role of 
selecting ends, thus substantially offsetting the non-rational portrait of virtue in the early 
books? In the next section I argue that there is a way of interpreting book 6 such that 
Aristotle is doing precisely this. As I will argue, there is a way of reading book 6 that 
allows us to see the early books as offering a substantially incomplete portrait of virtue, a 
portrait that book 6 ultimately corrects by making clear, particularly in 6.12 and 6.13, the 
role that reasoning, rather than non-rational desire, plays in supplying the virtuous agent 
with her ends.  
 
III. Book 6: The Role of Phronêsis in Virtue of Character 
 
To defend the claim that book 6 substantially expands the account of virtue in the early 
books of the EN, I here offer a reading of book 6—with emphasis on 6.12 and 6.13—that 
shows Aristotle in 6 attributing to phronêsis the role of determining an agent’s wishes.  
Presenting and defending my reading comes in two steps. My first step involves focusing 
on book 6’s comparison of phronêsis with political science. Here, my goal is to argue that 
this comparison puts to rest any interpretation that attributes to Aristotle a Humean 
picture of reason. This step, we will see, does not in itself offer much positive support for 
my interpretation of Aristotelian wish and decision; it merely resolves an obstacle to my 
reading. My second step is the more important step, in that it offers a particular 
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interpretation of 6.12 and 6.13, one that, if true, attributes to phronêsis and not to non-
rational desire the moral role in EN virtue.  
  
III.1 Phronêsis and Political Science 
 
Let us begin by addressing the question of whether Aristotle thinks that reason can 
specify final ends at all.  For some of Aristotle’s comments might seem to place him in a 
Humean camp that relegates reason to the domain of finding technical means to 
antecedently-determined ends;143 on this Humean view, reason can tell us what actions 
are instrumental in bringing about given ends, but it cannot recommend ultimate ends 
themselves. Might Aristotle follow Hume in this respect?  
Book 6’s comments about phronêsis rule out this possibility. An indication that 
Aristotle rejects the view that reason has a narrow scope comes from his comment that 
political science is the same state as phronêsis (6.8 1141b23-4).144  This comment is 
important, because it suggests that we cam learn something about the nature of phronêsis-
informed deliberation if we examine the nature of the inquiry undertaken in the Ethics. 
For Aristotle describes the inquiry of the Ethics as an exercise of “political science” (1.2 
1094b12-3). This suggests that the inquiry of the Ethics is itself an exercise of phronêsis–
informed reasoning, and that examining the nature of inquiry undertaken in the Ethics can 
tell us something about the nature of phronêsis.  
                                                
143 See, for example, his remark that nous or dianoia by itself moves nothing (EN 6 1139a35, DA 3.10 
433a23)  
144 “Political science (politikê) and phronêsis are the same state (hexis), but their being (to einai) is not the 
same” (6.8 1141b23-4). 
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The comment that political science is the same state as phronêsis thus prompts us 
to investigate what sort of reasoning we see in the Ethics. Now, as early as 1.2, Aristotle 
makes it clear that he takes the Ethics to be an inquiry into the nature of the final good for 
man, stating that we must try to grasp “in outline” the final good. Such a final good, if 
identified, will be of tremendous practical benefit, for it will be a target at which we, like 
archers, can aim (1.2 1094a21-4). Because the Ethics seeks to identify the final good, 
Aristotle subsequently takes a dialectical turn (1.4 1095a17) toward the endoxa about the 
human good.  
It is clear, then, that the inquiry in the Ethics is a search for the final good for 
man, a search that Aristotle thinks will lead to great benefit. If this is right, and if we take 
seriously Aristotle’s identification of political science with phronêsis, we have 
considerable evidence that Aristotle takes reason to be capable of determining final ends 
and not simply means.  
The fact that reason can, on Aristotle’s view, all by itself specify final ends does 
not show that reason does play the role in virtue of supplying the virtuous agent with her 
ends. For perhaps Aristotle thinks that such reasoning about the good is the business of a 
philosopher or statesman and not be the business of the on-the-ground virtuous 
deliberator;145 he may think that the virtuous person qua virtuous—and not qua statesman 
or philosopher—receives her goals not from reasoned reflection about the good but rather 
from habituation.  And indeed, it might seem that 6.12 and 6.13’s division of labor 
passages are making precisely this point that the virtuous person qua virtuous receives 
her wishes and ends from habituated non-rational desire. For those passages are 
concerned with proving the utility of phronêsis to the morally virtuous person qua 
                                                
145 This is Broadie’s view. See Broadie, chapter 4.  
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virtuous; they are concerned with showing why the morally virtuous person needs to 
acquire phronêsis.  
6.12 and 6.13 remain, then, a potential problem for the robust interpretation of 
wish.  In the next section, I present an alternative interpretation to the one that we have 
considered thus far. Reading 6.12 and 6.13 along the interpretive lines that I present, we 
can see 6.12 and 6.13 completing the picture of virtue in a way that makes clear the 
important moral role of reason in virtue. 
 
III.2 6.12 and 6.13 
 
In 6.12 and 6.13 Aristotle discusses the relationship between virtue and phronêsis, a 
discussion prompted by an objector who questions the virtuous person’s need to possess 
phronêsis.  In this section, I put forward a particular reading of the main passages in these 
chapters. On the reading I put forward, Aristotle answers the objector by making clear 
that genuine virtue is a condition in which phronêsis has a major moral role to play.  
 
§The Objection 
 
In 6.12 Aristotle takes on an imaginary objector who asks of what use phronêsis is.  The 
objector begins by noting that in the case of health, we do not think that knowledge of 
what contributes to a healthy state is necessary for an agent to act in a way characteristic 
of health.  For if an agent is already healthy, then healthy actions will proceed from his 
state regardless of whether he has knowledge of medicine; health, being a disposition of 
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the body, automatically issues in healthy activity, and so an agent need not learn 
medicine if he is to act in a way that the healthy person acts. Why, so the objection goes, 
should the case of phronêsis and practical goodness be any different from the case of 
medical knowledge and bodily goodness? For if someone is good she thereby has a 
consistent virtuous disposition, and so will do good acts regardless of whether she heself 
possesses phronêsis.  In the objector’s words:  “If phronêsis concerns the just and the fine 
and the good, and these things are that which it is characteristic of the good man to do, 
and he will become no more a doer of these things in virtue of having knowledge, if the 
virtues are dispositions…” (1143b21-8).    
According to the interpretation of Aristotle’s response that I will motivate in a 
moment, Aristotle responds to the objection by clarifying for the objector what genuine 
virtue is and showing that the objection rests on a false conception of virtue. He thinks 
that once the objector understands what genuine virtue is, he will no longer question 
phronêsis’ importance to the virtuous person. However, to see why Aristotle takes the 
objection to rest on a false conception of virtue, we need to take a closer look at what the 
objector’s conception of virtue is. We can get a sense of the objector’s conception by 
examining in greater detail the full challenge he poses to Aristotle. The objector reasons 
as follows: 
…[S]hould we say [phronêsis] is useful for becoming good? In that case it will be 
no use to those who are already excellent. Nor, however, will it be any use to 
those who are not.  For it will make no difference to them whether they have it 
themselves or obey others who have it (ouden gar dioisei autous echein ê allois 
echousi peithesthai). And that will suffice for us, just as it is with health: we wish 
to be healthy, but still do not learn medical science (hikanôs t' echoi an hêmin 
hôsper kai peri tên hugieian: boulomenoi gar hugiainein homôs ou manthanomen 
iatrikên) (6.12 1143b28-34).  
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We should begin by considering the analogy with physical fitness and athletic training 
that the objector invokes at 1143b26-8. We might think that for one to become physically 
fit, that person need not herself possess the expertise related to athletic training. For to be 
physically fit is to possess a state from which physically fit activities flow, and to have 
this state, one need not personally possess the expertise that produces it.  What one really 
needs is access to a person who possesses such expertise; such a person can then use that 
expertise to produce physical fitness in oneself by subjecting one to the proper training. 
By obeying the trainer’s instructions, one can gradually acquire the state of physical 
fitness and the activities that flow from fitness, and in this way, a person can come to do 
all the actions that flow from physical fitness without possessing the knowledge that 
produces physical fitness.  
  The objector seems to think that we can apply by analogy the case of 
physical fitness and knowledge of physical fitness to the case of virtue and phronêsis. On 
the objector’s view, just as we can engage in the activities that flow from a state of 
physical fitness without ourselves possessing knowledge about what produces physical 
fitness, so too can we decide on virtuous actions without having the knowledge that 
pertains to these virtuous actions; in both cases, what we need is merely access to 
someone else who possesses that expertise. As the objector argues, “it will make no 
difference to [those wanting to be virtuous] whether they have [phronêsis] themselves or 
obey others who have it (ouden gar dioisei autous echein ê allois echousi peithesthai).”   
There seems to be two possible scenarios that the objector may be envisaging 
when he argues that one can acquire virtue by “obeying others who have [phronêsis] (ê 
allois echousi peithesthai).” The objector may be envisaging a case where a non-
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phronimos’ rational part, being sophisticated enough to recognize the intellectual 
superiority or expertise of another individual, makes a rational choice to heed the advice 
of that individual. The person’s rational part adopts as her own the ends or goals that the 
phronimos recommends, and thus is able to do decide on virtuous actions. Alternatively, 
the objector may be envisaging a case where a non-phronimos’ non-rational part heeds 
the advice, instruction, or persuasion of some external source of phronêsis and adopts 
certain ends as a result. On this interpretation, the objector is arguing that affective 
habituation under an external source of phronêsis is sufficient to supply the agent with 
the right moral principles and ends, and so is sufficient to produce in the agent the 
disposition to consistently decide on the proper actions.  
I believe that there is evidence to support the latter over the former reading. This 
evidence comes from an earlier passage at 1.13 where Aristotle considers a formally 
similar situation in which an intellectually inferior party heeds the instruction or 
persuasion of an intellectually superior party. To see why this 1.13 passage seems to 
imply the second reading of the objection at 6.12, we must examine the 1.13 passage: 
  
…[A] [T]he appetite (epithumêtikon) and in general desiring part (holOs 
orektikon) does in a way have a share in [reason] (metechei), i.e., insofar as it is 
capable of listening to it and obeying it (katêkoon estin autou kai peitharchikon); 
[B]  it is the way one has reason (echein logon) when one [is persuaded] by one’s 
father or loved ones, not the way one has reason in (for example) mathematics. 
[C] That the non-rational is in a way persuaded by (peithetai) reason is indicated 
by the giving of advice (nouthetêsis), and by all reproof (epitimêsis) and 
exhortation (paraklêsis). [D] If one should call this too “having reason,” then the 
one aspect of soul that possesses reason will also be double in nature: one element 
of it will have it in the full sense and in itself, another as something listening [to 
reason] as to (hosper) a father. [E] Virtue too is divided according to this 
difference; for we call some of them intellectual virtues, others virtues of 
character (1.13 1102b30-1103a4). 
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Aristotle in this passage considers a case that is formally similar to that which 6.12 
considers: a case in which a rationally-inferior party is “persuaded by” (peithetai) a 
rationally-superior party to take some recommended practical direction. (Note the similar 
language peithesthai in both the 1.13 and the 6.12 passages).  In the 6.12 passage, the two 
parties in question are separate individuals, whereas in the 1.13 passage the two parties 
are parts of the soul within the same person.  
 The 1.13 passage is also important because it seems to consider this case in a way 
that paves the way for 6.12’s objection that the virtuous person needn’t herself be a 
phronimos. Note first that Aristotle has identified virtue of character throughout the 
Ethics as a type of “accordance with reason” (2.6 1107a1, 6.1 1138b20-5, cf. 3.7 
1115b19, 3.11 1119a20, 1119b18, 6.1 1138b20-5).   The 1.13 passage seems to assign 
virtue of character to the non-rational part of the soul ([E]), and this assignment might 
lead one to believe that virtue of character amounts to the non-rational part “according 
with” or “listening to” reason. Such an understanding of virtue of character leads to the 
autonomy worry once we combine it with 1.13’s claim that the alogon, in being 
“persuaded by” the rational part ([C]), partakes in reason in the way that a child who 
listens to a father partakes in reason (hosper tou patros akoustikon ti) ([D]).  For the 
allusion here to paternal authority may very well make the reader think it fine for the 
persuasion involved in virtue to be administered by an external rather than internal 
rational principle.  
 In taking literally the allusion to parental authority, would such a reader be 
grossly over-reading what Aristotle presents as a mere a metaphor? No, for it seems that 
Aristotle intends the allusion to parental authority to go beyond the level of metaphor.  
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The fact that Aristotle thinks that a child’s obedient response to parental admonition is 
evidence that the alogon listens to reason suggests that Aristotle takes a child’s obedient 
response to parental admonition to be analogous and continuous with, if not identical 
with, the response made by an alogon to an internal source of reason. As Broadie points 
out: 
Aristotle points to the actual exercise of authority in family or community as 
providing further evidence that there exists a part of the soul capable of listening 
to reason: ‘That the non-rational element is in some sense persuaded by reason is 
indicated also by the giving of advice and by all reproof and exhortation’ 
(1102b33-1103a1). The reference to every sort of reproof etc. cancels any suggest 
that he has in mind only self-admonition, self-reproach and the rest. He is squarely 
considering paradigm cases where the parties are distinct individuals.146 
 
Thus, to the reader of the 1.13 passage, it is reasonable for the following questions to 
arise: is there a morally relevant difference between an agent’s listening to an external, as 
opposed to an internal, source of reason?  If not, and if moral virtue just is a matter of 
one’s alogon listening to some source of reason, what reason is there for an agent to 
acquire her own phronêsis rather than to rely on that of another?  
Thus, the 1.13 passage anticipates the very objection that 6.12 raises. (Recall the 
6.12 challenge: “Nor, however, will [phronêsis] be any use to those who are not [already 
good].  For it will make no difference to them whether they have it themselves or obey 
others who have it” (ouden gar dioisei autous echein ê allois echousi peithesthai) (6.12 
1143b30-1)).  
These two considerations—the fact that 1.13 and 6.12 consider scenarios that are 
formally identical and the fact that 1.13 considers the scenario in a way that anticipates 
the autonomy objection at 6.12—suggest that the objector at 6.12 has been influenced by 
                                                
146 Broadie, 63.  
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the 1.13 passage and has 1.13 in mind when he presents his objection. Now in 1.13 we 
have a person’s non-rational part heeding to the advice or persuasion of a rational part; 
we do not have a rational part heeding the advice or persuasion of another rational part. It 
follows, then, that the objector at. 6.12 most likely is raising a case in which it is a non-
phronimos’ non-rational part in particular that is heeding the advice, instruction, or 
persuasion of some external source of phronêsis; the objector is not envisaging a case in 
which the non-phronimos’ rational part makes a rational choice to follow the advice of 
another.  
Thus, so far on this interpretation of the objection, we can understand the objector 
as envisaging a case where the virtuous person receives her virtuous goals from non-
rational habituation under an external source of phronêsis; she does not receive her goals 
from reasoning. With this interpretation of the objector’s proposal in mind, we can see 
that the objector is assuming an anti-intellectualist conception of virtue: the objector 
makes virtue a primarily non-rational condition by denying that virtuous decisions 
necessarily arise out of reasoning about the good.   
The objector’s holding such a conception of virtue is not unreasonable, given 
Aristotle’s comments about virtue in the early books of the EN. For Aristotle’s 
assignment of virtue of character to the non-rational part and his description of 
habituation as involving primarily habituation in pleasures and pains encourages the 
objector to think that the virtuous person’s ends needn’t arise out of deliberative 
reasoning. 
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§ Aristotle’s Response to the Objection (I): The Importance of Rationally-Derived Ends 
for Virtuous Prohaireseis 
 
It is, I will argue, this feature of the objector’s conception of virtue that Aristotle first 
targets in his response to the objection: Aristotle argues that the conception of virtue 
assumed by the objector is flawed to the extent that it insists that non-rational habituation 
is sufficient to supply the virtuous person’s ends. As we shall see, Aristotle clarifies for 
the objector genuine virtue by arguing that virtuous prohaireseis and desires do not arise 
out of a non-rationally-derived grasp of the end. By showing that the virtuous decisions 
and desires characteristic of virtue decisively depend on rationally-derived ends, 
Aristotle makes clear that virtuous ends cannot arise out of habituation of one’s non-
rational part by an external source of phronêsis. 
To motivate this interpretation of Aristotle’s response, let us look at the following 
passage:  
[A] First, let us state that phronêsis and wisdom must necessarily be desirable in 
themselves, if virtues they are, each of one of the two soul-parts in question, even 
if neither of themselves produces anything at all…[B] The next point is that they 
are in fact productive: not in the way medical expertise produces health, but in the 
way health does—this is how wisdom produces happiness; for since it is a part of 
virtue as a whole it is the possession of it, and its exercise, that make a person 
happy. [C] And further the product (ergon) is completed because of phronêsis and 
virtue of character.  [D] For virtue makes (poei) the goal (skopos) correct, but 
phronêsis [makes correct] the things leading to the [goal] (ta pros touton)…. [E] 
Concerning the charge that phronêsis in no way makes one more of a doer of fine 
and just actions, we must go further back, taking up this beginning:  [F] Just as we 
say that some people do just things while not yet being just, for example those 
doing the things ordered by the laws either unwillingly or because of ignorance or 
because of some other thing, and not because of the things themselves, although 
they do that which is necessary and that which the good person must do, in this 
way, it seems, it is possible for a person of a certain disposition to do each of 
these with the result that he is a good person, I mean (hoion) [doing them] 
because of decision (dia prohairesin) and for the sake of the actions themselves 
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(autôn heneka prattomenôn).  [G] Virtue, then, makes the decision (prohairesis) 
right, but the doing (to prattesthai) of whatever by nature is to be done for the 
sake of the decision (ekeinês heneka) is not the business of virtue but of some 
other capacity (6.12 1144a6-22).   
 
Aristotle begins [at (A)] by arguing that phronêsis, being an excellence of the rational 
part, is desirable and worth choosing for its own sake, and would be so even if it made no 
contribution to goodness in action. In other words, phronêsis has value independently of 
its causing us to be good ethical agents in the world.  But he then asserts (at [B]) that 
phronêsis in fact does make a contribution to practical goodness; phronêsis contributes to 
our practical goodness, in the sense that it facilitates our acting virtuously.  
 What is phronêsis’ contribution to practical goodness? Aristotle tells us  (at [C]) 
that phronêsis helps complete the ergon, where “ergon” seems to mean “practical 
goodness” or “genuine virtue.”  He then explains this claim about phronêsis’ contribution 
by saying that phronêsis makes correct the things leading to an agent’s goal (ta pros 
touton, [D]). This claim is on its own vague, but [E] suggests that Aristotle begins to 
flesh out what he has in mind in [F]. Let us, then, turn to [F]. 
 In [F], Aristotle distinguishes between (i) doing virtuous actions and (ii) doing 
virtuous actions virtuously. He contrasts two sorts of people, person A and person B, both 
of whom do right actions, but only one of whom actually counts as a virtuous person.   
Both A and B have their desires focused on the right actions and ends, and in this way do 
“what is necessary and that which the good person must do.”  However, person B, but not 
person A, performs those actions in a particular way, a way which, according to Aristotle, 
actually makes B virtuous and not merely a doer of virtuous actions: person B, unlike A, 
performs virtuous actions “because of decision (dia prohairesin) and for the sake of the 
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actions themselves (autôn heneka prattomenôn).” This suggests that Aristotle seems to 
think that phronesis’ contribution to practical goodness is a contribution that helps 
distinguish person A from person B; phronêsis has a role in practical goodness that helps 
distinguish the person who merely performs the proper actions from the person who not 
only performs the proper actions but performs them because she has a virtuous 
prohairesis.  
 What exactly is this role that phronêsis plays in person B’s action but not in 
person A’s action?  What role does phronêsis play in the formation of the virtuous 
prohairesis that makes person B, but not person A, virtuous? And, moreover, why isn’t 
an external source of phronêsis capable of playing this role?  After all, to answer the 
objection, Aristotle must not simply show that some source of phronêsis plays a role in 
virtue; he must show that a person’s own phronêsis plays a critical role.  
Defenders of the robust account of wish have answers to these questions. Because 
on this view wishes (and thus decisions) by nature have reasoning about final ends in 
their causal history, habituation of non-rational desires cannot result in virtuous 
decisions. Given that phronêsis is what gets an agent the rationally-derived wishes that 
are a pre-requisite for a virtuous prohairesis, one must have phronêsis if she is to be 
virtuous.  
 Is there any evidence that Aristotle offers this response to answer the 
objection? I think there is: if we look at 6.12’s and 6.13’s response to the objection, we 
can see an interpretation on which Aristotle makes these important connections I’ve just 
outlined between virtue, a virtuous prohaireseis, and phronêsis. Consider again the first 
way in which Aristotle describes phronêsis’ role in practical goodness or genuine virtue: 
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he says (at [D]) that phronêsis makes right the things leading to the end (ta pros touton). 
We saw that his analysis (at [F]) of person A and person B seems to flesh out what he 
means by this, and that in that analysis, he seems to imply that a person’s own phronêsis 
plays a critical role in the formation of the virtuous prohairesis that distinguishes truly 
virtuous person B from not virtuous person A.  With that in mind, let us examine [D]’s 
claim that phronêsis makes right the things leading to the end (ta pros touton). It’s 
possible that by this Aristotle means that phronêsis ensures that an agent engages in the 
correct deliberative processes, the deliberative processes that lead the agent to a proper 
judgment of the end.  On this interpretation, the ta pros touton are the reasoning 
processes ultimately responsible for one’s virtuous ends or conception of the good; and 
phronêsis, by being an excellence of the rational part, is what ensures that those 
reasoning processes are the right ones. The idea is straightforward: without phronêsis, 
one would not be able to arrive at the correct end, because one wouldn’t engage in the 
sort of phronêsis-informed reasonings that are necessary to arrive at the correct end.  
 We can continue this interpretation as follows. Having established at [D] 
phronêsis-informed reasoning’s role in getting the agent to the right end, Aristotle goes 
on to link having the right end with having a correct prohairesis.  At [G] we see Aristotle 
describing phronêsis’ contribution to a correct prohairesis as follows; he implicitly (not 
explicitly) says that phronêsis [makes right] the things that are “for the sake of” (ekeinê 
heneka) the prohairesis. Now, I want to argue that here he is saying that phronêsis 
contributes to a correct prohairesis partly because it supplies the agent with a rationally-
derived end. That this is what he has in mind at [G] is suggested by the later division of 
labor passage at 6.13 1145a3-6. That passage reads as follows:  
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 It is clear, even if [phronêsis] did not lead to action (praktikê), that there would be a 
need for it because of its being a virtue of its soul-part; and it is clear that a 
prohairesis will not be correct in the absence of phronêsis, or in the absence of virtue; 
for the one causes us to do (poiei prattein) the end (telos), the other causes us to do 
the things leading to the end (ta pros to telos) (6.13 1145a3-6). 
 
This passage is important because it explicitly tells us the role that phronêsis plays that 
makes possessing phronêsis crucial for the one wishing to have a virtuous prohairesis. 
Aristotle says that phronêsis contributes to a person’s coming to have a correct 
prohairesis insofar as it is phronêsis that causes one to do (poiei prattein) or engage in 
the things that lead to the end (ta pros to telos).  Our analysis of [D] has already supplied 
us with an interpretation of this claim that phronêsis makes right the things leading to the 
end; “the things leading to the end” are the deliberations or reasonings leading to an end 
or conception of the good, and phronêsis makes them right in the sense that it ensures 
that the agent will engage in those deliberations that will lead to a correct grasp of the 
end. What the division of labor passage in 6.13 adds is the point that it is because 
phronêsis plays this role—the role of making correct the deliberations leading to a correct 
grasp of the end—that possessing it is so critical for one to have a correct prohairesis.  
 Thus, what we have so far here is Aristotle defending the utility of phronêsis 
by stressing phronêsis’ role in producing a correct grasp of the end.  Such a conception of 
the end is necessary for virtue partly because of the prohairetic aspect of virtue: insofar as 
we agree that the virtuous person doesn’t simply do actions but decides on them, and 
insofar as a prohairesis, has its origins in a rationally-derived rather than a non-
rationally-derived grasp of the end, it follows that one can have virtue only if one has the 
phronêsis required to supply proper ends.  
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 On this interpretation, then, when Aristotle at [G] says that phronêsis makes 
right the things “for the sake of” the decision, he is here attributing to phronêsis a critical 
moral role in the production of virtuous decisions; he is here pointing out phronêsis’ role 
in supplying the ends that underlies virtuous decisions.   In supplying not just 
instrumental means but ends as well, phronêsis “makes right” the distinctly virtuous 
aspect of the virtuous person’s decisions; it does not simply make right the morally-
neutral instrumental means-end deliberations involved in producing a decision.   
 This is a major step in Aristotle’s clarification of genuine virtue. It involves 
showing that virtue, insofar as it involves decision, necessarily involves rationally rather 
than non-rationally derived ends, and hence necessarily involves phronêsis on the agent’s 
part. It involves showing that the ends that underlie the virtuous person’s prohaireseis 
aren’t simply non-rational desires that have been properly habituated under an external 
source of phronêsis.  In this way, Aristotle corrects the objector’s conception of virtue 
according to which an agent has the ends required for virtuous decisions just in case her 
non-rational desires have been habituated by an external source of phronêsis.  
But if it is phronêsis-informed reasoning that supplies the agent with the correct 
ends, what are we to make of Aristotle’s claim (at [D] and [G]) that virtue makes the aim 
or goal right? (1144a8, cf. 1144a20, 1145a5). To answer this question, it is necessary first 
to determine what Aristotle means by “virtue” here. The contrasting structure of the 
passages suggests that he has something non-rational in mind, something rather different 
from phronêsis.  We have already seen that the objector presupposes a non-rational 
portrait of virtue, a portrait whereby the ends underlying virtuous decisions and desires 
do not arise out of reasoning about ends but rather out of habituation. I want to put 
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forward the possibility that when Aristotle says that virtue makes the end correct, he is 
adopting the objector’s sense of virtue, and is doing this in order to show the role that 
non-rational desire plays in what is virtue strictly speaking. 
To see how one might develop this line, let us grant that “virtue” here is 
understood as a condition of the non-rational part, a condition similar to the objector’s 
conception of virtue.  We have already seen (in section II) the important role non-rational 
desire plays in virtue, and in these division of labor passages, we can see (so this 
interpretive line argues) Aristotle honing in on one particular role that we discussed there: 
non-rational desire, by causing us to desire the actions and ends that accord with reason, 
makes reason’s recommendations ultimately effective. This is how we can understand the 
division of labor passages’ claims that virtue “causes us to do” (poiei prattein) the end 
(telos) (1145a3-6); that virtue “makes right” the end (skopon) (1144a7-9); and that virtue 
makes right the prohairesis (1144a20-2). Here, virtue is “virtue” in the objector’s sense, 
and Aristotle is granting that virtue so construed plays an indispensable role in genuine 
virtue, or practical goodness; as a condition of the non-rational part, such virtue “makes 
correct” an agent’s conception of the end or prohairesis in the sense that it supplies the 
non-rational motivating power needed to make such a conception or prohairesis 
ultimately effective or implemented in action. 
 On this interpretation, then, the passage does not say that an agent gets her 
ends from non-rational desire; it says rather that she has the non-rational desire for these 
ends in virtue of having a controlled non-rational part; what supplies the ends is 
phronêsis-informed reasoning about the good. 
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 If this interpretation is right, then it shows the anti-intellectualist to be making the 
following sort of mistake when interpreting the division of labor passages. Recall that 
anti-intellectualists interpret the division of labor passages as limiting the role of reason 
in producing the wishes that underlie the virtuous person’s decisions and desires. Anti-
intellectualists interpret the claim that virtue makes the end or prohairesis correct as 
saying that it is not reason but rather a non-rational condition, viz., virtue, that is 
responsible for an agent’s virtuous ends; on his view, reason specifies not ends but only 
instrumental means.   
We now see that this interpretation is not necessary. For we can distinguish (i) 
what supplies a rational judgment about the end to be pursued from (ii) what supplies the 
desire for that end. Taking this distinction seriously, we need not see the contrast in the 
division of labor passages as a contrast between what specifies an end and what specifies 
the instrumental means to that end. We can instead see the contrast as being a contrast 
between two functions on one particular object. Specifically, we can see the contrast as 
being a contrast between what supplies an agent with her ends and what makes said ends 
ultimately effective; it is phronêsis-informed reasoning that supplies the former, and non-
rational desire that supplies the latter.  
 
§ Aristotle’s Response to the Objection (II): The Importance of a Rationally-Derived 
Ends for Virtuous Non-Rational Desires 
 
On the interpretation developed thus far, Aristotle responds to the objection first by 
pointing out phronêsis’ role in providing the ends that are involved in acting on virtuous 
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decisions; he points out that phronêsis is necessary for virtue, because the virtuous person 
acts on a prohairesis, and thus acts on ends that are rationally rather than non-rationally-
derived.  
In 6.13 Aristotle adds to this answer, this time focusing on the importance of having a 
phronêsis-derived ends if one is to have the proper non-rational desires required for 
virtue; Aristotle argues for the utility of phronêsis by pointing out phronêsis’ role in 
giving adequate direction to a person’s non-rational desires. This addition comes in 
Aristotle’s discussion of natural and full virtue. Here is the most important passage from 
that discussion: 
 
[A] We must, then, examine virtue over again. For virtue is similar [in this way] 
to phronêsis; as phronêsis is related to cleverness (deinotêta), not the same, but 
similar, so natural virtue (phusikê aretê) is related to full (kurian) virtue. [B] For 
each of us seems to possess his type of character to some extent by nature; for in 
fact we are just, brave, prone to temperance, or have another feature, immediately 
from birth. [C] But still we look for some further condition to be full goodness (to 
agathon kuriôs), and to partake of these features in another way. [D] For these 
natural states belong even to children and to beasts, but [E] without understanding 
(nou) they are evidently harmful (blaberai). [F] Still, this much would seem to be 
clear:  just as a strong body moving around without sight suffers a heavy fall 
because it has no sight, so it is with [virtue]. [G] But if someone acquires 
understanding (noun), he improves in his actions, and [H] the state he now has, 
though still similar [to the natural one], will be fully virtue. [I] And so, just as 
there are two sorts of conditions, cleverness (deinotês) and phronêsis, in the part 
of the soul that has belief, so also there are two in the part that has character, 
natural virtue and full virtue (kuriôs aretê). [J] And of these, full virtue does not 
come about without phronêsis (6.13 1144b1-17).  
 
In this passage, we see Aristotle again contrasting genuine virtue with a non-rational 
conception of virtue, and emphasizing the important role that phronêsis plays in the 
former. This non-rational conception of virtue is “natural virtue”; it appears to be a state 
of the non-rational part whereby the non-rational desires are focused on the proper 
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actions and ends, and as such it is a condition available to animals and small children 
([B]).  An animal whose natural state of non-rational desires disposes him to engage in 
dangerous behavior has “natural bravery” in the sense that its non-rational desires dispose 
him to do behaviors that are typically associated with bravery, behaviors like facing 
dangerous predators. Similarly, a child whose natural state of non-rational desires dispose 
the child to give to friends has “natural generosity” in the sense that his non-rational 
desires are focused on behaviors typically associated with generosity.   
Now, natural virtue is not genuine virtue, Aristotle says, though they bear 
important similarities; [A] “natural virtue (phusikê aretê) is related to full (kurian) virtue” 
insofar as they are “not the same but similar.”  Presumably they are similar to the extent 
that they both involve having one’s non-rational desires focused on the proper objects 
and actions. We have also seen how they are dissimilar: genuine virtue, insofar as it 
involves excellent prohairesis, involves having a rationally-derived ends that issue in that 
prohairesis. Given that animals and children lack reason altogether, they are incapable of 
having the rationally-derived conception of the good that is a pre-requisite for having any 
prohairesis at all (let alone a virtuous one).  To the extent that animals lack reason and 
hence phronêsis, they cannot have the virtuous prohairesis characteristic of virtue.  
But here in 6.13 Aristotle makes a further point about how phronêsis contributes 
to virtue. Up until now, he has focused on phronêsis’ role in producing the rationally-
derived conception of the good that is a necessary material for forming a prohairesis; 
here, he draws attention away from this role of phronêsis and instead focuses on 
phronêsis’ role in supplying the agent’s non-rational desires with the right direction. 
Aristotle here expresses skepticism at the possibility of one acquiring the proper state of 
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non-rational desires without possessing phronêsis; he says that “natural” virtue (and 
presumably “habituated” virtue as well), is like a heavy body that suffers a heavy fall as a 
result of not having sight ([F]), suggesting that non-rational desire, when not 
supplemented by reason, is unlikely to achieve a state whereby it perfectly aligns itself 
with the right actions and ends.  Without phronêsis, one’s non-rational desires from time 
to time will inevitably attach to the wrong objects or ends, so that a person will 
“improve” in her actions, only if these non-rational desires are supplemented by 
understanding (noun) [G].  So here, Aristotle suggests that “natural virtue” is in reality 
quite limited in ensuring correct action; phronêsis is necessary to ensure that non-rational 
desires are properly directed.  
What exactly does Aristotle have in mind here? He seems to be pointing out that 
non-rational desires are most likely to focus consistently on the right actions if they are 
directed by a correct prohairesis, that is, a prohairesis that is issued by the agent’s 
phronêsis-informed reasoning. That is, he seems to think that one will have the proper 
appetites and spirited desires only if one has the proper phronêsis-issued prohaireseis 
from which to take their cue.   This is a reasonable view to take, given that Aristotle 
thinks that hitting upon the mean definitive of a virtuous response is a rather nuanced and 
hence difficult aim, one requiring taking into account various weights and measures of 
the different human goods at stake.147   
Thus, in 6.13, Aristotle offers a second reason while phronêsis is necessary for 
                                                
147 “Virtue, then, is a mean, insofar as it hits upon what is intermediate. Moreover, there are many ways to 
go astray, since badness is proper to what is unlimited as the Pythagoreans said, and good to what is 
limited; but there is only one way to b e correct. That is why error  is easy and correctness hard, (since 
missing the target is easy and hitting it is hard. And so for this reason also excess and deficiency are proper 
to vice, the mean to virtue; ‘for we are noble in only one way, but bad in all sorts of ways’ (2.6 1106b27-
33). 
 166 
virtue: in addition to being necessary for a person to have a virtuous prohairesis, 
phronêsis is necessary for a person to consistently have the proper non-rational desires. 
Without phronêsis, one will not simply lack a virtuous prohairesis; one will also lack 
non-rational desires that are consistently focused on the proper objects and actions, since 
non-rational desire, when not supplemented by phronêsis-issued prohaireseis, is like a 
blind moving body. Non-rational desires will consistently be focused on the intermediate 
action only if those non-rational desires are responses to prohaireseis issued by 
phronêsis-informed reasoning.  
If what I have said so far is correct, then we can summarize 6.12’s and 6.13’s 
response to the objection as follows. Aristotle’s primary strategy in answering the 
objection is to clarify his conception of genuine virtue in a way that allows him to show 
that, contrary to the claims of the objector, the virtuous person must possess phronêsis; 
the virtuous person cannot rely on the phronêsis of someone else.   And he does this by 
making clear that in genuine virtue, phronêsis has a critical moral role to play, a role that 
the objector’s (false) conception of virtue neglects. This role is none other than that of 
supplying the agent with a conception of the good, a conception of the good that is 
ultimately responsible both for supplying the agent’s virtuous decisions and for giving an 
agent’s non-rational desires proper direction; in Aristotle’s words, phronêsis “makes 
right” the things leading to the end or decision (ta pros to telos), where by this he means 
that phronêsis ensures the correctness of the reasonings needed to lead to a correct grasp 
of the end. In this way, he rejects the objector’s conception of virtue according to which 
the virtuous agent’s conception of the good has its origins not in reasoning but rather in 
pre-rational habituation of one’s non-rational part. 
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§ Implications of this Interpretation of 6.12 and 6.13 
 
I have offered an interpretation of 6.12 and 6.13 according to which 6.12 and 6.13 correct 
the early books’ non-rational portrait of virtue. In particular, I have argued that Aristotle 
corrects this picture primarily by emphasizing the role that phronêsis plays in supplying 
the virtuous person’s conception of the good; this conception of the good supplies the 
wishes that underlie the virtuous person’s decisions and gives proper direction to her non-
rational desires.  
 If I am right that Aristotle in 6.12 and 6.13 emphasizes this role for phronêsis, 
then we can understand Aristotle in 6.12 and 6.13 as building upon the earlier books’ 
non-rational portrait of virtue in order to show a substantially expanded picture of virtue 
of character. Having focused on virtue’s non-rational aspects in the early books, Aristotle 
waits until book 6 to present virtue’s rational aspects, operating in this selective manner 
in order to convey the important roles that both non-rational desire and reason play in 
virtue. The result is that in the early books Aristotle focuses almost exclusively on 
virtue’s non-rational parts, presenting a portrait of virtue that is significantly incomplete. 
For in genuine virtue, we learn in 6.12 and 6.13, it is reason and not non-rational desire 
that has the leading role of supplying an agent with her conception of the good. 
Interpreting Aristotle’s mode of presentation and 6.12 and 6.13 along these lines, we 
can show that the evidence outlined in (1)-(3) needn’t be read along anti-intellectualist 
lines presented in section I; rather, we can interpret such evidence in a way that is 
friendly to a robust conception of wish.  
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 I am not arguing that the evidence outlined in (1)-(3) cannot be read in a way to 
support anti-intellectualism; in fact, I do think that there are anti-intellectualist readings 
of the evidence in (1)-(3) that are internally consistent and compatible with the EN. My 
aim instead has been to show that the textual evidence outlined in (1)-(3) does not on its 
own refute the account of virtue of character I argued for in chapter 5, and I have done 
this by trying to show that there is an interpretation of Aristotle’s mode of presentation 
and of 6.12 and 6.13 that helps explain away (1)-(3) in a manner friendly to my robust 
interpretation of Aristotelian wish and decision.  
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CHAPTER 7 
 
SLAVES’, WOMEN’S, AND CHILDREN’S RATIONAL CAPACITIES 
 
 
 
I. Introduction 
 
 
Let us take stock. In chapters 2-4 I argued that the human alogon can prompt an agent to 
pursue the fine as such. My argument rested on an interpretation of what it is for the 
reason-responsive part of the soul (the alogon) to obey (peitharchei, peitharchikon), 
listen to (euêkoôteron, katêkoon) or harmonize with (homophônei) reason. On the view I 
put forward, one of the features that make an alogon obedient to reason is its grasping, 
and being motivated by, the fine (kalon) as such. In chapters 5-6 I argued that decisions 
necessarily rest on reflective reasoning about the human good.  
In this chapter I look at the deliberative and non-rational desiderative capacities of 
slaves, women, and children.  The goal is to compare these capacities with the capacities 
that (according to the previous chapters) go into non-rational and prohairetic motivation 
for fine activity.  As we shall see, while slaves, women, and children can all have 
appetites and spirited desires that obey reason and thus can act out of a non-rational 
concern for the fine as such, only women can have prohairetic motivation for fine 
activity.  
 
 
II. Natural Slaves 
 
II.1 Natural Slaves’ Deliberative Capacities   
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Aristotle says at Pol. 1.13 1254b20-5 that slaves lack a bouleutikon:  
Although the parts of the soul are present in all [i.e., slaves, women, and children] 
(kai pasin enhuparchei men ta moria tês psuchês), they are present in different 
ways. For the slave lacks the deliberative faculty (bouleutikon) entirely (holôs). 
The woman has it, but it is without authority (akuron). A child (pais) has it, but it 
is incomplete (ateles). (Pol. 1.13 1260a10-14) 
 
We saw in chapter 5 that Aristotle denies slaves the capacity to deliberate about ends in 
themselves.  While they can deliberate about how to achieve a given object of desire, 
they cannot step back from their desires and rationally determine whether they are worth 
having. If I am right about this, then it’s plausible that when Aristotle says that slaves 
lack a bouleutikon, he is saying that they lack the capacity to deliberate about the make- 
up of the human good; they lack the capacity to deliberate about ends in themselves.   
If slaves cannot deliberate about the human good, then they cannot form wishes 
and so cannot make decisions. Any motivational attitudes they have will be non-
rational—based in appetite or spirited desire.  And indeed, in chapter 5 we saw that 
Aristotle accepts this conclusion.  Because slaves lack wishes, Aristotle says that they fail 
to “partake of living according to decision” (Pol. 3.9 1280a34).  
While slaves cannot deliberate about the constituents of the human good, they are 
capable of means-end reasoning.  This will be important to their ability to focus their 
non-rational desires onto concrete actions in particular circumstances.  
 
II.2 Non-Rational Desiderative Capacities of Slaves 
 
Pol. 1.5 1254b22-5 attributes a reason-responsive alogon to slaves, and (if my 
interpretation of reason-responsiveness is correct) this means that they can have non-
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rational desires that both (1) respond to empirical information from reason concerning 
salient features of the agent’s situation and (2) attach to fine actions qua fine. Indeed, 
Aristotle makes several claims that confirm that slaves can represent objects as fine and 
be motivated by considerations of fineness: Aristotle implies that slaves, being humans, 
have the capacity to make judgments about the good (and presumably the fine), and he 
explicitly says that the non-Greek Triballoi and Scythians—natural slaves in Aristotle’s 
view—represent objects as fine.148 
 If natural slaves’ desires obey reason, and if natural slaves lack reason (Pol. 1.5 
1254b22-5), then they need an external source of reason to guide them to reason-
recommended actions.  How can slaves rely on an external form of reason to direct their 
non-rational desires? Moral paideia, training of the alogon, allows slaves to learn moral 
principles and rules of good conduct like “justice requires that I keep my promises” or 
“bravery requires that I not leave the battle line.” Such moral principles would make up a 
slave’s conception of the good, and the slave could apply these principles to her 
particular situation to identify appropriate action.   In cases where technical means-end 
instrumental deliberation is needed, a slave could perform the necessary calculation 
himself.   
 
III. Children  
 
III.1 Children’s Deliberative Capacities  
                                                
148 If this passage conflicted with what Aristotle says about natural slaves or the fine elsewhere, we would 
have reason to doubt that Aristotle really attributes the concept ‘fine’ to slaves.  However, absent any 
passages that conflict with the attribution of the concept ‘fine’ to slaves, we should assume that Aristotle is 
speaking with theoretical rigor in this passage.  
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Children have a bouleutikon, but it is ‘immature or ‘undeveloped’ (ateles: 1260a14). We 
saw that it’s plausible to interpret Aristotle’s claim that slaves lack a bouleutikon as a 
claim that slaves lack the capacity to deliberate about the make up of the human good.  It 
is reasonable, then, that when Aristotle goes on to describe a child’s bouleutikon as 
ateles, he is saying that the child’s capacity to deliberate about the human good is ateles. 
What would such a claim mean?  
One idea is that Aristotle is pointing out that the bouleutikon is only potentially 
present in a child: while the child cannot deliberate about ends at all, she will develop a 
working bouleutikon when she enters adulthood and at that time will acquire the ability to 
reason about ends. Thus, on this reading of ateles, children’s and slaves’ actual 
deliberative capacities are very close:  both children and slaves wholly lack a working 
bouleutikon, and so cannot engage in any deliberation about ends. 
Scott argues against the “potentiality” interpretation on the grounds that it cannot 
explain a seeming asymmetry Aristotle draws between slaves and children at Pol. 1.13 
1260b5-7. That passage says the following:  
Wherefore they are mistaken who are in favor of withholding reason from slaves 
and say that we should employ command only, for one should admonish slaves 
more than children. (Pol. 1.13 1260b5-7) 
 
This passage is ambiguous about the relative rationality of children and slaves. This is 
because it is not clear if slaves need admonishment more than children because (i) slaves 
are capable of rationally and usefully receiving more of it (i.e. are more rational than 
children) or because (ii) slaves are incapable of doing any of their own deliberation (i.e. 
are less rational) and therefore need more, (i.e. forcefully and relentlessly). In any case, 
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Aristotle does here attribute an asymmetry between slaves and children, and so Scott 
concludes that Aristotle must not take both slaves’ and children’s virtue to consist in an 
alogon obedient to an external source of reason.  
But I think that this is not necessitated by the asymmetry of 12605-7. Aristotle’s 
point may simply be the following: precisely because slaves do not have a deliberative 
faculty even potentially, their potential for virtue is entirely dependent on their masters. 
By contrast, children, while dependent on their masters during their childhood, will over 
time develop their own rational capacities, and this means that they will (in time) have a 
deliberative faculty which can help direct their alogon. To the extent that slaves have no 
hope of developing their own deliberative capacities, it follows that more rides on their 
receiving direction from their masters than rides on children receiving direction from 
their fathers. Children may be able to correct for a lack of direction from an external 
capacity when they start to develop their own capacities, but there is no such hope for a 
slave. Hence why Aristotle suggests that it is more important for slaves to receive 
admonishment than children.   
An alternative interpretation is that a child has a partially-functioning 
bouleutikon. On this interpretation, the child can do a limited amount of reasoning about 
ends-- perhaps there are some desires which a child can step back from and subject to 
rational scrutiny—but she cannot do this with all her desires.  So, unlike slaves, children 
can do some deliberation about ends.  
One weakness of this “partially-functioning” interpretation is that it ignores the 
passages where Aristotle compares slaves with children,149 comparisons that may suggest 
                                                
149 For example, like slaves, children do not act on decision; they act only on non-rational desire (1111b8-9, 
EE 1224a24-30).  Moreover, both slaves and children are considered “parts” of their master (children: EN 
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that he takes them to suffer similar deliberative deficiencies.  For this reason, we ought to 
favor the interpretation that interprets ateles as “potential.”  
  If I am right, then when Aristotle says that children’s bouleutikon is ateles, he is 
saying that they have the mere potential to deliberate about the make up of the human 
good.  Before they activate this potential in adulthood, they cannot deliberate about the 
human good. Given that wish, and hence decision requires deliberation about ends, 
children will not have prohairetic motivation for virtuous activity. Any motivation they 
have will be based in non-rational desire.  
 
III.2  Children’s Non-Rational Capacities 
 
Aristotle seems to attribute to children a condition of the alogon that is identical to, or at 
the very least, close to, reason-responsiveness. This is the implication of the following 
passage where he compares a reason-responsive alogon to a child who is obedient to a 
parent:  
That the non-rational part of the soul also is persuaded (peithetai) in some way by 
reason is shown by correction (nouthetêsis), and by every sort of reproof 
(epitimêsis) and exhortation (paraklêsis)” (EN 1.13 1102b34-1103a1, italics 
mine). 150   
 
Aristotle cites a child’s obedient response to parental admonition as evidence that the 
alogon listens to reason, and, as Broadie has pointed out, the fact that he does this 
                                                
5.6 1134b11, MM 1194b11-17; slave: EN 1.4 1254a8-11). The both have virtues “relative” to their masters: 
“Since the child is undeveloped, it is clear that his virtue is not his own in relation to himself, but in relation 
to his goal and his guide; likewise, the virtue of a slave is in relation to his mater (Pol. 1.13 126-a31-3).  
Also, Aristotle describes slaves and animals as lacking reason (echein logon), and he describes children 
(and animals) as alogon (EN 1111b8-9). 
150 cf. 3.12 1119b14-16.  
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suggests that he takes a child’s obedient response to parental admonition to be continuous 
with, indeed perhaps identical to, the response made by an alogon to an internal source of 
reason. In Broadie’s words:  
Aristotle points to the actual exercise of authority in family or community as 
providing further evidence that there exists a part of the soul capable of listening 
to reason: ‘That the non-rational element is in some sense persuaded by reason is 
indicated also by the giving of advice and by all reproof and exhortation’ 
(1102b33-1103a1). The reference to every sort of reproof etc. cancels any suggest 
that he has in mind only self-admonition, self-reproach and the rest. He is squarely 
considering paradigm cases where the parties are distinct individuals.151 
 
If Broadie is right, then what a child does when it obeys his or her parents is continuous 
with the responsiveness to reason displayed by an internal source of reason.  And if this is 
right, then a child’s alogon is reason-responsive in the same general way the alogon of 
the virtuous person is responsive to that person’s own reason.  
Thus, children with reason-responsive aloga will have non-rational desires that, in 
addition to being directed at the right objects, encapsulate cognitions about the 
choiceworthiness of those objects qua fine. As we saw in chapter 3, Aristotle’s comments 
about young people strongly suggest that young people can have non-rational desires that 
encapsulate such evaluative cognitions about the choiceworthiness of fine action and fine 
action as such.  
Just as in the slave case, a child will rely on an external source of reason. That is, 
the child will be habituated under a phronimos ruler or system of laws so as to acquire a 
conception of the good that includes the virtues and is spelled out in terms of moral 
principles. The child can then apply these principles to individual situations.  
 
                                                
151 Broadie, 63.  
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IV.  Women 
 
IV.1 Women’s Deliberative Capacities 
 
Pol. 1.13 says that a woman’s bouleutikon is “inauthoritative” (akuron). What does 
akuron mean here? According to Scott and Deslauriers,152 a woman’s deliberative faculty 
is akuron in the sense of lacking intellectual authority. On his interpretation, women can 
deliberate about the sphere of the household but not about the sphere of the city. This 
restriction amounts to a deliberative inferiority because the sphere of political science 
includes that of household management and specifies the ends of the other practical 
sciences like household management. Because women lack the capacity for political 
science, they must adopt their ends from their husbands. In Scott’s words:  
The man of political expertise sets the goals for those subordinate to him, often 
adjusting or even overruling their judgements. So a woman’s deliberative faculty 
‘lacks authority’ in the sense that she has to defer to those who have expertise 
about the goal for the sake of which the household exists. If this is correct, a 
virtuous woman has a functioning rational part that can issue commands for her 
alogon to obey, and she does not have to borrow her husband’s phronêsis directly 
to control her alogon. Yet a woman’s deliberations lack the deeper and synoptic 
understanding that would come from political phronêsis, and so she does depend 
on her husband to guide those deliberations.153 
 
Having adopted these ends, women can then use their own deliberative capacities to 
identify appropriate particular actions to do. 154 Whether women thereby act on decision 
depends on whether they adopt the ends of their husbands rationally-- that is, whether 
                                                
152 Deslauriers, Marguerite. “Aristotle on the Virtues of Slaves and Women.” Oxford Studies in Ancient 
Philosophy 25 (2003), 229. 
153 Scott., 15. 
154 Women are in charge of preserving the household goods (Pol 3.4 1277b24-5), and if they are to be able 
to do this with any competence, they must have basic instrumental deliberation skills. So they will have 
certain instrumental deliberation, along with (if Scott is right) the capacity to engage in mid level 
deliberation that takes for granted the ends women receive from their husbands. 
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they adopt their husbands’ ends out of a rational conviction that men are intellectually 
superior. If their adoption of ends is based on such a conviction, then it seems that 
women do make decisions. After all, people often make choices to defer to the option of 
experts, and these choices can be rational.155  
  Unfortunately, Aristotle tells us very little about women’s deliberative capacities, 
and thus it is difficult to know whether Scott’s interpretation of akuron is right. As we 
shall see, there is an alternative interpretation of Aristotle’s claim that women’s 
bouleutikon is akruon, an alternative that says the claim is about women’s non-rational 
desiderative faculties in particular. We thus should move on to women’s desiderative 
faculties. 
 
IV.2 Women’s Non-Rational Desiderative Capacities 
 
According to Fortenbaugh156 and Sherman,157 when Aristotle says that a woman’s 
deliberative faculty is “akuron,” he means that it lacks authority over her alogon—that is, 
he means that women’s desires are unruly and naturally disposed to overrule her 
deliberative faculty’s decisions. On this reading, women are naturally disposed to 
weakness of will (akrasia). Aristotle, following popular opinion in antiquity, regards 
women as unable to subordinate their physical appetites and desires to rational control.158  
                                                
155 If, however, women adopt these ends on non-rational grounds—if, for example, their adopting their 
husbands’ ends is not based on the rational conviction that their husbands are rationally superior—then 
women’s actions will not be the result of decision. Their virtue will be restricted to non-rational motivation. 
156 Fortenbaugh, 60.  
157 Nancy Sherman. The Fabric of Character. Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1989, 154. 
158 References to women’s alleged difficulties at controlling their emotions are widespread in Greek 
literature. “Are you going to say that ‘Foolishness is not to be found in men, but that it is inborn in 
women’? I know young men who are no better than women in defending themselves against the assaults of 
Aphrodite on the heart of youth. But they are male, and that helps them. Euripides, Hippolytos: 966-70); “A 
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 Such a reading coheres with other uses of “akuron” in the ethical works. One 
passage in particular (cited by Fortenbaugh) is EN 7.9 1151b15:   
The stubborn include the opinionated, the ignorant, and the boorish. The 
opinionated are as they are because of pleasure and pain. For they find enjoyment 
in winning [the argument] if they are not persuaded to change their views, and 
they feel pain if their opinions are voided (akura), like decrees [in the Assembly]. 
Hence they are more like incontinent than like continent people. (EN 7.9 
1151b13-17)   
 
In this passage, Aristotle is concerned with distinguishing stubborn people from 
incontinent people. He thinks that stubborn people’s and continent people’s similar 
behaviors have led people to falsely think that the two types of people are the same. 
Given that Aristotle wants to maintain a behavioral similarity between continent and 
stubborn people, then when he compares stubborn people to continent people on the 
grounds that stubborn people don’t want their opinions to be voided or rendered 
inauthoritative (akura 1151b15), the point of comparison is presumably that continent 
people’s opinions are also not voided.   Since the continent person acts on her decision 
against her appetite, presumably her opinions are authoritative in the sense of not being 
overruled by appetites. Thus, Aristotle sometimes uses kuron and akuron to describe the 
condition of a continent’s and incontinent’s alogon. 
If we are right to interpret akuron as “inauthoriative,” so that Aristotle is here 
attributing to women a natural disposition to be weak-willed, it would not follow that 
they cannot have reason-responsive aloga.  They might be able to overcome this 
disposition through extra training or habituation. Such habituation could not permanently 
                                                
youth does not share in the pleasure of intercourse with a man as a woman does, but looks on sober as a 
spectator of Aphrodite. Consequently it does not excite any surprise if contempt for the lover is engendered 
in him.” (Xenophon, Symposion: 8.21-2); “Now if they’d been summoned to some shrine of Bacchos, Pan, 
Kolias, Genetyllis, there’d have been no room to move, so thick the crowd of timbrels. But now—not a 
woman to be seen.” (Aristophanes, Lysistrata: 1-4) 
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or completely remove her alogon’s tendency to have overpowering emotions (otherwise 
Aristotle could not justify permanent rule by men), but sustained habituation and 
occasional interference by male rulers could control woman’s emotional unruliness so 
that in most cases there is no disconnect between her alogon and her deliberative faculty.  
In fact, we have reason to interpret women’s desiderative capacities in a way that 
makes their alogon reason-responsive (albeit with modifications like the one’s suggested 
above). For Aristotle criticizes the Spartans for making slaves and women equal,159 and 
his criticism is presumably based on the conviction that women are   rationally superior 
to slaves. If Aristotle thinks that women are rationally superior to slaves, then it’s likely 
that he extends any rational capabilities that a slave has to a woman. Since slaves have 
reason-responsive aloga, it is reasonable to assume that women have reason-responsive 
aloga. 
If then, a woman can have a reason-responsive alogon in this qualified way, her 
non-rational desires can attach to reason-recommended actions qua fine.  Since on the 
incontinence reading of akuron, nothing is wrong per se with the ratiocinative quality of 
a woman’s bouleutikon, a woman whose alogon is brought under control by an external 
source of reason should eventually be able to use her own deliberative part to deliberate 
about ends. If this is right, then a woman should be able to have the wishes that are a pre-
requisite for a virtuous decision. Thus, her virtue will include prohairetic motivation.  
                                                
159 “Now nature has distinguished between the female and the slave. For she is not niggardly, like the smith 
who fashions the Delphian knife for many uses; she makes each thing for a single use, and every instrument 
is best made when intended for one and not for many uses. But among barbarians no distinction is made 
between women and slaves, because there is no natural ruler among them: they are a community of slaves, 
male and female. Wherefore the poets say, ‘’Tis meet that Hellenes should rule over barbarians;’ as if they 
thought that the barbarian and the slave were by nature one” (Pol. 1.2 1252b1-9).  
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We see, then, that there are two different interpretations of Aristotle’s statement 
about a woman’s bouleutikon, and that these interpretations have different implications 
for how we interpret women’s virtue. On Scott’s reading, women lack the capacity to 
engage in the highest level of deliberation, but they can nevertheless acquire the wishes 
that are a pre-requisite for decision if they adopt, on rational grounds, their virtuous 
husbands’ ends. Since on Scott’s interpretation nothing is wrong per se with women’s 
non-rational part, they can have reason-responsive non-rational desires that support their 
decisions.  
On Fortenbaugh’s and Sherman’s reading, there is nothing defective about a 
woman’s deliberative faculty—in principle she’s capable of the highest forms of practical 
reasoning—but rather something wrong with her alogon.   For her alogon to continually 
be reason-responsive, she requires extra training by phronimos lawmaker.  Once she has 
acquired this extra training, then we can assume that in addition to deciding on virtuous 
activity, she has well-ordered non-rational desires that prompt her to pursue fine action 
qua fine. 
Aristotle does not tell us enough about women for us to decide between these two 
interpretations of akuron. It’s possible that the claim describes women as natural 
incontinents, and it is possible that it describes women as lacking the most architectonic 
forms of reasoning.  Either way, however, we have reason to think that women can have 
reason-responsive aloga and make virtuous decisions.  
  
V. Skepticism about Guidance from Moral Principles 
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I have assumed that slaves and children can focus their desires on the proper actions 
because they have been habituated under an external source of reason that provides them 
with moral principles.  
    However, some commentators insist that Aristotle is skeptical about the 
possibility of moral principles or rules of conduct.  Broadie, for example, says the 
following:  
 [No]t even the wises moralist can firmly lay down general rules for good or right 
action, since only the agent in each case can know then and there what is best. 
There is no recipe for ‘functioning well.’ It is functioning in accordance with the 
right reason or the orthos logos, but no one can say in advance what the orthos 
logos for a particular situation might be.160 
 
Broadie denies that practical deliberation primarily involves the application of rules of 
conduct to particular cases, where these rules are based on an agent’s conception of the 
good (whether rationally or non-rationally derived).  This is because no such principles 
are possible: there are an infinite number of combinations of values and considerations 
possible for particular situations, and so it is impossible to formulate principles that can 
account for all these considerations: 
[N]ot even the wisest moralist can firmly lay down general rules for good or right 
action, since only the agent in each case can know then and there what is best.  
There is no recipe for ‘functioning well’.  It is functioning in accordance with 
right reason or the orthos logos, but no one can say in advance what the orthos 
logos for a particular situation might be.161 
  
Without moral principles, one can identify correct action only by relying on the 
quasi-perceptual ability to read ethical situations that comes with phronêsis (Broadie’s 
‘practical intelligence’):  
                                                
160 Broadie, 60. 
161 Broadie, 60.  
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I would say that having such principles is a surrogate for Aristotelian practical 
intelligence. If we could understand clearly the role he assigns to intelligence, we 
should no longer feel it a lack that practical principles do not appear in his 
account of the formation of rational choice.162  
 
Scanning a given situation, the phronimos deliberator is able to examine the particulars 
that characterize that particular ethical context and “see” the situation aright.  Thus, the 
agent’s decisions are not to be explained in terms of a deliberative process that has 
yielded moral principles but rather in terms of a deliberative process that is a type of 
perception whereby the agent “sees” what to do, where this choice is not explicable in 
terms of a discursive justification.163  
Desires must be focused on particular actions if they are to lead to action, and 
such focusing requires moral principles, Broadie’s “reading ability,” or both. Whereas 
moral principles can be transferred from one party to another, a perceptual ability cannot. 
The bigger the role for a reading ability in identifying correct action, the less likely a non-
phronimos will be able to identify correct action. That is, if Broadie’s view is correct, 
then, while deliberatively imperfect agents can identify correct action in non-complex 
moral occasions, they will not be able to identify correct action in morally complicated 
situations: in situations when there are multiple goods at stake, the rough-and-ready 
values inculcated through habituation will be insufficient to focus an agent’s desire on 
precisely the action to be done in that situation.    
                                                
162 Broadie, 248-9. 
163 According to Broadie, an ethical agent’s deliberation begins when some specific and ordinary end enters 
that agent’s current situation. These ends are ordinary and specific in that they are not ultimate ends nor 
ends that are desirable only to the virtuous; they are, rather, things “which we desire immediately, as soon 
as it occurs to us that they might be possible, because nature or upbringing disposes us to seek them—
things such as “gaining a college degree, making a fortune, establishing useful contacts, moving to a place 
with good opportunities, getting one’s affairs into good order, successfully defending one’s reputation 
against libelous attack, winning a war”(234). When an agent encounters one of these ends—call it O—she 
typically forms a wish for O.  According to Broadie, the task for deliberation is to determine whether, and 
if so, how, she can achieve O in a way that does justice to “all else that matters” (363). 
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In my view, Broadie’s skepticism about moral principles rests on an over-
interpretation of Aristotle’s warnings about the inexactness of ethics. When we look at 
the passage where Aristotle stresses the inexactness of ethics we do not see extreme 
resistance to moral principles:  
But let us take it as agreed in advance that every account of the actions we must 
do has to be stated in outline, not exactly.  As we also said at the beginning, the 
type of accounts we demand should accord with the subject matter; and questions 
about actions and expediency, like questions about health, have no fixed answers. 
While this is the character of our general account, the account of particular cases 
is still more inexact.  For these fall under no craft or profession; the agents 
themselves must consider in each case what the opportune action is, as doctors 
and navigators do.  The account we offer, then, in our present inquiry is of this 
inexact sort; still, we must try to offer help.” (1103b34-1104a11, Irwin 
translation). 
 
The lack of “fixed answers” need only imply that moral principles must be general in 
scope. This makes sense of comparison between ethics and fields like medicine and 
navigation. In medicine and navigation, rules must be general:  they cannot apply to 
every situation, and so in particular cases experience and perception are necessary to 
make sure that the principle should be applied. 164 165  
                                                
164 “Aristotle does not say that all ethical truths (e.g., ‘Bravery is fine than cowardice’) are only usual. He 
means that those giving relatively specific practical advice (e.g., ‘Stand firm in the battle-line’ or ‘Keep 
promises’) are only usually true. He does not try to add the exceptions to make a more complex rule with 
no exceptions (e.g., ‘Keep your promises except in conditions A, B, C’). He might argue that such rules 
will be so complex as to be unlearnable and useless; he prefers the agent to use deliberation, perception, 
and understanding to see what different moral principles apply to a situation, and how they affect 
eachother. This is what the prudent person can see because of experience and familiarity with particular 
cases” (Irwin [2], 352). Irwin grants that to apply these rules, it is sometimes necessary to have some sort of 
further moral perception: “Aristotle certainly commits himself to saying that general rules cannot always be 
expected to decide particular cases, and that it is a mistake to attempt to formulate them so precisely that 
we can apply them to particular cases with nothing more than the aid of ordinary (nonmoral) perceptual 
information. That does not show, however, that we cannot firmly lay down general rules that will hold in 
most cases; it does not even show that we cannot lay down exceptionless rules, as long as they are 
imprecise enough” (Irwin [4], 326).  
165 Aristotle on the importance of perception in particular cases: “Still, we are not blamed if we deviate a 
little in excess or deficiency from doing well, but only if we deviate a long way, since then we are easily 
noticed.  But how great and how serious a deviation receives blame is not easy to define in an account; for 
nothing else perceptible is easily defined either.   Such things are among particulars, and the judgment 
depends on perception” (1109a30-b23, translation Irwin). 
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  If Aristotle recognizes general moral principles, the law or guardians can transfer 
such principles to deliberatively deficient individuals, and such individuals can rely on 
these principle in action. Of course, because these principles do not apply in every case, 
reliance on these principles inevitably brings about occasional mistakes. Those without 
moral perception who follow principles will occasionally act incorrectly, and for this 
reason deliberatively deficient individuals suffer a genuine practical handicap. 
Nevertheless, even with this handicap individuals who rely on moral principles can, in a 
good number of cases, be counted on to identify correct action. 
 
VI. The Virtues of Slaves, Women, and Children: Conclusions   
   
VI.1 Slaves and Children 
 
I argued that Aristotle thinks that slaves and children can have aloga that are reason-
responsive in this way.  It follows that slave and children, to the extent that they can have 
the reason-responsive aspect of paradigmatic virtue, can have an approximation of 
paradigmatic virtue, an approximation that includes the non-rational motivation to do fine 
action as such. This non-rational desiderative state is the result of habituation under an 
external source of phronêsis. 
 I then turned to the prohairetic aspect of slaves’ and children’s virtues. 
According to the account of decision I defended in chapter 5, decision rests on 
deliberation about the good, and so any agents who lack this capacity cannot have 
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decision. Slaves and children lack this capacity, and so do not make any decisions; their 
virtue is thus limited to the non-rational desiderative aspect of paradigmatic virtue.  
 
VI.2 Women 
 
Women can have the reason-responsive aspect of paradigmatic virtue, and so can have an 
approximation of paradigmatic virtue, an approximation that includes non-rational 
motivation to do fine action qua fine. Women’s virtue also includes a prohairetic 
element.  
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